Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law

An engineer who had worked for more than two decades at a manufacturing company resigned after a demotion and accepted a leadership position at a competitor. As he was leaving, the company discovered that he had potentially printed several documents containing confidential information about its products. Although forensic analysis could not confirm that he actually printed these documents, the company concluded he had taken trade secrets and sued him and his new employer, alleging breach of a confidentiality agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets. The company sought a preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure of the alleged secrets and to restrict the engineer’s work with the competitor.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the preliminary injunction. The district court ruled that the company failed to meet its burden by not providing “clear and convincing” evidence for each of the four required factors for a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, risk of irreparable harm, risk of harm to others, and the public interest. The court treated each factor as a separate prerequisite, each requiring clear and convincing proof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, clarifying that the district court had committed a legal error. The appellate court held that the correct approach is to weigh all four preliminary injunction factors together in a sliding-scale analysis, not to require clear and convincing evidence for each factor individually. It explained that a heightened standard of proof is not mandated unless required by statute, the Constitution, or in rare cases involving unusually coercive government action, none of which applied here. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration under the appropriate standard. View "PCC Airfoils, LLC v. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Fetch! Pet Care, Inc., a nationwide franchisor of pet-care services, alleged that a group of former franchisees coordinated to exit their franchise agreements and start competing businesses, allegedly misappropriating Fetch!’s branding, client lists, intellectual property, and trade secrets. The franchisees contended that the newer “2.0” franchise model imposed high fees, delivered poor support, and led to high attrition, while some “1.0” franchisees claimed they were forced out of the system unexpectedly, leaving them no choice but to start their own businesses. A franchisee association was formed, and many franchisees sent rescission notices and pursued arbitration. Fetch! responded by filing suit for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets, and sought injunctive relief to prevent the franchisees from operating competing businesses or using its intellectual property.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held evidentiary hearings and granted Fetch!’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in part, ordering defendants to stop using Fetch!’s trademarks and cease communication with current Fetch! franchisees, but denied broader injunctive relief. The court reasoned that a full injunction could harm ongoing arbitration proceedings and found sufficient evidence to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands against Fetch!, based on allegedly deceptive conduct in selling franchises. Fetch! timely appealed the district court’s order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the unclean hands doctrine for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying broad injunctive relief based on Fetch!’s bad faith and deceptive marketing practices as an underlying cause of franchisee conduct. The court clarified standards for irreparable harm and affirmed the partial denial of preliminary injunction, relying on the doctrine of unclean hands rather than other defenses. View "Fetch! Pet Care, Inc. v. Atomic Pawz Inc." on Justia Law

A Kentucky high school intended to administer a mental-health survey to its students. Concerned about the survey’s contents, a parent requested a copy under the Kentucky Open Records Act, aiming to share it with other parents and reporters. The school denied her request, citing a provision of the state law that excludes records “prohibited by federal law or regulation” from disclosure, and argued that the survey was copyrighted by its publisher, NCS Pearson. The school did allow her to inspect the survey in person, but would not provide a copy.The parent, Miranda Stovall, did not pursue available state remedies, such as review by the Kentucky Attorney General or a state court appeal. Instead, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking a declaratory judgment that releasing the survey would fall under the fair-use exception in federal copyright law. NCS Pearson moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed the case, finding that Stovall’s claim did not arise under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking because Stovall’s claim arose under state law, not the Copyright Act, and did not “necessarily raise” a substantial federal question. The court found that copyright law entered the dispute only as a defense to the state-law claim, and that potential future infringement actions did not establish Article III standing. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Stovall v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy's complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay's copyrights, precluded Tammy's claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy's arguments regarding the termination notices' compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). View "Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Lavery, an ophthalmologist, invented a vision screening device and patented it. He entered into an agreement with Pursuant Health, a company developing vision screening kiosks, to transfer his patent in exchange for royalties on the sales of these kiosks. Lavery's patent expired in May 2021, and Pursuant Health ceased paying royalties. Lavery sued Pursuant Health, seeking a declaration that the royalty payments should continue indefinitely, damages for breach of the Contribution Agreement, and damages for unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Pursuant Health, ruling that the expiration of Lavery's patent rendered the royalty agreement unenforceable. Lavery appealed the decision, challenging the grant of summary judgment on his breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the royalty provision in the Contribution Agreement was unenforceable after the expiration of Lavery's patent. The court found that the agreement did not specify any non-patent contributions that would justify continuing the royalty payments beyond the patent's expiration. The court also noted that the royalty was based on the sales of kiosks that incorporated Lavery's patent, and thus, the royalty provision improperly extended beyond the patent's 20-year term. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Pursuant Health. View "Lavery v. Pursuant Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Sixth Circuit finds little likelihood of confusion between the trademarks “OrderLink” and “UPS OrderLink.” Progressive, located in Michigan, provides logistical services to online businesses. Under the trademark “OrderLink,” Progressive develops clients’ websites and handles deliveries. Progressive registered the OrderLink trademark in 2004, but alleges that it has used the mark for at least 19 years and spent $2.5 million dollars advertising the mark. UPS also serves small volume shippers who operate businesses on Amazon and eBay. In 2012, UPS developed a new interface to enable those customers to import their orders directly into UPS’s shipping application. UPS initially concluded that the name “orderlink” was not available, but determined that the terms “order” and “link” were commonly used together by other companies. UPS concluded that Progressive’s services differed substantially from tits application UPS and chose the name “UPS OrderLink.” Its USPTO application was rejected based on a likelihood of confusion with Progressive’s mark. Nonetheless, UPS launched UPS OrderLink as a free service, accessible only through UPS’s website. Progressive sent a cease-and-desist letter. UPS changed the name of its service to “Ship Marketplace Orders.” Progressive alleged violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and the common law. The district court granted UPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The balance of eight factors, particularly the strength of the mark and the similarity of the marks, indicate little likelihood of customer confusion. View "Progressive Distribution Services, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Kibler, a disc jockey, uses turntables and others’ vocals to produce music containing jazz and funk elements. He released several albums under the name “DJ LOGIC” since 1999, but currently has no record deal. Kibler registered “DJ LOGIC” as a trademark in 2000, allowed the registration to lapse, and re-registered it in 2013. He has also been known as “LOGIC.” Hall has performed under the name “LOGIC” since 2009. In 2012, Kibler’s attorney sent Hall’s management company and booking agent an email ordering them to stop using the name “LOGIC” and to recall any product or advertisement that did, claiming infringement on Kibler’s mark. Hall’s company applied to register “LOGIC” as a trademark. Kibler sued, alleging trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); breach of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act; unfair competition under Michigan law; and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act. In 2014, defendants delayed Hall’s tour and first album release due to ongoing settlement negotiations that ultimately collapsed. Defendants then released the album, which sold over 170,000 copies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Kibler did not provide evidence sufficient to find that relevant consumers are likely to confuse the sources of his and Hall’s products or that Hall diluted Kibler’s mark. View "Kibler v. Hall" on Justia Law

Albert Brumley, author of the gospel song “I’ll Fly Away,” assigned the song’s 1932 copyright to a company. The company subsequently became the property of his son, Robert. Albert died in 1977. Albert’s widow also executed an assignment to Robert. During the term of a copyright, an author may use, assign, sell, or license the copyright, 17 U.S.C. 201(d), but songwriters and their descendants may terminate the songwriter’s assignment of a copyright to another party, Sections 203, 304(c). In 2008, four of Brumley’s six children filed notice to terminate the assignment to their brother, Robert. The copyright was then generating about $300,000 per year. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed their right to terminate the assignment, rejecting arguments that the song was a “work made for hire,” which is not eligible for termination, 17 U.S.C. 304(c); and that Albert’s widow relinquished any termination rights. View "Brumley v. Brumley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1969, the Flynt brothers opened “Hustler Club” nightclub, in Cincinnati. Larry later created the Hustler conglomerate, producing sexually explicit magazines. Jimmy opened his retail store, Hustler Cincinnati, in 2000, using the “HUSTLER” trademark (owned by Larry’s corporation) and began paying licensing in 2004. Jimmy and Larry had a falling out. Larry's Hustler fired Jimmy in 2009. Jimmy’s Hustler stopped paying fees, but continued to use the mark. Larry sued. The court enjoined Jimmy from “using in commerce any HUSTLER trademark” and “using any trademark or any variation thereof owned by” Larry or his corporations. Later, Larry complained that Jimmy had opened a new store in Florence, Kentucky, “FLYNT Sexy Gifts.” The court denied the contempt motion because the injunction did not directly prohibit Jimmy’s conduct. but modified the injunction, reasoning that Jimmy’s use of “FLYNT Sexy Gifts” was “likely to cause confusion with the LARRY FLYNT trademark.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed a modification that prohibits Jimmy from “[u]sing the name ‘Flynt’ in connection with the sale, promotion or advertising of adult entertainment products or services unless it is accompanied by the first name ‘Jimmy’ in the same font size, color, and style and on the same background color,” and required Jimmy, when using the name “Flynt” anywhere except on “store signage,” to incorporate “a conspicuous disclaimer stating that the goods or services are not ‘sponsored, endorsed by, or affiliated with Larry Flynt or Hustler, or any business enterprise owned or controlled by Larry Flynt.’” View "LFP IP, LLC v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc." on Justia Law