Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Crocs, Inc. owns two U.S. trademarks covering features of its Classic Clog shoes. In June 2021, Crocs filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that several respondents violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing or selling footwear that infringed or diluted Crocs’s trademarks. Crocs sought a general exclusion order (GEO) or, in the alternative, a limited exclusion order (LEO). During the investigation, some respondents were found in default for failing to participate, while others actively defended against the claims.An Administrative Law Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing for the three active respondents and, in January 2023, issued an Initial Determination finding no violation of Section 337. The judge concluded that Crocs had not shown infringement or dilution of its trademarks and had waived infringement contentions against the defaulting respondents. The Commission reviewed parts of this determination and, in September 2023, issued a final decision: it found no violation by the active respondents and determined not to apply the waiver to the defaulting respondents. For the defaulting respondents, the ITC presumed the facts in Crocs’s complaint to be true, as required by statute, and issued an LEO against them, finding no public interest factors weighed against exclusion.On appeal, Crocs challenged both the no violation finding as to active respondents and the issuance of only an LEO rather than a GEO for the defaulting respondents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Crocs’s appeal regarding the active respondents was untimely and dismissed it. Regarding the defaulting respondents, the court affirmed the Commission’s decision to issue a limited exclusion order, finding no abuse of discretion or error in law. Thus, the appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "CROCS, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

Two competing software companies specializing in business process management platforms were embroiled in a dispute after one company's employee, acting as a covert consultant, obtained confidential information about the other’s products. The employee, who had access through a third-party government contractor, provided the competitor with detailed tutorials, internal documentation, and live presentations designed to help the competitor improve its own offerings and target the rival’s weaknesses in sales efforts. The information was disseminated within the competitor’s organization and used both to inform product development and to shape competitive strategy. The aggrieved company discovered the espionage years later when the consultant’s handler joined its staff and disclosed the conduct. The company then pursued claims for trade secret misappropriation under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, among other causes.The Circuit Court for Fairfax County oversaw a lengthy trial and issued several key evidentiary and instructional rulings: it excluded evidence about the number of users who had access to the alleged trade secrets, limited the competitor’s damages defense based on a discovery response, prohibited the competitor from authenticating certain software versions except on a specified laptop, and issued a damages instruction that shifted the burden of proof to the competitor. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded substantial damages. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the jury’s finding of misappropriation but reversed the judgment, holding that the circuit court committed multiple errors in its evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, and remanded for a new trial on the trade secret claims.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. It held that the circuit court erred by shifting the burden of proof for damages to the defendant, by limiting the defendant’s damages evidence, by precluding authentication of software exhibits, and by instructing the jury that the number of people with access to the trade secrets was irrelevant. The Supreme Court ordered a remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Appian Corporation v. Pegasystems" on Justia Law

Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper. View "Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc." on Justia Law

Kesters Merchandising Display International, Inc. and SurfaceQuest, Inc. are competing manufacturers in the architectural materials industry. Kesters produces MicroLite, a lightweight, seamless material. Around 2014, the parties collaborated to market samples of MicroLite wrapped in SurfaceQuest film, with Kesters supplying photographs and product guides. Subsequently, SurfaceQuest began independently selling and marketing its own lightweight beam wrapped in its film, utilizing photographs of MicroLite in promotional materials. Kesters alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented MicroLite as its own in various advertisements and communications with customers.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the initial lawsuit. Kesters claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, arguing that SurfaceQuest’s use of MicroLite images and representations damaged its business. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to SurfaceQuest, finding that Kesters had neither established a presumption of injury nor presented evidence of actual injury resulting from the alleged false advertising.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. The appellate court determined that injury could not be presumed because Kesters failed to show that only two significant competitors existed in the relevant market or to provide evidence of cross-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, Kesters did not present evidence of actual injury, such as a causal connection between SurfaceQuest’s advertising and lost business opportunities. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SurfaceQuest and the denial of Kesters’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kesters did not provide evidence supporting the required element of injury for its Lanham Act claim. View "Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed. View "YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents.Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs.On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. View "ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law

Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate. View "Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC" on Justia Law

Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. " on Justia Law

The case concerns an engineer who worked for a microchip design company. While employed, he downloaded proprietary design files, including a file for a microchip known as the HMC1022A, and retained them after leaving his employer. Shortly after his departure, he started a competing business that marketed and sold microchips bearing strong similarities to his former employer’s products, using some of the appropriated design files in the manufacturing process. He concealed the origins of these files by renaming them and sought to keep his new business secret from his former employer.A federal grand jury indicted him on a range of charges, including possession of stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, export violations, visa fraud, and unlawful procurement of citizenship. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the jury trial. The defendant was convicted on only one count: unlawful possession of a trade secret, specifically the design layout and GDS file for the HMC1022A microchip. He was acquitted of all other charges, and the court dismissed related charges against his business partner and spouse. Post-trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing selective enforcement and prosecution on the basis of his Chinese ethnicity, but the district court denied these motions.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the file in question was both a trade secret and that the defendant knew it to be so. The court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the selective prosecution and enforcement claims, determining that the defendant had not shown similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently, nor that the investigation or prosecution was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The conviction and sentence were therefore upheld. View "United States v. Yu" on Justia Law