Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries
Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc.
Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. and CarnaudMetalbox Engineering Ltd. (collectively, “Crown”) sued Belvac Production Machinery, Inc. (“Belvac”) for infringing claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,308,570, 9,968,982, and 10,751,784, which relate to necking machines used in manufacturing metal beverage cans. Belvac argued that the patents were invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because a necking machine embodying the invention was on sale in the U.S. before the critical date. Both parties sought summary judgment on this issue.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment to Crown, ruling that the patents were not invalid under the on-sale bar, and denied Belvac’s motion. After a jury trial, the court entered a judgment that the asserted claims were not invalid and not infringed. Crown appealed the noninfringement judgment, and Belvac appealed the no invalidity judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the letter sent by Crown to Complete Packaging Machinery constituted a commercial offer for sale in the U.S. before the critical date, thus invalidating the patents under § 102(b). The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Crown and remanded for entry of judgment in Belvac’s favor. The court did not address the issue of infringement due to the invalidity finding. View "Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc." on Justia Law
Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C.
Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. (Phoenix) sued Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C. (DCO) and obtained a jury verdict for tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. The jury awarded Phoenix compensatory and punitive damages, as well as reasonable attorney fees. The trial court awarded additional punitive damages for the misappropriation claim and enhanced the attorney fees by a multiplier of two.The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in part but reversed the application of the punitive-damages cap for the conspiracy claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. Phoenix requested postjudgment attorney fees, which the Ninth District did not specifically address but remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction over DCO's challenge to the enhancement of the attorney-fee award. The court reversed the Ninth District's affirmation of the enhanced attorney fees and remanded the case to the trial court to issue a final judgment granting Phoenix attorney fees in the amount of $1,991,507.On remand, the trial court awarded Phoenix postjudgment attorney fees and expenses. The Ninth District affirmed this award, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider postjudgment attorney fees and did not exceed its authority.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the trial court exceeded its authority by considering and granting Phoenix's motion for postjudgment attorney fees and expenses. The court reversed the Ninth District's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its award of postjudgment attorney fees and expenses and to enter final judgment. View "Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC
DDR Holdings, LLC (DDR) sued Priceline.com LLC and Booking.com B.V. (collectively, Priceline.com) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 (’399 patent). The ’399 patent relates to generating a composite web page that combines visual elements of a “host” website with content from a third-party “merchant.” The dispute centered on the construction of the claim terms “merchants” and “commerce object.” DDR argued that “merchants” should include purveyors of both goods and services, while Priceline.com contended it should be limited to purveyors of goods alone.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware construed “merchants” as “producers, distributors, or resellers of the goods to be sold” and “commerce object” to exclude services. Following this construction, the parties stipulated to non-infringement, agreeing that the accused instrumentalities did not infringe the asserted claims of the ’399 patent under the court’s claim constructions. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Priceline.com, and DDR appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s construction of “merchants” as purveyors of goods, not services, noting the significant deletion of any reference to services in the final specification of the ’399 patent compared to the provisional application. The court also affirmed the construction of “commerce object” as “a product, a product category, a catalog, or an indication that a product, product category, or catalog should be chosen dynamically,” consistent with the construction of “merchants.”The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly construed the disputed terms and affirmed the judgment of non-infringement in favor of Priceline.com. View "DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC" on Justia Law
Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin, Inc.
Galderma Laboratories, L.P. and TCD Royalty Sub LP (collectively, Galderma) own and market Oracea®, a doxycycline-based treatment for rosacea. They hold U.S. Patent Nos. 7,749,532 and 8,206,740 (the Asserted Patents), which cover a specific formulation of doxycycline. Lupin Inc. and Lupin Ltd. (collectively, Lupin) filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to market a generic version of Oracea®, claiming bioequivalence. Galderma sued Lupin for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Lupin’s product infringed the Asserted Patents.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and found that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. The court concluded that Galderma failed to prove that Lupin’s product met the specific formulation requirements of the Asserted Patents, particularly the immediate release (IR) and delayed release (DR) portions of doxycycline. The court also found that Galderma did not demonstrate infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Galderma argued that the district court erred in disregarding dissolution test data from Lupin’s ANDA, admitting evidence from a rebuttal batch, imposing additional claim limitations, and not finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s findings. It held that the district court correctly determined that the two-stage dissolution test did not represent in vivo behavior and that Galderma did not prove its theory of infringement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the rebuttal batch evidence and no imposition of additional claim limitations. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Galderma did not prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. View "Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin, Inc." on Justia Law
PS Products, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., Inc.
PS Products, Inc. and Billy Pennington (collectively, PSP) own a U.S. Design Patent for a long-spiked electrode for a stun device. They filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Arkansas against Panther Trading Company, Inc. (Panther) for patent infringement. Panther responded with a Rule 11 letter and a motion to dismiss, arguing the infringement claims were frivolous and the venue was improper. PSP did not respond to these communications and later moved to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice. Panther then sought attorney fees and sanctions, claiming the lawsuit was frivolous.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case with prejudice and awarded Panther attorney fees and costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285, deeming the case exceptional. The court also imposed $25,000 in deterrence sanctions on PSP under its inherent power, citing PSP's history of filing meritless lawsuits. PSP filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PSP appealed the $25,000 sanctions, arguing the district court lacked authority to impose them in addition to attorney fees and that the court applied the wrong legal standard. The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in imposing sanctions under its inherent power, even after awarding attorney fees under § 285. The court found that PSP's conduct, including filing a meritless lawsuit and citing the wrong venue statute, justified the sanctions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and declined Panther's request for attorney fees for the appeal, determining the appeal was not frivolous as argued. View "PS Products, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., Inc." on Justia Law
MIRROR WORLDS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. META PLATFORMS, INC.
Mirror Worlds Technologies, LLC owns three patents related to methods for storing, organizing, and presenting data in time-ordered streams on a computer system. In 2017, Mirror Worlds sued Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) for patent infringement, alleging that Facebook's features, such as News Feed, Timeline, and Activity Log, infringed on these patents. Facebook moved for summary judgment of non-infringement, which the district court granted, concluding that Facebook did not infringe the patents as a matter of law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that Facebook's systems did not meet the "main stream" or "main collection" limitations of the patents, as the evidence showed that not all data units received or generated by Facebook's systems were stored in the accused main streams. The court also rejected Facebook's defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 but granted summary judgment of non-infringement on several grounds, including that the accused systems did not display a "glance view" as required by the '538 and '439 patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's construction of "data unit" and found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Facebook's systems received data units not stored in the accused main streams. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain evidence presented by Mirror Worlds and found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the "glance view" limitation. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of non-infringement and dismissed Facebook's cross-appeal regarding the invalidity defense. View "MIRROR WORLDS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law
CYTIVA BIOPROCESS R&D AB v. JSR CORP.
Cytiva BioProcess R&D AB ("Cytiva") appealed the final written decisions from six inter partes reviews (IPRs) that determined 79 claims of three challenged patents were unpatentable. JSR Corp. and JSR Life Sciences, LLC (collectively, "JSR") cross-appealed the decisions in four of these IPRs, which held the remaining four challenged claims not unpatentable. The patents in question relate to chromatography matrices and processes for isolating target compounds using those matrices, specifically involving a ligand made from Protein A (SPA) found in staphylococcus aureus.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) found that it would have been obvious to make the G29A mutation to Domain C of SPA based on prior art, which suggested this modification for any of the SPA domains. The Board held that claims 1–7, 10–20, 23–26 of the '765 patent, claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, 23–30 of the '142 patent, and claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 of the '007 patent were unpatentable. However, the Board found that claims 4 and 17 of the '142 patent and claims 11 and 29 of the '007 patent were not unpatentable, as JSR had not shown a reasonable expectation of success for these claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's determination that the majority of the claims were unpatentable, agreeing that the prior art expressly suggested the G29A modification to Domain C. The court also concluded that the Board erred in limiting the construction of "Fab part of an antibody" to Fab fragments and reversed the Board's determination that claims 4 and 17 of the '142 patent and claims 11 and 29 of the '007 patent were not unpatentable. The court held that if a property of a composition is inherent, there is no question of a reasonable expectation of success in achieving it, and thus, both the composition and process claims were unpatentable. View "CYTIVA BIOPROCESS R&D AB v. JSR CORP." on Justia Law
US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie’s Coffee LLC
US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) operates a bed and breakfast at the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River, Massachusetts, offering ghost tours and related activities. Ghost Adventures holds federal trademarks for the name "Lizzie Borden" and a hatchet logo. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) opened a coffee shop next to the Lizzie Borden House, using the Lizzie Borden story in its marketing, including a hatchet logo and references to being "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World." Some visitors mistakenly believed the two businesses were affiliated.Ghost Adventures sued Miss Lizzie's in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for trademark infringement and unfair competition, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Miss Lizzie's from using the "Lizzie Borden" name and hatchet logo. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that Ghost Adventures failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court determined that the key element in any infringement action is the likelihood of confusion, which Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate. The court found that Miss Lizzie's hatchet logo and use of the name "Lizzie" were not similar enough to Ghost Adventures' trademarks to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos were dissimilar and that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie" was to the historical figure, not the trademark. The court also found that any consumer confusion was due to the proximity of the businesses and their common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story, not the similarity of their marks. The court concluded that Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC" on Justia Law
National Presto Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group, Inc.
National Presto Industries, Inc. ("Presto") designed and sold a personal electric heater called "HeatDish" since 1989. The product was sold at Costco, where Presto used a specific merchandising strategy to boost sales. In 2017, Costco sought a new supplier and contacted U.S. Merchants Financial Group, Inc. ("U.S. Merchants"), which developed a similar heater called "The Heat Machine." Presto claimed that U.S. Merchants infringed on its unregistered trade dress under the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota handled the initial proceedings. Presto filed a complaint with multiple claims, including trade dress infringement and copyright infringement. The district court dismissed some claims and denied others, leading to a bench trial for the trade dress claim and a jury trial for the copyright claim. The district court ruled that Presto was not entitled to a jury trial for the trade dress claim, as the remedy sought was equitable, not legal. After a six-day bench trial, the court found that Presto failed to prove that its trade dress had acquired secondary meaning, an essential element for trade dress protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Presto was not entitled to a jury trial for the trade dress claim because the remedy sought was equitable. The appellate court also upheld the district court's finding that Presto failed to prove secondary meaning for its trade dress. Without secondary meaning, Presto's trade dress infringement claim could not succeed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "National Presto Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group, Inc." on Justia Law
Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran
In 2014, Ed Sheeran and Amy Wadge wrote the song "Thinking Out Loud," which became a global hit. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (SAS), which owns a portion of the royalties for Marvin Gaye's 1973 song "Let’s Get It On," alleged that Sheeran's song infringed on the copyright of Gaye's song. SAS claimed that the chord progression and syncopated harmonic rhythm in "Thinking Out Loud" were copied from "Let’s Get It On."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially denied Sheeran's motion for summary judgment but later granted it upon reconsideration. The court concluded that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm in "Let’s Get It On" was too commonplace to warrant copyright protection. The court also excluded evidence and expert testimony related to musical elements not present in the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office in 1973, which defined the scope of the copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the scope of the copyright was limited to the elements in the deposited sheet music and that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm was not original enough to be protectable. The court also found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs substantially similar as a whole, given their different melodies and lyrics. Thus, the court held that Sheeran did not infringe on the copyright of "Let’s Get It On" and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Sheeran. View "Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran" on Justia Law