Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, claimed infringement by the defendant, Google LLC, concerning a patent related to web conferencing systems. The patent describes systems that allow participants to view sessions in real time, with time-shifting capabilities so that sessions can also be viewed with delay or after completion, and at different playback rates while maintaining consistent audio quality. The asserted claims permit asynchronous review of multimedia presentations, such as going back to review one aspect while another continues live.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged infringement of claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the patent. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims were patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the claims were directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept that would make them patent-eligible. The court also denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, citing futility.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, applying the Alice two-step test for patent eligibility. The appellate court affirmed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of asynchronous review of presentations and did not disclose a specific technological improvement or inventive concept. The court found that conventional components and result-oriented language did not suffice for eligibility and agreed that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Costs were awarded to Google. View "US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

A physician brought suit against several related companies, alleging that they induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. These patents involve methods and devices for correcting misaligned vertebrae, including the use of “handle means” and “cross-linking members” in en bloc derotation procedures. The defendant companies manufacture derotation devices that, according to the plaintiff, infringe the asserted patents when used in certain configurations. The dispute centered on whether the accused devices contained the claimed “handle means” and whether surgeons actually used the devices in infringing ways.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the parties disputed the meaning of “handle means,” and the court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed construction. During the trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from two experts: one on infringement and another who conducted a survey on surgical practices. The defendants moved to exclude both experts under Daubert, challenging the reliability and relevance of their methods and opinions. Initially, the district court denied these motions, finding that the experts’ application of the court’s claim construction and survey methodology affected the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility.However, following the experts’ testimony at trial, the district court reversed its earlier decision, excluded substantial portions of both experts’ testimony as unreliable and contradictory to the court’s claim construction, and then granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants due to the lack of admissible evidence supporting infringement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s rulings, holding that the excluded testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction and that any methodological concerns went to evidentiary weight, not admissibility. The case was remanded for a new trial in which both experts may testify. View "BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES " on Justia Law

Crocs, Inc. owns two U.S. trademarks covering features of its Classic Clog shoes. In June 2021, Crocs filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that several respondents violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing or selling footwear that infringed or diluted Crocs’s trademarks. Crocs sought a general exclusion order (GEO) or, in the alternative, a limited exclusion order (LEO). During the investigation, some respondents were found in default for failing to participate, while others actively defended against the claims.An Administrative Law Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing for the three active respondents and, in January 2023, issued an Initial Determination finding no violation of Section 337. The judge concluded that Crocs had not shown infringement or dilution of its trademarks and had waived infringement contentions against the defaulting respondents. The Commission reviewed parts of this determination and, in September 2023, issued a final decision: it found no violation by the active respondents and determined not to apply the waiver to the defaulting respondents. For the defaulting respondents, the ITC presumed the facts in Crocs’s complaint to be true, as required by statute, and issued an LEO against them, finding no public interest factors weighed against exclusion.On appeal, Crocs challenged both the no violation finding as to active respondents and the issuance of only an LEO rather than a GEO for the defaulting respondents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Crocs’s appeal regarding the active respondents was untimely and dismissed it. Regarding the defaulting respondents, the court affirmed the Commission’s decision to issue a limited exclusion order, finding no abuse of discretion or error in law. Thus, the appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "CROCS, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents.Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs.On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. View "ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law

Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate. View "Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC" on Justia Law

Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. " on Justia Law

A non-profit organization focused on supporting student-athletes registered a stylized mark incorporating the phrase “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE. GP GAME PLAN” for use in charitable fundraising via apparel sales. Later, a media company filed six intent-to-use applications for marks containing “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” and “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE,” covering clothing and entertainment services. The non-profit opposed these applications before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, arguing likelihood of confusion and asserting priority based on both its registration and alleged common law rights. The media company counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the non-profit’s registration and asserting that it had acquired priority through an assignment of common law rights from a third party who had used “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” since at least 2012.During the Board proceeding, the non-profit failed to introduce any trial evidence to establish its common law rights or priority. The Board dismissed the opposition due to lack of evidence. As to the counterclaim, the Board found that the media company had acquired valid and enforceable common law rights in the mark through its assignment, which included the goodwill associated with the mark. The Board rejected arguments that the assignment was invalid because it occurred during litigation or was an assignment in gross, and concluded that, at least for clothing, the transfer was valid. The Board canceled the non-profit’s registration and dismissed its opposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed that the assignment was not in gross, did not violate statutory or regulatory prohibitions, and that the non-profit’s failure to submit evidence justified dismissal. The decision to cancel the non-profit’s registration and dismiss its opposition was affirmed. View "GAME PLAN, INC. v. UNINTERRUPTED IP, LLC " on Justia Law

IBM owns a patent concerning single sign-on (SSO) technology, which allows users to access protected resources on a second system using credentials from a first system. In simplified terms, the invention facilitates account creation on a second platform (such as a healthcare provider) using a user identifier already stored by the first platform (such as a social media website), thereby avoiding the need for users to create separate accounts for each service. The patent describes specific systems and processes for transmitting user identifiers and managing account creation in distributed environments.Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. (Rakuten) filed petitions for inter partes review of IBM’s patent at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), asserting anticipation and obviousness based on several prior art references, especially a system disclosed in Sunada. The PTAB adopted IBM’s construction of certain claim terms but found that Sunada taught or suggested most relevant limitations. The Board held claims 1–4, 12–16, and 18–19 unpatentable, while claims 5–11, 17, and 20 were found not unpatentable because the prior art did not disclose a specific process required by those claims.IBM appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s analysis exceeded the scope of Rakuten’s petition and that its findings lacked substantial evidence. Zillow, which had joined the review, cross-appealed regarding claims found not unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s analysis was consistent with the petition and supported by substantial evidence. It found the Board’s distinction between similar claims reasonable and affirmed both the appeal and cross-appeal, leaving the PTAB’s patentability determinations undisturbed. View "IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC. " on Justia Law

Bayou Grande Coffee Roasting Company applied to register the trademark KAHWA for use in connection with cafés and coffee shops. The trademark examiner refused registration on the grounds that KAHWA was generic or merely descriptive, relying on two meanings: one, that KAHWA allegedly means “coffee” in Arabic, and two, that it refers to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea. The examiner also invoked the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which tests foreign words for genericness and descriptiveness by translating them into English.After Bayou responded, arguing that KAHWA does not mean coffee in Arabic and that the Kashmiri green tea meaning is not relevant to American cafés and coffee shops, the examiner maintained refusals on both grounds. Bayou requested reconsideration, and the examiner continued to refuse registration, reiterating both rationales. Bayou appealed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the refusal solely on the basis of the Kashmiri green tea meaning, without addressing the Arabic coffee meaning.On further appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bayou contended that the Board’s findings of genericness and mere descriptiveness were unsupported by substantial evidence, and also challenged reliance on the doctrine of foreign equivalents. The Federal Circuit held that there was no evidence showing any café or coffee shop in the United States has ever sold kahwa, and thus KAHWA cannot be generic or merely descriptive for cafés and coffee shops. The court also concluded that the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not apply because KAHWA has a well-established English meaning as Kashmiri green tea. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, holding that KAHWA is registrable for the identified services. View "In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO. " on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY" on Justia Law