Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines.The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the rights to the name, image, and trademarks associated with the late artist Frida Kahlo. Two Panamanian corporations with principal places of business in Florida, Frida Kahlo Corporation and Frida Kahlo Investments, manage and license numerous Frida Kahlo trademarks. Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo, Frida Kahlo’s grandniece and a resident of Mexico, is an owner and former officer of Familia Kahlo S.A. de C.V., a Mexican company. The parties’ relationship became contentious, leading to litigation in several countries over the intellectual property rights. Plaintiffs alleged that, beginning in 2017 and specifically targeting Florida in 2021 and 2022, the defendants sent cease-and-desist letters to plaintiffs’ business partners in Florida, threatening legal action based on what plaintiffs contend were false claims to trademark ownership. Plaintiffs claimed these actions constituted tortious interference under Florida law and the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Florida’s long-arm statute was satisfied for Familia Kahlo, but the corporate shield doctrine protected Pinedo because she was not acting in her personal capacity. The court further concluded that the minimum contacts required by due process were not established for either defendant, as sending cease-and-desist letters alone was insufficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that the corporate shield doctrine did not apply to Pinedo because the cease-and-desist letters were sent on her behalf in her personal capacity. The court also held that due process permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over both defendants, as the “effects test” was satisfied and a tortious cease-and-desist letter can meet the minimum contacts requirement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Frida Kahlo Corporation v. Pinedo" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including a medical device company and its founder, developed and sold a cosmetic penile implant. In 2018, a urologist who later became one of the defendants attended a training session hosted by the plaintiffs, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was introduced to certain ideas for improving the implant as well as a list of required surgical instruments. Plaintiffs claimed that these ideas and the instrument list were trade secrets. Soon after, the defendants began developing a competing implant, filed patent applications based on allegedly misappropriated information, and advertised using plaintiffs’ trademark.The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case, which included claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract under the nondisclosure agreement, trademark counterfeiting, and incorrect inventorship of two patents. The jury found for the plaintiffs on all major claims, including that the asserted trade secrets were protectable and misappropriated, and that there had been a breach of contract. The court awarded substantial damages, including a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from using the trade secrets. The court also found for plaintiffs on their counterfeiting claim and invalidated the two patents for failure to name an alleged true inventor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted information qualified as trade secrets under California law, as the core concepts were either generally known or not subject to reasonable secrecy efforts. The court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secret and breach-of-contract claims, vacated the damages and injunction based on them, and reversed the invalidation of the patents. However, the court affirmed the verdict and damages for trademark counterfeiting. The result was an affirmance in part, reversal in part, and vacatur in part. View "INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL " on Justia Law

The dispute arose when two pharmaceutical companies, one holding patents on methods of using humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies to treat headaches, accused a competitor of infringing these patents through the marketing of a competing medication. The relevant technology involves antibodies that inhibit the CGRP protein, which is linked to headache by promoting blood vessel dilation. The patents in question claim methods of treating headaches by administering humanized versions of these antibodies. The patent specifications referenced prior art disclosing murine (mouse) antibodies of this type, described methods for their humanization, and included one specific humanized antibody used in the patent holder’s product.Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the competitor had willfully infringed the asserted patent claims and rejected arguments that the patents were invalid for lack of written description or enablement. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the competitor, ruling that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing both the written description and enablement requirements. The district court reasoned that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized antibodies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidity judgment. The appellate court held that, in the context of these method claims, the specification and background knowledge in the field were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the written description and enablement requirements were met. The court emphasized that the invention concerned the use of a well-known genus of antibodies for a specific purpose, and the specification indicated that all members of the genus would function as claimed. The holding reinstated the jury’s verdict, reversing the district court’s judgment of invalidity, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL GMBH v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY " on Justia Law

The dispute concerns patented methods and apparatuses for upgrading software in engine controllers by connecting an external device that can replace and restore software without losing the original version. The patent, with a priority date of March 30, 2001, was asserted by the patent owner against a competitor. The accused infringer responded by alleging that a non-party, Hypertech, had sold a device called the Power Programmer III (PP3) well before the patent’s critical date. The PP3 was alleged to have all features described in the asserted patent claims, based on contemporaneous sales records and analysis of its source code.The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), finding that the PP3 was on sale more than one year before the patent’s critical date and that it embodied every claim limitation of the asserted patent. In reaching this decision, the district court admitted deposition testimony from Hypertech’s CEO regarding sales records and the device’s code, holding that, at summary judgment, corporate representatives may testify beyond their personal knowledge. The court also found that the source code itself was not hearsay and, even if it were, could be admitted as a business record.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence at summary judgment. The court further clarified that the on-sale bar under pre-AIA § 102(b) does not require a sale to publicly disclose the inner workings of the device; it is sufficient that the sale of a device embodying the patented invention occurred before the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of all asserted patent claims. View "DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS v. POWERTEQ " on Justia Law

VLSI Technology LLC brought a lawsuit against Intel Corporation, alleging infringement of multiple patents, including U.S. Patent No. 8,566,836. The patent concerns methods and apparatuses for selecting processor cores in multicore systems to execute tasks based on performance parameters, such as processing speed. VLSI asserted several claims from the patent, including both method and apparatus claims, and introduced expert damages theories to support its case.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed several pretrial issues. It struck certain damages theories from VLSI’s expert Dr. Sullivan, concluding that VLSI had not adequately disclosed these theories in its damages contentions as required under local patent rules. The district court also granted Intel summary judgment of noninfringement on two grounds: first, that the alleged infringing acts occurred outside the United States (extraterritoriality), and second, by rejecting VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents (DOE) theory. The district court’s construction of claim terms, particularly importing an “upon identifying” limitation into an apparatus claim, was central to its resolution of the DOE issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement on extraterritoriality grounds, finding that a pretrial stipulation between the parties established a U.S. nexus for infringement, and that the district court erred in its analysis of the apparatus claims’ capability to perform the patented functions. The Federal Circuit also reversed the summary judgment for noninfringement under the DOE theory for certain apparatus claims, holding that the district court improperly construed the claims based on prosecution disclaimer. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Dr. Sullivan’s NPV and VPU damages theories, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC v. INTEL CORPORATION " on Justia Law

DISH Network L.L.C. held exclusive rights to broadcast certain Arabic-language television channels in the United States, secured through written agreements with foreign content producers. The defendants operated businesses that provided U.S. customers with unauthorized access to these channels through internet streaming devices and services, bypassing DISH’s authorization and payments. The defendants’ services relied on content delivery networks and encoders to capture, transcode, and transmit live broadcasts of the protected channels to their customers in the U.S.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment for DISH regarding its ownership of valid copyrights but found factual disputes about infringement, leading to a bench trial. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of DISH, finding that the defendants' use of both content delivery networks and encoders constituted direct copyright infringement. The court awarded DISH a permanent injunction, $600,000 in statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court rejected all arguments by the defendants, including challenges to DISH’s ownership, the validity and transfer of the copyrights, and several evidentiary rulings. The court specifically found that the audiovisual works at issue were “Collective Works” under UAE law, supporting MBC’s initial ownership, and that the transfer of rights to DISH was uncontested by the original owner. The Eleventh Circuit held that sufficient evidence showed the defendants directly infringed DISH’s exclusive rights by operating encoders, and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer" on Justia Law

Fuente Marketing Ltd., a family-owned company selling premium hand-rolled cigars, owns two registered standard character trademarks for the letter X in connection with cigars and related products. Vaporous Technologies, LLC, designs and manufactures oral vaporizers and sought to register a mark featuring an abstract stick figure composed of intersecting lines forming a stylized X and a shaded circle above it, for use with various smoking-related goods. Fuente opposed this trademark application, alleging a likelihood of confusion with its own X marks.The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), reviewed the opposition. The parties stipulated certain facts, including a description of Vaporous’s mark. The TTAB applied the In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. factors, finding that while the goods and trade channels overlapped and thus favored a likelihood of confusion, the dissimilarity of the marks weighed heavily against it. The Board found Fuente’s X marks conceptually strong but commercially weak and determined the relevant DuPont factors were either neutral or favored confusion, except for the critical mark similarity factor. Ultimately, the TTAB concluded that the marks were sufficiently distinct in commercial impression, appearance, and sound to avoid confusion and dismissed Fuente’s opposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, holding that the dissimilarity between the marks was sufficient, even in light of other factors, to negate any likelihood of confusion. The court concluded that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Fuente had not shown any harmful legal error. The decision of the TTAB was therefore affirmed. View "FUENTE MARKETING LTD. v. VAPOROUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC " on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a South Korean electronics manufacturer and a group of Delaware-based patent holding entities after the manufacturer paid $12.8 million to license certain patents in order to protect itself and its customers from infringement claims. Despite this agreement, the patent holders later sued two of the manufacturer’s major automotive customers in Texas, alleging infringement based on those customers’ use of the manufacturer’s telematics units. The customers settled with the patent holders and then sought indemnification from the manufacturer for their legal expenses and settlement payments, as contemplated by supply agreements between the manufacturer and its customers.The manufacturer initiated a breach of contract action in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging that the patent holders’ Texas lawsuits violated the license agreement, which was intended to provide “patent peace” for both the manufacturer and its customers. The parties disputed whether the telematics units at issue were covered by the license or excluded as “Foundry Products.” The Superior Court ruled on summary judgment that the telematics units were covered and not excluded. The jury found for the manufacturer, awarding over $17 million in damages. The court then capped damages at $12.8 million per the contract but, after trial, further reduced the award to $4.9 million based on a new argument by the patent holders about which entity had received the license fee. The court also denied prejudgment interest and costs.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the findings that the telematics units were covered by the license and that sufficient evidence supported the manufacturer’s damages and indemnification obligations. It reversed the post-trial reduction of damages to $4.9 million, finding that argument was raised too late and prejudiced the manufacturer, reinstating the $12.8 million cap. The court also reversed the denial of prejudgment interest and costs, remanding for their calculation and award. View "LG Electronics Inc. v. Invention Investment Fund I, L.P." on Justia Law

A non-profit organization that develops and sells technical standards for use in industry brought suit against a for-profit company that operates an online library of building codes. The for-profit company published on its website the full text of several copyrighted standards developed by the non-profit, which had been incorporated by reference into the International Building Code. This building code, in turn, was adopted as law by the City of Philadelphia and other jurisdictions. The for-profit company made these incorporated standards freely available, though it also sold premium subscriptions for enhanced features. The non-profit derived significant revenue from licensing and selling its standards, including those incorporated into law, and did not authorize the copying.The case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After limited discovery and a hearing, the District Court denied the non-profit’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the for-profit company was likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The District Court found that the company’s publication of the standards for the purpose of public access to the law was transformative, even though the use was commercial in part, and that the standards, as incorporated into law, were primarily factual in nature. The District Court also found that copying the entire standards was reasonable because the law incorporated those standards in full, and that the effect on the market for the standards was at best equivocal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit held that the for-profit company is likely to succeed on the merits of its fair use defense, as three of the four statutory fair use factors favored fair use and the fourth was equivocal. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "American Society for Testing & Materials v. UPCODES Inc" on Justia Law