Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

IV’s 248 patent describes “an application-aware resource allocator” that allocates bandwidth resources to transmit information from software applications over a packet-switched network. The patent explains that quality of service (QoS) requirements may vary among applications, with some types of applications demanding, for instance, error minimization, and others prioritizing speed. To meet these varying requirements, the application-aware resource allocator “allocates bandwidth resource to an application based on an application type.” The district court rejected an infringement suit on summary judgment. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The plain meanings of “application-aware resource allocator” in claim 1 and “application-aware media access control (MAC) layer” in claim 20 permits the resource allocator to allocate resources based on application type, which can be discerned using information from any of network layer 3, transport layer 4, and application layer 7. The district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement resulted from a contrary construction. The court affirmed a determination that the “allocating means” in claim 20 are indefinite. The patent described QoS as “subjective” and varying based on individual preferences; the patent does not “provide adequate guidance.” View "Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The patent, which expired in 2015, is entitled “Optimizing packet size to eliminate effects of reception nulls,” and is directed to increasing the reliability of a wireless communications system when a wireless receiver is moving by minimizing the effects of burst errors (nulls) that occur at the receiver. Although nulls occur randomly, they can be predicted based on signal drop characteristics, such as the speed the receiver is moving. In describing prior art, the patent notes another technique for reducing the effects of burst errors "involves interleaving multiple message packets together.” On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found various claims not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Board improperly failed to consider a portion of the petitioner’s (Ericsson) reply brief, having characterized that portion of the reply as raising a new theory of obviousness, not addressed in the Petition or responding to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. “The Board’s error was parsing Ericsson’s arguments on reply with too fine of a filter.” Given the acknowledgment in the patent that interleaving was known in the art, Ericsson was entitled to argue on reply that the distinction in the specific type of interleaving between prior art and the patent would have been insubstantial to a person of skill in the art. The error was exacerbated by the fact that the significance of interleaving arose after the Petition was filed. View "Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC" on Justia Law

Diamond Hong petitioned for cancellation of Cai’s mark, “WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA,” based on a likelihood of confusion with its registered TAI CHI mark. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) found a likelihood of confusion, giving limited consideration to Cai’s briefing because it contravened provisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP). The Federal Circuit affirmed the cancellation of Cai’s mark under 15 U.S.C. 1052(d). The TBMP states that the TTAB is not required to permit “a party in the position of defendant” to file a reply brief. Diamond Hong initiated the cancellation proceedings by filing a petition;Cai was in the position of a defendant and was not entitled to file a reply brief. In its likelihood of confusion analysis, the TTAB considered the first three "DuPont factors," treating the rest as neutral because neither party submitted evidence related to them. Substantial evidence supports the TTAB’s findings with respect to each DuPont factor: the similarity of the nature of the goods, the similarity of established trade channels, and the similarity of the marks. View "Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc." on Justia Law

Maatita filed a design patent application, covering the design of an athletic shoe bottom, with two figures showing a plan view of the claimed shoe bottom design. As is customary, the solid lines of Figure 1 show the claimed design, whereas the broken lines show structure that is not part of the claimed design—the shoe bottom environment in which the design is embodied. An examiner rejected the application’s single claim as non-enabled and indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112 because the plan left the design open to multiple interpretations regarding the depth and contour of the claimed elements. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board misapplied section 112 in the design patent context. The standard for indefiniteness is connected to the standard for infringement. A design patent is infringed if “an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art, would be deceived into thinking that the accused design was the same as the patented design.” Maatita’s decision not to disclose all possible depth choices would not preclude an ordinary observer from understanding the claimed design since the design is capable of being understood from the two-dimensional, plan- or planar-view perspective shown in the drawing. View "In re: Maatita" on Justia Law

Core sued Apple, alleging infringement of two patents concerning technology for wireless communications in a digital network. Claim 14 is directed to a mobile station, such as a mobile telephone, configured to synchronize to a base station using the same timing information for the uplink and downlink channels. Claim 19 is directed to a receiver, such as a mobile telephone, that can detect predetermined control messages where they are not otherwise expected. A jury found that Apple infringed both asserted claims and that neither was invalid. The court rejected Apple’s argument that the 151 patent was unenforceable due to implied waiver. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The jury’s finding of infringement of claim 14 was supported by substantial evidence. The issue of validity came down to a disagreement between the experts; the jury could reasonably credit the testimony of Core’s expert over that of Apple’s expert. The court remanded with respect to Apple’s implied waiver theory of unenforceability, based on actions taken by Nokia, the original assignee of one patent, during its participation with the standards-setting organization referenced in the patent. The district court did not make findings regarding whether either party inequitably benefited from Nokia’s failure to disclose, or whether Nokia’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify finding implied waiver without regard to any benefit resulting from that misconduct. The court reversed in part; Core’s theory of infringement is inadequate to support a judgment on claim 19. View "Core Wireless Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Luminara owns three patents for making flameless candles that look and behave like real candles. At Liown’s request, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) of 31 claims of those patents. The Board first addressed whether the IPR of the 319 patent was time-barred under 35 U.S.C. 315(b), because the petition was filed more than a year after Liown was served with a complaint alleging infringement by Candella, Luminara’s predecessor. The district court had entered a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Luminara later commenced another lawsuit against Liown, again alleging infringement of the 319 patent as to the same products. The IPR petition was within one year of service of the second action. The Board rejected the timeliness argument because the first action had been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, ‘leav[ing] the parties as though the action had never been brought.’” The Board found all 31 claims were either anticipated or would have been obvious over the prior art. The Federal Circuit vacated the decision as to the 319 patent and remanded for dismissal of that IPR, holding that the section 315(b) time-bar applies, and affirmed the other IPRs. The Board lacked jurisdiction to institute the time-barred IPR. View "Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Iancu" on Justia Law

PI filed four petitions with the Patent and Trademark Office under 35 U.S.C. 311(b) requesting inter partes review of the claims of three patents. The patents share a priority date of June 4, 1997. The Board denied the petitions, finding that PI failed to show that any reference cited in the petitions was publicly accessible before that date and that the relied-upon references were not invalidating prior art. The petitions relied on three references: a paper presented at a 1993 conference and two data sheets. The Board rejected the references under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 311(b), concluding that they were not printed publications available to the public. The Federal Circuit denied relief, rejecting claims of procedural irregularities; 35 U.S.C. 314(d), states that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” A disappointed petitioner cannot by-pass the statutory bar on appellate review simply by directing its challenge to asserted procedural irregularities rather than to the substance of the non-institution ruling. View "In re: Power Integrations, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Inforocket sued Keen for infringement suit of the 836 patent. Keen brought its own infringement suit against Inforocket based on another patent, before the same judge. The court granted Inforocket summary judgment of noninfringement. While its appeal was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket. Both suits were dismissed “without prejudice.” Keen changed its name to Ingenio.and successfully requested ex parte reexamination of the 836 patent. Several claims were canceled, others were determined to be patentable as amended, and new claims were added. Ingenio was later sold twice. CTC acquired the 836 patent, and, in 2012, asserted infringement against multiple parties. In 2013, Ingenio and others filed a single IPR petition challenging claims of the 836 patent. CTC argued that 35 U.S.C. 315(b) barred institution of IPR proceedings, and that Ingenio lacked standing because Ingenio was served with the 2001 infringement complaint.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found the suit was not barred because the 2001 suit was “dismissed voluntarily without prejudice … leaving the parties as though the action had never been brought.” The Board did not address whether the patent at issue in that suit is the same patent, in light of interim amendments, or whether section 315(b)’s time bar should be determined on a “petitioner-by-petitioner” basis. The Board determined that several claims either were anticipated by or would have been obvious in view of prior art. The Federal Circuit, having previously held that section 315(b) time-bar determinations are appealable,” vacated. The petition was time-barred and the Board lacked jurisdiction to institute IPR proceedings. View "Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v. Ingenio, Inc." on Justia Law

The patent describes an ATM, capable of performing banking transactions, including “automatically depositing a bundle of cashes and cheques inserted at once” by separating deposited bundles into individual banknotes; verifying the authenticity or abnormality of each note; sorting and processing the notes based on how each was verified; and preparing the notes for storage safes. One component recited in each of the nine claims is a “cheque standby unit.” The specification does not mention a “cheque standby unit,” but references a “cheque temporary standby unit” in three portions of the detailed description. The International Trade Commission found that Diebold violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing ATM components that infringe the claims, all of which recite the term “cheque standby unit.” The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the term “cheque standby unit” is a means-plus-function term subject to 35 U.S.C. 112, para. 6, which lacks corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. The claimed function is “holding the at least one authentic cheque to return the at least one authentic cheque to the user responsive to receiving user instructions canceling depositing of the at least one authentic cheque.” A person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim. View "Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

BSG sued BuySeasons for infringement of three patents related to systems and methods for indexing information stored in wide access databases. The patents teach that the “self-evolving” aspect of the claimed invention addresses the shortcomings of prior art by enabling users to “add new parameters for use in describing items.” The district court dismissed the suit on grounds that none of the asserted patent claims were patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The asserted claims are directed to the abstract idea of considering historical usage information while inputting data. BSG does not purport to have invented database structures that allow database users to input item data as a series of parameters and values. The recitation of a database structure slightly more detailed than a generic database does not save the asserted claims; a claim is not patent eligible merely because it applies an abstract idea in a narrow way. The only alleged unconventional feature of BSG’s claims is the requirement that users are guided by summary comparison usage information or relative historical usage information but this simply restates an abstract idea. View "BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc." on Justia Law