Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

After participating in a songwriting contest co-sponsored by Sony and a well-known Puerto Rican singer, the plaintiff submitted an original song and accompanying music video for consideration. Upon advancing as a finalist, the plaintiff was asked to sign documents related to contest participation. Another entrant was ultimately selected as the contest winner. Later, the defendant released a song and video that the plaintiff claimed were substantially similar to his contest submission, leading the plaintiff to file suit for copyright infringement and allege fraudulent inducement into the contest.Following extensive procedural history, including several prior appeals and a Supreme Court decision clarifying when copyright owners may sue, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the plaintiff’s earlier complaint without prejudice due to the timing of his copyright registration. The plaintiff then filed a new action, again asserting copyright infringement. The defendant responded with counterclaims challenging the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright registration and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had assigned his copyright to Sony by agreeing to the contest’s rules. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the defendant, dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims, and invalidated the plaintiff’s copyright registration, all without permitting discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment and invalidating the copyright registration without affording the plaintiff a fair opportunity to conduct discovery, particularly since the relevant evidence was largely under the defendant’s and Sony’s control. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and the invalidation of the copyright registration, remanding the case for further proceedings to allow discovery. View "Cortes-Ramos v. Martin-Morales" on Justia Law

EnvTech, Inc., a company specializing in cleaning products and services for hydrofluoric acid alkylation (HF alky) units in oil refineries, alleges that Patrick DeBusk, CEO of USA DeBusk LLC (USAD), orchestrated the theft of its proprietary neutral pH chelation cleaning formula and process. EnvTech claims that DeBusk directed the hiring of key former EnvTech employees, who were privy to EnvTech’s trade secrets, and used their knowledge to allow USAD to enter and compete in the specialized market for HF alky unit cleaning. EnvTech further asserts that this conduct was part of a broader pattern, with USAD hiring competitors’ employees to misappropriate trade secrets under DeBusk’s direction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed EnvTech’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that EnvTech had not plausibly alleged that DeBusk personally engaged in trade secret theft with the necessary mental state or that a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was sufficiently pleaded. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after EnvTech’s amended complaint did not cure the perceived deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that EnvTech plausibly alleged DeBusk’s knowing direction and participation in the theft and use of EnvTech’s trade secrets, as well as a broader pattern of similar conduct involving other competitors. The Fifth Circuit held that EnvTech’s allegations were sufficient to state a RICO claim based on a pattern of trade secret theft and conspiracy, and that the continuity and relatedness requirements for a RICO pattern were satisfied. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EnvTech v. DeBusk" on Justia Law

Two businesses and their principals were involved in the sale of a cigar company. The sale was governed by a written agreement which expressly reserved three registered trademarks for the sellers, and did not mention other closely related marks. After the sale, the buyers’ company launched new cigar products and marketing campaigns referencing the history and reputation of the reserved marks and associated product lines. The sellers objected, claiming infringement of their reserved trademark interests and associated goodwill. When attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the sellers filed a federal trademark infringement lawsuit.The first lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court did not address the merits of the trademark claims. Instead, it found that the claims arose out of the sales agreement, which contained a forum selection clause requiring venue in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. On that basis, the Florida district court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Subsequently, the buyers initiated a related contract lawsuit in South Dakota state court. The sellers then filed the present lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, asserting only federal Lanham Act claims and omitting the sales agreement from their initial filings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the federal trademark claims arose out of the sales agreement, because resolving them would require analyzing the parties’ contractual allocation of trademark rights and goodwill. The court further held that the forum selection clause in the agreement was valid, mandatory, and enforceable under South Dakota law and federal law, and that it required litigation to proceed in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. The Eighth Circuit also concluded that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal Lanham Act claims. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages.Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on three patents owned by the appellant, which describe a method for displaying information to facilitate the return of lost or stolen computers. The patented method involves powering on a computer and automatically displaying a screen with return information, either before or alongside the lock screen, and includes the ability to remotely initiate or change the displayed information without assistance from a user with the computer. The appellant alleged that certain devices sold by LG Electronics, featuring Google or Microsoft’s “Find My Device” software, infringed these patents.Following the appellant’s lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Google and Microsoft initiated six inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), contesting the validity of the patents based on prior art. The PTAB instituted review despite the appellant’s arguments referencing a parallel district court action and concerns about duplicative proceedings. LG, named as a real party in interest, filed a “Sotera stipulation,” agreeing not to pursue in district court any grounds raised in the IPRs, which the PTAB considered in its decision to institute review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s final written decisions, which found all challenged claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges tied to the PTAB’s institution decision, specifically regarding the impact of LG’s violation of the Sotera stipulation. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB’s construction of the “without assistance” claim limitation, finding no error and concluding that the prior art disclosed the disputed method. The court also determined that the PTAB’s analysis of secondary considerations of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part, awarding costs against the appellant. View "HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

Amarin Pharma, Inc. developed and marketed Vascepa, a drug containing icosapent ethyl. Initially, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication). Later, the FDA approved a new use: reducing cardiovascular risk in certain patients (the CV indication), for which Amarin held two method-of-use patents. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., a generic manufacturer, sought to market a generic icosapent ethyl. After Amarin’s SH-indication patents were invalidated by a district court, Hikma pursued FDA approval for a “skinny label” generic, carving out the patented CV indication. The FDA approved Hikma’s application with the label limited to the SH indication.Amarin sued Hikma in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s CV-indication patents. Amarin argued that various statements in Hikma’s skinny label, patient information leaflet, website, and press releases encouraged infringement. The District Court granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss, finding that the statements did not constitute active encouragement of infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding it plausible that a physician could read Hikma’s statements as instructions or encouragement to prescribe the drug for the patented use.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b). The Court clarified that liability requires affirmative “active steps” to encourage infringement, not merely statements that could be read as encouragement. The Court found Hikma’s statements either reflected legal compliance or ordinary industry practice, or were too vague or passive to plausibly constitute active inducement. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two companies over patents related to wireless communications for building automation systems. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s smart thermostat products infringed four patents, which addressed improvements in wireless network architecture, power and bandwidth usage, and data redundancy within building control systems. At trial, a jury found that the defendant had infringed at least one of the asserted patents (without specifying which), determined that the claims of one patent were not limited to well-understood or routine technology, found another patent’s claims invalid, and awarded the plaintiff lump sum damages.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the court denied these motions for the patents at issue, except for one where factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The court also denied the defendant’s post-trial motions, including challenges to the verdict form, jury instructions related to patent eligibility, and motions to exclude expert testimony. The plaintiff, in turn, appealed the district court’s limitation on prejudgment interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court’s verdict form, which combined all asserted patents into a single infringement question, violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. The appellate court vacated both the infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial on those issues. The court also vacated and remanded the § 101 eligibility determination for one patent, requiring further proceedings under the Alice framework. However, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that the asserted claims of two other patents were not directed to abstract ideas and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement on one patent. Remaining evidentiary and interest issues were dismissed as moot. View "OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC " on Justia Law

Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lil' Joe Records, Inc. v. Won" on Justia Law

AGI SureTrack LLC brought suit against Farmers Edge Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging infringement of several patents relating to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing, and sharing farming data. The core patented technology involved using a relay device with generic computer components to collect real-time data from various farming equipment, process this information, and share it via an online exchange. The patent claims described a system using a microprocessor, bus connector, GPS receiver, and memory storage, together with software that records and interprets data from farming implements.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Edge. The court found that the asserted patent claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded that the claims merely used generic computer components to collect and process data and did not constitute an inventive concept. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional and denied Farmers Edge’s request for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed both AGI’s challenge to the finding of patent ineligibility and Farmers Edge’s cross-appeal regarding exceptionality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted patents were not patent-eligible, holding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked any inventive concept beyond conventional technology. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s summary determination that the case was not exceptional, finding the lower court failed to provide adequate reasoning or allow both parties to present argument on the issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings on exceptionality and attorney’s fees. View "AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC. " on Justia Law

A clothing company filed a lawsuit against multiple e-commerce vendors, including a Chinese company, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition, and related claims under the Lanham Act. The defendants were identified in a document attached to the complaint. Because the defendants were primarily Chinese entities operating online, the plaintiff asserted it was difficult to determine their exact identities and addresses. The plaintiff sought and was granted permission by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to serve the defendants by email, which included sending a link to the complaint and other documents. The defendant, Hangzhou, engaged in settlement discussions but did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment. The court’s order also allowed the plaintiff to collect funds from third parties, including from Hangzhou’s Amazon account.After the plaintiff collected a portion of the judgment, Hangzhou appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment, primarily arguing that service by email in China was prohibited under the Hague Service Convention and thus the judgment was void for lack of proper service. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the Convention permits email service in China, and rejected other arguments related to Illinois post-judgment procedures.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by email in China, contrary to the district court’s conclusion. However, the appellate court determined that the district court must first decide whether the Convention applies to this case, specifically whether the defendant’s address was “not known,” which would render the Convention inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision denying the motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this threshold issue. View "Kangol LLC v Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd." on Justia Law