Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Denis Navratil, his wife Dimple Navratil, and their business, Dimple’s LLC, who filed a lawsuit against the City of Racine and Mayor Cory Mason. The lawsuit was based on several constitutional claims and a defamation claim against Mason. The core of the claims was the city's decision not to grant an emergency grant to Dimple’s LLC because Denis had attended a rally protesting the statewide “Safer at Home Order” that limited public gatherings, travel, and business operations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The rally was a violation of the Safer at Home Order and a permit required for holding rallies at the State Capitol had been denied due to the pandemic.The case was initially heard by a magistrate judge who granted summary judgment for both defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Denis's attendance at the rally was not protected First Amendment activity because the rally was prohibited by two valid time, place, and manner restrictions—the Safer at Home Order and the state permit requirement. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, finding no evidence of political animus or similarly situated comparators. The court further dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims, finding no deprivation of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Lastly, the court found that Mayor Mason's statements were substantially true or pure opinion and thus not actionable under defamation law. View "Denis Navratil v. City of Racine" on Justia Law

A pilot, who was injured in an airplane crash in 1985, sought medical benefits for a 2016 spinal surgery and subsequent treatment, as well as for diabetes treatment related to his spinal treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, concluding that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot’s spinal problems. The Board also excluded the testimony of the pilot’s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision and that the Board had not abused its discretion in its procedural rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot's spinal problems. The court also found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the pilot's biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The court further held that the Board did not have an obligation to secure the testimony of a particular witness, and that the pilot's failure to secure a witness's testimony did not create an obligation for the Board to do so. View "Jespersen v. Tri-City Air and Alaska Insurance Guaranty Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Kyle Harris against Oasis Petroleum, Inc., and other parties, alleging negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Harris claimed that he was injured in an explosion on an oil rig operated by Oasis while he was working as an employee of Frontier Pressure Testing, LLC. The district court dismissed the other parties from the action, leaving Oasis as the sole defendant.The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found Oasis, Frontier, and Harris each at fault for and a proximate cause of Harris’s injuries. The jury apportioned the fault as follows: Oasis 15%; Frontier 65%; Harris 20%. The jury found $5,012,500 in monetary damages would compensate Harris for his injuries. The district court entered an order for judgment, applying N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, and deducted 85% of fault attributable to Frontier and Harris from the total damages.Harris filed a statement of costs and disbursements, arguing he should be awarded certain costs and disbursements because he was the prevailing party under the special verdict of the jury. Oasis objected to Harris’s statement of costs and disbursements, challenging the amount of expert fees and that the testimony did not lead to a successful result. The district court approved Harris’s amended statement of costs and disbursements, concluding that Harris was the prevailing party and was entitled to costs and disbursements undiminished by the percentage of negligence attributed to him.Oasis appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining Harris was a prevailing party and abused its discretion in awarding Harris costs and disbursements. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with Harris that he was the prevailing party. The court held that Harris was the prevailing party, and the court had the discretion to award Harris costs and disbursements under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06, without reduction by his percentage of fault. View "Harris v. Oasis Petroleum" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Hannah Tanner against Texas State University. Tanner was injured on October 4, 2014, when she was thrown from a golf cart on the University campus. She filed a lawsuit against the University, the Texas State University System, and Dakota Scott, a University employee who was driving the golf cart, on September 29, 2016, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions was set to expire. However, Tanner did not serve the University until May 20, 2020, several years after the statute of limitations had run.The University argued that Tanner's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she did not serve the University until after the statute of limitations had expired. The University contended that timely service of process is a statutory prerequisite to a suit against a governmental entity, and Tanner did not satisfy this prerequisite. The district court granted the University's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that untimely service does not pose a jurisdictional issue that a plea to the jurisdiction can resolve.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the statute of limitations, including the requirement of timely service, is jurisdictional in suits against governmental entities. Therefore, the University's plea to the jurisdiction was a proper vehicle to address Tanner's alleged failure to exercise diligence in serving the University. However, the court declined to determine whether the district court properly granted the plea. Instead, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to determine whether Tanner's service on Scott excuses her from the duty to serve the University. View "TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY v. TANNER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lori Randolph, who was injured after falling down stairs in a rental property owned by Aidan, LLC. Randolph sued Aidan, alleging negligence in failing to provide safe stairs. Aidan, in turn, filed a third-party claim against Sioux City, asserting that a city employee had inspected the property and declared it compliant with the municipal code. Aidan claimed that the city was negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising the unqualified inspector, and thus, should indemnify Aidan for any damages owed to Randolph. Sioux City moved to dismiss Aidan’s claim, arguing it was immune under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j).The district court denied Sioux City's motion to dismiss Aidan's claim. Sioux City and Randolph requested interlocutory review, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Iowa was tasked with reviewing the denial of Sioux City's motion for the correction of errors at law.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Sioux City was immune from Aidan's claim under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j). The court reasoned that Aidan's claim for negligent hiring was "based upon" the negligence of Sioux City's employee in inspecting the stairs. Therefore, the claim fell within the scope of the immunity provided by section 670.4(1)(j). The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the dismissal of Aidan's claim against Sioux City. View "Randolph v. Aidan, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Charles W. Cole, was walking on a brick sidewalk in North Conway Village, a village of the Town of Conway, when he tripped and fell due to holes in the sidewalk caused by missing or broken bricks. The plaintiff alleged that the Town of Conway was aware of the sidewalk's disrepair prior to his injury and had received written notice of the damaged bricks and holes. The plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against the Town of Conway in superior court.The Town of Conway moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to statutory immunity as the plaintiff had failed to allege with particularity how the Town had received written notice of the sidewalk's condition. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the complaint contained sufficient particularity and that the Town was barred from claiming statutory immunity because it was insured against the risk through Primex. The trial court granted the Town's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to plead with sufficient particularity that the Town had received notice of the holes in the sidewalk, and that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute an insurance policy within the meaning of the relevant statute. The trial court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the trial court that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute "insurance" within the meaning of the relevant statute, and thus the Town was not barred from claiming statutory immunity. However, the court reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, finding that the plaintiff's proposed amendments could potentially satisfy the particularity requirement of the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cole v. Town of Conway" on Justia Law

The case involves three plaintiffs, Parker Wideman, Riley Draper, and William and Jessica Douglass, who were severely burned while cleaning a plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The plant, owned by Innovative Fibers LLC and Stein Fibers Ltd, converted recycled plastics into polyester fibers. The plaintiffs were employees of a third-party contractor, Advanced Environmental Options, hired to clean the plant. During the cleaning process, a fire broke out, causing severe injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the plant owners for negligence under state common law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to federal court by the defendants. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs were "statutory employees" covered by South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Law. This law prohibits statutory employees from suing in tort in state courts and instead requires them to submit their claims to South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Commission. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that while state law can define the substantive rights asserted in federal diversity jurisdiction, it cannot strip federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over any category of claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the dispute satisfied all the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. View "Wideman v. Innovative Fibers LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether a hospital that supplies and administers a drug that causes harm can be considered a "seller" under Oregon's strict product liability statute, ORS 30.920(1). The plaintiffs, Brown and Gomez, are the parents of a child who suffered irreparable heart defects as a result of in utero exposure to the drug Zofran, which Providence Health System - Oregon administered to Gomez. The plaintiffs sued Providence, asserting a claim for strict liability under ORS 30.920, alleging that Providence was a "seller" of Zofran and that the drug was "unreasonably dangerous and defective."The trial court granted Providence's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute was inapplicable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, disagreeing with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Oregon granted review.The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to exclude hospitals from the scope of ORS 30.920(1); a hospital that supplies and administers a dangerously defective drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service can be a "seller" that is "engaged in the business of selling" for purposes of liability under ORS 30.920; and, consequently, the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC" on Justia Law

James Corley, as the representative of his deceased son's beneficiaries, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Wyoming Rents, LLC. His son had died in a work-related accident while operating a manlift rented from Wyoming Rents. Corley's counsel missed several deadlines to file an amended complaint, continued to pursue claims against another party that the district court had dismissed, and attempted to engage in discovery without a properly filed amended complaint. Consequently, the district court granted Wyoming Rents' motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. Corley appealed, arguing that a lesser sanction was more appropriate.The district court had previously dismissed Wyoming Machinery Company (WMC) from the case due to lack of claims against it and granted Corley leave to file a second amended complaint. However, Corley failed to meet the deadline for filing the revised complaint and included WMC in the complaint's caption despite the court's dismissal. The court granted Corley another chance to file an amended complaint, but he again missed the deadline. Wyoming Rents then filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Corley's failure to file any pleading by the court's deadline.The Supreme Court of Wyoming found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court noted that Corley's counsel demonstrated a complete lack of diligence throughout the case, which prejudiced Wyoming Rents by forcing it to incur substantial attorney’s fees and hindered the court's ability to move forward in resolving the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. View "Corley v. Wyoming Rents, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Timothy Morales, who was injured when he was hit by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal within the Weatherford Distribution Facility in Williston. Morales filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Weatherford U.S., L.P., Junewal, and Junewal's employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc. He also claimed that Weatherford was negligent for failing to install proper lighting, road signs, or sidewalks near the road.The District Court of Williams County dismissed Morales's claims against Wilhoit with prejudice after the parties did not oppose Wilhoit’s motion for summary judgment. Later, Weatherford moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Morales because he was aware of the obvious danger posed by vehicles on the roadway. The district court granted Weatherford’s motion, and Morales appealed.Meanwhile, Junewal notified the court that she and Morales had reached a settlement. However, no concluding documents were filed. The district court then entered an order for judgment under its order granting Weatherford summary judgment. Morales appealed again, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed his appeal because claims against Junewal remained pending in the district court.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the law when it treated Morales’s request as a Rule 60(b) motion and held it “no longer has jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Morales's request and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enter a single final judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities within twenty days from the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P." on Justia Law