Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Cooperative’s ’452 patent relates to systems and methods of structuring a peer-to-peer (P2P) dynamic network for distributing large files, namely videos and video games. In prior art systems, video streaming was controlled by content distribution networks (CDNs), where the content was “distributed directly from the CDN server originating the content.” The 452 patent claims methods and systems for a network in which content distribution occurs “outside controlled networks and/or [CDNs],” i.e., outside a “static network of controlled systems,” using dynamic P2P networks comprising “peer nodes,” i.e., nodes consuming the same content contemporaneously, that transmit content directly to each other instead of receiving content from the CDN.The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of Cooperative’s infringement suit. The complaint contains several alleged inventive concepts which the specification touts as specific improvements in the distribution of data compared to the prior art, which should have precluded the district court’s holding on ineligibility (35 U.S.C. 101). One such concept is the required dynamic P2P network wherein multiple peer nodes consume the same content and are configured to communicate outside the CDNs. Another requires trace routes to be used in content segmentation. View "Cooperative Entertainment, Inc. v. Kollective Technology, Inc. (" on Justia Law

Provisur’s patent describes a method and system for “classifying slices or a portion cut from a food product according to an optical image of the slice.” Some food products, like bacon or cold cuts, are packaged and sold in groups of slices and “in accordance with a particular weight requirement.” Systems of conveyors and slicers create and gather these groups for packaging. The patent explains that, while slicing apparatuses and conveyor systems were known in the art, it remained “desirable to provide a system which would be directly responsive to the quality of cut slices and which would provide a compact and effective arrangement to classify slices based on fat content and fat deposits.” The patent describes an apparatus that includes a slicing station with a blade for removing slices from a food product.On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concluded that Weber had proved unpatentable as obvious claims 1–10, 13, and 14 but not claims 11 or 12. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The Board erred in deciding that claims 11 and 12 are not obvious; on remand, should the Board find the independent claims obvious after considering the surface-area limitations, claims 11 and 12 are also obvious in view of the Board’s determinations regarding claims 2, 6, and 7. View "Provisur Technologies, Inc. v. Weber, Inc." on Justia Law

A world-famous boxer and a famous MMA fighter faced one another in a legendary fight, produced by Showtime, which allowed individuals to live-stream the fight from Showtime’s website for $99.99. Showtime granted Mayweather the exclusive right to exhibit and distribute, and authorize the exhibition and distribution of, the fight. Mayweather enlisted JHP to issue commercial licenses. JHP sold commercial licenses to broadcast the event at bars and restaurants and collected fees, ranging from $3,700-$15,700. The fight was not registered as a copyrighted work when it first aired on August 26, 2017. Two months later, Showtime applied to register its copyright, as the sole author and claimant. Showtime later signed the Copyright Agreement, giving JHP the exclusive right to distribute and publicly perform the fight live and the exclusive right to sue anyone who live-streamed the fight without paying the licensing fee. JHP sued several restaurants and bars that aired the fight without paying.In an action for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 106, 501, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that JHP did not own the copyright to the fight on the day it aired and that the “retroactive transfer" was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Copyright Agreement merely codified earlier transfers in the wake of the post hoc registration, there is no retroactivity issue. JHP owned the exclusive right to distribute and publicly display the fight on the day it aired. View "Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Polaris’s 993 patent, titled “Control Component for Controlling a Semiconductor Memory Component in a Semiconductor Memory Module,” explains that the control component can send both address signals and control signals through the same leads, allowing the control component to perform its functions with fewer leads. Its 505 patent involves a shared-resource system in which logical controls are used to manage resource requests.In inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that all challenged claims are unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the Board decided the merits before Polaris filed its motion to terminate the IPR Polaris’s motion was untimely. The Board properly exercised its discretion. The court rejected Polaris’s argument that the Board misconstrued the claim terms “memory chips” and “semiconductor memory component” within the claim phrase “wherein the semiconductor memory component comprises a plurality of memory chips.” Prior art discloses all claim limitations under the Board’s claim constructions. The Board correctly adopted Polaris’s expert’s definition of “single buffer” as the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, which discloses that resource tags "may be located in disparate locations." Substantial evidence supports a finding that the prior art discloses a “resource tag buffer.” View "Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Brent" on Justia Law

Sawstop requested patent term adjustments (PTA) under 35 U.S.C. 154(b)(C), which grants day-for-day extensions for delays attributable to appellate review by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board or by a Federal court in a case in which the patent was issued under a decision in the review reversing an adverse determination of patentability.With respect to the application that led to the issuance of the 476 patent, the Board had affirmed the rejection of claim 11 on new grounds. On remand, SawStop filed amendments and a request for continued examination. The examiner eventually allowed claim 11. The PTO made no adjustment to the patent's term because “the patent only issue[d] after further prosecution” and amendment. The district court and Federal Circuit agreed. Because claim 11 was subject to a new ground of rejection on appeal, the application was not “issued under a decision in the review reversing an adverse determination of patentability.” With respect to the 796 patent, PTA had been granted for the delay incurred in the successful reversal of the rejection of claim 2 but was not granted for Sawstop’s appeal to the district court because the appeal did not “revers[e] an adverse determination of patentability.” Claim 1 remained subject to an outstanding provisional double patenting rejection and was unpatentable both before and after the appeal. Claim 1 was canceled and did not issue in the patent. View "SawStop Holding LLC v. Vida;" on Justia Law

During the GATT Bubble–a 1995 application “rush” by applicants who wanted their patent claims to be governed by the pre-35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) patent term, Hyatt filed the 938 application, which claims priority to applications filed as early as 1983. The PTO completed an initial examination in 2003, but from 2003-2012, stayed the examination of many of Hyatt’s applications pending litigation. In 2013, an examiner instructed Hyatt to select claims for examination as part of efforts to manage Hyatt’s approximately 400 pending applications. Hyatt selected eight of approximately 200 claims in that application. Hyatt responded to a non-final rejection in 2015 with significant claim amendments. The Examiner determined that the amendments shifted seven claims to different species of computer systems and processes and issued a restriction requirement between the originally-selected claims and the amended claims, requiring Hyatt to prosecute his amended claims in a new application.The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the PTO. Hyatt failed to disclose claims to a separate invention and attempted to file them years after 1995. Withholding these claims falls within the 37 C.F.R. 1.129 exception to the general rule prohibiting restriction: In an application that has been pending for at least three years as of June 8, 1995, no requirement for restriction shall be made or maintained in the application after June 8, 1995, except where the examiner has not made a requirement for restriction in the present or parent application before April 8, 1995, due to actions by the applicant. Hyatt’s amended claims are subject to the new patent term. View "Hyatt v. United States Patent and Trademark Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wrote and recorded the song “Everything Be Lit,” which he later copyrighted. Then Plaintiff filed suit against several parties and Think It’s a Game Records (TIG) for copyright infringement based on one of Defendant’s recordings and release of a similar song “Everyday We Lit.” Two co-defendants failed to respond to the initial complaint and the district court entered a default against them. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint, requesting among other forms of relief, actual profits, jointly and severally, from Defendants.   One Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including that the district court erred in using Plaintiff’s amended complaint as the basis for the default judgment because the amended complaint stated a new claim for relief, and Plaintiff failed to serve the amended complaint on Defendant as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the amended complaint stated a new claim for relief, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff did not have to serve the amended complaint on Defendant. Accordingly, the court vacated the default judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Copyright Act did not put Defendant on notice that he could be subject to joint and several liability for actual damages and profits. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for actual damages plus profits, jointly and severally, constituted a new claim for relief. View "Anthony Campbell v. June James" on Justia Law

Arendi sued LG for infringement. The District of Delaware’s rules required Arendi to “specifically identify the accused products and the asserted patent(s)” and to produce "an initial claim chart relating each accused product to the asserted claims each product allegedly infringes.” Arendi filed its Disclosure, listing hundreds of LG products as infringing four claims of the 843 patent but provided claim charts for only one product—LG’s Rebel 4 phone, labeling the Rebel 4 as “exemplary.” LG objected, stating that, “[s]hould Arendi intend to accuse [non-Rebel 4] products, then Arendi must promptly provide claim charts demonstrating how these products infringe[] or explain why Arendi contends the current claim charts are representative of specific non-charted products.” Arendi did not respond. The parties later agreed on eight representative products to represent all accused products, including seven non-Rebel 4 products. Arendi did not supplement its Disclosure. In response to an interrogatory relating to those eight products, LG reiterated that Arendi only provided infringement contentions for the Rebel 4. Arendi provided its expert report months after the close of fact discovery.The district court granted LG's motion to strike portions of that report because it “disclosed—for the first time—infringement contentions for five of” the non-Rebel 4 representative products. Arendi still did not supplement its Disclosure but filed a second complaint, asserting that LG’s non-Rebel 4 products infringed the 843 patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, citing the duplicative-litigation doctrine. View "Arendi S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Amyndas Pharmaceuticals, S.A.'s claims against Zealand Pharma A/S and vacated the dismissal of Amyndas's claims against Zealand Pharma U.S., Inc., holding that the district court erred in dismissing Amyndas's claims against Zealand Pharma U.S.When Amyndas was considering separate joint ventures with Zealand Pharma and Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. it shared trade secrets before understanding that neither of the joint ventures would materialize. Zealand Pharma and Zealand US, its newly established affiliate, subsequently announced a partnership with Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Amyndas sued for misappropriation of trade secrets and other confidential information. The district court (1) dismissed Amyndas's claims against Zealand Pharma on the ground that Amyndas was required to litigate those claims in Denmark; and (2) dismissed Amyndas's claims against Zealand US for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court (1) correctly dismissed Amyndas's claims against Zealand Pharma; and (2) erred in concluding that Amyndas's claims against Zealand US were futile. View "Amyndas Pharmaceuticals, S.A. v. Zealand Pharma A/S" on Justia Law

The district court appointed the receiver and authorized him to sell Defendants’ property—three radio stations—to generate the funds needed to satisfy the judgment. Contending that they had satisfied the judgment by depositing certain sums with the district court, Defendants moved to discharge the receiver, terminate the receivership, and enjoin the sale of the radio stations. The district court denied the motion, holding that it was within its discretion to prolong the receivership in order to protect other creditors and ensure that the receiver would be paid for his services.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to discharge a receiver who had been appointed to aid in the execution of a judgment for violations of the Copyright Act. Agreeing with the First Circuit, the panel held that, even assuming Defendants satisfied the judgment, it was within the district court’s discretion to prolong the receivership. The panel further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion to terminate the receivership.   The district court offered valid reasons for not terminating the receivership—protecting creditors, permitting the receiver to prepare a final accounting, ensuring that the receiver would be compensated for his time, and seeing to it that obligations incurred during the receivership would be paid. View "WB MUSIC CORP. V. ROYCE INTL. BROADCASTING CORP." on Justia Law