Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

The case involves IOENGINE, LLC (IOENGINE) appealing a series of Final Written Decisions by the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that found certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,539,047, 9,059,969, and 9,774,703 unpatentable during inter partes review (IPR). The patents in question share a written description and title—“Apparatus, Method and System for a Tunneling Client Access Point.” They claim a “portable device” configured to communicate with a terminal, with the device and terminal having various program codes stored in memory to facilitate communications.The Board had previously determined that certain claims of the patents were unpatentable. IOENGINE appealed, arguing that the Board incorrectly construed the claim term “interactive user interface,” incorrectly applied the printed matter doctrine, and otherwise erred in its anticipation and obviousness analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in its application of the printed matter doctrine to certain claims, reversing the Board’s unpatentability determinations as to claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent. However, the court affirmed the Board’s unpatentability determinations as to all other claims. The court also found that IOENGINE forfeited its proposed claim construction by not presenting it to the Board during IPR. View "IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. " on Justia Law

This case involves Packet Intelligence LLC ("Packet") and NetScout Systems, Inc. and NetScout Systems Texas, LLC (collectively, "NetScout"). Packet had sued NetScout for patent infringement. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found that NetScout had willfully infringed Packet's patents and awarded Packet damages, enhanced damages for willful infringement, and an ongoing royalty. NetScout appealed this decision.In a previous appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had reversed the district court's award of pre-suit damages and vacated the court's enhancement of that award. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the district court. On remand, the district court denied NetScout's motion to dismiss or stay the case and entered an amended final judgment. The amended judgment reduced the enhanced damages and reset the ongoing royalty rate.Meanwhile, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("Board") found all of the patent claims asserted by Packet in this case unpatentable as obvious. Packet appealed the Board's final written decisions. The Federal Circuit coordinated those appeals so they would be considered by the same panel deciding this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s amended final judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. The court held that Packet’s infringement judgment was not final before the Board’s unpatentability determinations were affirmed. Therefore, the court was compelled to order that Packet’s patent infringement claims be dismissed as moot. View "PACKET INTELLIGENCE LLC v. NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. " on Justia Law

The case revolves around SnapRays, a Utah-based company that designs, markets, and sells electrical outlet covers with integrated guide lights, safety lights, motion sensor lights, and USB charging technology, and Lighting Defense Group (LDG), an Arizona-based company that owns a patent related to a cover for an electrical receptacle. LDG submitted an Amazon Patent Evaluation Express (APEX) Agreement alleging that certain SnapPower products sold on Amazon.com infringed its patent. SnapPower subsequently filed an action for declaratory judgment of noninfringement.The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed SnapPower's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over LDG. The court concluded that LDG lacked sufficient contacts with Utah for it to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. It found that LDG's allegations of infringement were directed toward Amazon in Washington, where the APEX Agreement was sent, and not at SnapPower in Utah. The court also noted that under Federal Circuit law, principles of fair play and substantial justice support a finding that LDG is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Utah.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that LDG purposefully directed extra-judicial patent enforcement activities at SnapPower in Utah, thereby satisfying the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction. The court found that LDG's submission of the APEX Agreement to Amazon, which identified SnapPower's listings as allegedly infringing, was an intentional action aimed at affecting SnapPower's sales and activities in Utah. The court also rejected LDG's argument that the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over it in Utah would be unfair and unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SNAPRAYS v. LIGHTING DEFENSE GROUP " on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two tribally owned businesses, AQuate II, LLC and Kituwah Services, LLC, both of which compete for federal contracts under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program. AQuate alleges that Kituwah and its employee, Jessica Myers, stole trade secrets related to a government contract that AQuate had won in the past. AQuate claims that Myers, a former employee, breached her employment agreements and violated both the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 and the Alabama Trade Secrets Act. Kituwah, however, argues that it is shielded by tribal sovereign immunity, while Myers contends that her employment contract mandates that any claims against her can only be brought in a designated tribal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the case, finding that Kituwah had not waived sovereign immunity for the trade secrets claims and that the claims against Myers should be resolved in the Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town court, as stipulated in her employment contract. AQuate appealed the decision, arguing that the tribal court did not exist.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that Kituwah had waived sovereign immunity for claims related to the federal contracting program and could be sued. Regarding Myers, the court determined that the district court failed to consider whether the clause naming the allegedly nonexistent tribal court as the appropriate forum was valid and enforceable. The case was remanded for further consideration. View "Aquate II, LLC v. Myers" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Intellectual Tech LLC (IT), a wholly owned subsidiary of OnAsset Intelligence, Inc. (OnAsset), and its patent dispute with Zebra Technologies Corporation (Zebra). In 2019, IT asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,233,247 against Zebra, claiming that it was the owner and assignee of the patent. However, Zebra moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that IT lacked standing. The district court initially denied the motion, but later granted it based on its determination that IT lacked constitutional standing, leading to the dismissal of all claims without prejudice.Previously, OnAsset had granted Main Street Capital Corporation (Main Street), a lender, a security interest in its patents, including the one in question, as part of a loan agreement. When OnAsset defaulted on the loan, Main Street gained certain rights. Subsequently, OnAsset assigned the patent to IT, which also defaulted on its obligations. The district court found that Main Street's ability to license the patent upon default deprived IT of all its exclusionary rights, leading to a lack of constitutional standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court found that IT retained at least one exclusionary right, even considering the rights Main Street gained upon default. The court clarified that a patent owner has exclusionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has transferred all exclusionary rights away. The court concluded that IT still suffered an injury in fact from infringement even if IT and Main Street could both license the patent. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Jalmar Araujo and Framboise Holdings Inc. over the registration of the standard character mark #TODECACHO. Araujo filed a U.S. Trademark Application to register #TODECACHO for hair combs. Framboise opposed the registration, claiming that it would likely cause confusion with its #TODECACHO design mark, which it had been using in connection with various hair products since March 24, 2017. Framboise also had a pending trademark application for the same mark.The United States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) granted Framboise an extension to submit its case in chief. Araujo opposed this extension and the late submission of a declaration by Adrian Extrakt, Director of Framboise. However, the Board granted the extension, finding that the delay was minimal and that Framboise had met the applicable good cause standard. The Board then relied on the Extrakt declaration to support Framboise's claim of prior use of the #TODECACHO design mark.The Board found that Framboise had met its burden to establish prior use by a preponderance of the evidence. It found that the Extrakt declaration alone was sufficient to prove prior use because it was clear, convincing, and uncontradicted. Having found an earlier priority date for Framboise, the Board found a likelihood of confusion between the two marks, sustained the opposition, and refused registration of Araujo’s mark.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in granting the extension and that the Board's finding that Framboise established prior use of the #TODECACHO design mark was supported by substantial evidence. View "ARAUJO v. FRAMBOISE HOLDINGS INC. " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between GeLab Cosmetics LLC, a New Jersey-based online nail polish retailer, and Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics, a China-based nail polish manufacturer. The founders of GeLab, Xingwang Chen and Shijian Li, are both Chinese citizens. The dispute centers around the ownership of GeLab and allegations of trade secret theft. According to Chen, he and Li founded GeLab with Chen owning 60% and Li 40%. They entered a joint venture with Zhuhai, which was supposed to invest in GeLab for an 80% ownership stake. However, Chen alleges that Zhuhai never sent the money and instead began using low-quality materials for GeLab's products, selling knock-off versions under its own brand, and fraudulently claiming majority ownership of GeLab. Zhuhai, on the other hand, asserts that Chen was its employee and that it owns 80% of GeLab.The dispute first began in China, where Li sued Chen for embezzlement. Chen then sued Li, Zhuhai, and Zhuhai's owners in New Jersey state court, alleging that he had a 60% controlling interest in GeLab and that Zhuhai had no ownership interest. The state defendants counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Zhuhai owns 80% of GeLab. GeLab then filed a second action in New Jersey against Li alone. The state court consolidated the two cases.While the New Jersey proceedings were ongoing, GeLab filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Zhuhai and its owners, alleging violations of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The defendants responded that Zhuhai owns GeLab and that it cannot steal trade secrets from itself. The district court stayed the federal case, citing the doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, reasoning that judicial economy favors waiting for the New Jersey court to determine who owns the company. GeLab appealed the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to stay the proceedings. The court found that the federal and state cases were parallel as they involved substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issues. The court also found that exceptional circumstances warranted abstention, with at least seven factors supporting the district court's decision. These factors included the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora, the source of governing law, the adequacy of state-court action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights, the relative progress of state and federal proceedings, and the availability of concurrent jurisdiction. View "GeLab Cosmetics LLC v. Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing trademark dispute between two charities, Kars 4 Kids, Inc. and America Can! Cars for Kids. Both organizations sell donated vehicles to fund children's education programs. In 2003, Texas-based America Can discovered a Kars 4 Kids advertisement in the Dallas Morning News and sent Kars 4 Kids a cease and desist letter, asserting America Can’s rights to the “Cars for Kids” mark in Texas. Kars 4 Kids, based in New Jersey, did not respond to the letter and continued to advertise in Texas.The case was first brought to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 2014, where both parties alleged federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution claims. A jury found that Kars 4 Kids infringed on America Can’s unregistered mark in Texas. The District Court awarded monetary and injunctive relief. However, the court's decision was appealed, and the case was remanded for the District Court to reexamine its conclusion that the doctrine of laches did not bar America Can’s claims.On remand, the District Court again concluded that laches did not bar relief. The court found that Kars 4 Kids’ advertising in Texas was not open and notorious enough to prompt America Can to act more quickly to protect its mark. The court also found that Kars 4 Kids was not prejudiced by America Can’s delay because Kars 4 Kids had assumed the risk of its advertising campaigns after receiving the 2003 cease and desist letter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's findings. The appellate court held that the District Court abused its discretion by not properly applying the presumption in favor of laches. The court found that America Can failed to establish that its delay in bringing suit was excusable and that Kars 4 Kids was not prejudiced as a result of that delay. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court's judgment granting monetary and injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss America Can’s claims with prejudice based on laches. The court also dismissed as moot America Can’s cross-appeal. View "Kars 4 Kids Inc v. America Can Cars For Kids" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the use of the term "Medical Special Operations Conference" and its acronym "MSOC" as a trademark. The plaintiff, the City of New York and the FDNY Foundation, and the defendant, Juan Henriquez, both claimed rights to the term. Henriquez, a rescue paramedic with the FDNY, had been organizing conferences under this name since 2011. The FDNY also used the term for its own events. In 2019, Henriquez applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.) to register the term as a trademark under his name. The P.T.O. initially rejected his application, finding the term merely descriptive of the events Henriquez organized. However, Henriquez successfully amended his application, attesting to his continuous and exclusive use of the mark for the past five years, and the P.T.O. registered the mark under his name.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Henriquez, prohibiting the FDNY from using the term for their events. The court found the term to be a suggestive mark, which is entitled to more protection under trademark law than a descriptive mark.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's classification of the term as a suggestive mark. The appellate court found that the term was descriptive, not suggestive, and therefore merited less protection under trademark law. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of New York v. Henriquez" on Justia Law

The case involves TBL Licensing, LLC, commonly known as Timberland, and its attempt to register certain features of its popular boot design as trade dress under the Lanham Act. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused to register the design, concluding it was not distinctive. Timberland appealed to the federal district court, which agreed with the USPTO and added that the design was impermissibly functional. The district court granted the USPTO's motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the subset of design features that Timberland sought to register lacked distinctiveness in the public's view. The court did not decide on the issue of functionality. The court emphasized that the question was not whether the public recognizes the entire product as Timberland's boot, but whether the specific design features that Timberland sought to register have acquired a distinctive meaning in the public's view. View "TBL Licensing, LLC v. Vidal" on Justia Law