Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Dyax Corporation performed research for Ares Trading S.A. and licensed patents to Ares, including some held by Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT Patents). Ares used Dyax’s research to develop a cancer drug, Bavencio, and agreed to pay royalties to Dyax based on the drug’s sales. The royalty obligation outlasted the lifespan of the CAT Patents. The District Court held that Ares’ royalty obligation was not unenforceable under Brulotte v. Thys Co., which prohibits royalties that extend beyond a patent’s expiration.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that Ares’ royalty obligation did not violate Brulotte because it was not calculated based on activity requiring the use of inventions covered by the CAT Patents after their expiration. The court characterized the royalties as deferred compensation for Dyax’s pre-expiration research. Additionally, the court noted that Ares’ royalty obligation could run until the latest-running patent covered in the agreement expired, which included patents other than the CAT Patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Ares’ royalty obligation was not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use of the CAT Patents, and thus, Brulotte did not apply. The court emphasized that the royalties were based on sales of Bavencio, which did not require the use of the CAT Patents after their expiration. The court also rejected Ares’ argument that Dyax violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, noting that Ares received all the benefits promised under the agreement. The court concluded that Dyax did not breach any obligations under the agreement, and Ares’ royalty obligation remained enforceable. View "Ares Trading SA v. Dyax Corp" on Justia Law

Lontex Corporation, a small Pennsylvania business, holds a registered trademark for “Cool Compression” used in its athletic compression apparel. Lontex sued Nike, Inc. for trademark infringement after discovering Nike's use of the phrase “Cool Compression” in its product names and marketing materials. Nike had rebranded a line of its athletic clothing as “Nike Pro” and used the phrase “Cool Compression” in product names on its website and catalogs. Lontex sent a cease-and-desist letter to Nike in 2016, but Nike continued using the phrase for some time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held a trial where the jury found Nike liable for willful trademark infringement and contributory infringement, awarding Lontex $142,000 in compensatory damages and $365,000 in punitive damages. The District Court also trebled the compensatory damages to $426,000 and awarded Lontex nearly $5 million in attorney’s fees, deeming the case “exceptional” under the Lanham Act. Nike appealed the findings and the damages awarded, while Lontex cross-appealed the dismissal of its counterfeiting claim and the denial of profit disgorgement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s findings on trademark infringement, willfulness, and the trebling of damages. The Court held that a reasonable jury could find Nike’s continued use of “Cool Compression” after receiving the cease-and-desist letter as willful infringement. However, the Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding that the District Court relied on broad policy considerations rather than specific facts of the case. The Court remanded the issue of attorney’s fees for further proceedings. The Court also upheld the dismissal of Lontex’s counterfeiting claim and the denial of profit disgorgement. View "Lontex Corp v. Nike Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing trademark dispute between two charities, Kars 4 Kids, Inc. and America Can! Cars for Kids. Both organizations sell donated vehicles to fund children's education programs. In 2003, Texas-based America Can discovered a Kars 4 Kids advertisement in the Dallas Morning News and sent Kars 4 Kids a cease and desist letter, asserting America Can’s rights to the “Cars for Kids” mark in Texas. Kars 4 Kids, based in New Jersey, did not respond to the letter and continued to advertise in Texas.The case was first brought to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 2014, where both parties alleged federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution claims. A jury found that Kars 4 Kids infringed on America Can’s unregistered mark in Texas. The District Court awarded monetary and injunctive relief. However, the court's decision was appealed, and the case was remanded for the District Court to reexamine its conclusion that the doctrine of laches did not bar America Can’s claims.On remand, the District Court again concluded that laches did not bar relief. The court found that Kars 4 Kids’ advertising in Texas was not open and notorious enough to prompt America Can to act more quickly to protect its mark. The court also found that Kars 4 Kids was not prejudiced by America Can’s delay because Kars 4 Kids had assumed the risk of its advertising campaigns after receiving the 2003 cease and desist letter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's findings. The appellate court held that the District Court abused its discretion by not properly applying the presumption in favor of laches. The court found that America Can failed to establish that its delay in bringing suit was excusable and that Kars 4 Kids was not prejudiced as a result of that delay. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court's judgment granting monetary and injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss America Can’s claims with prejudice based on laches. The court also dismissed as moot America Can’s cross-appeal. View "Kars 4 Kids Inc v. America Can Cars For Kids" on Justia Law

The case in question is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Abbott Laboratories, Abbvie Inc., Abbvie Products LLC, Unimed Pharmaceuticals LLC, and Besins Healthcare, Inc. These petitioners were involved in a patent and antitrust lawsuit concerning the drug AndroGel 1%. They sought a writ of mandamus after a district judge ruled that the application of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege justified an order compelling the production of certain documents. The Petitioners claimed those documents were privileged.The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied their petition. The court reasoned that the petitioners failed to meet the high standard for granting a petition for writ of mandamus. Specifically, they failed to show a clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or error of law, a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate relief, and a likelihood of irreparable injury.The court also found that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege as it applies to sham litigation. The court held that sham litigation, which involves a client’s intentional “misuse” of the legal process for an “improper purpose,” can trigger the crime-fraud exception. The court also rejected the argument that a "reliance" requirement must be applied in this context. View "In re: Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

About 20 years ago, PIM introduced a chewy candy, watermelon-flavored, wedge-shaped Sour Jacks Wedges. Its colors match its flavor: a green layer topped by a thin white band with a larger red section. PIM advertised the candy as “The Ultimate Shape of Sour” and told consumers to “Respect the Wedge.” Years later, PIM tried to trademark the wedge shape. The Patent and Trademark Office required PIM to add colors. PIM registered the shape of a wedge, with an upper green section with white speckles, followed by a narrow middle white section, with a lower red section with white speckles. PIM later produced Sour Jacks Wedges in other flavors. Each has a color to match its flavor. The Patent Office granted PIM a supplemental registration for a tricolored wedge with unspecified colors. Haribo recently introduced its own chewy watermelon candy as an elongated watermelon wedge in red, white, and green.PIM sued for trademark and trade-dress infringement, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A). Haribo countered that PIM’s trade dress was functional and asked the court to cancel PIM’s trademark. The district court granted Haribo summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. PIM may have created the wedge shape to distinguish its product in the market but in doing so, it made a candy reminiscent of a juicy watermelon wedge, which makes the whole trade dress functional when applied to a watermelon candy. The cancellation order should apply to the primary registration. View "Pim Brands Inc v. Haribo of America Inc." on Justia Law

PPG, a Pittsburgh company, developed a new kind of plastic for airplane windows, “Opticor™ A former PPG employee, Rukavina, agreed to share proprietary information concerning Opticor with TMG, a China-based manufacturer. TMG contacted the PPG subcontractor that made Opticor window molds, asking it to manufacture the same molds, attaching photographs and drawings from a proprietary report. The subcontractor alerted PPG, which notified the FBI, which executed warrants to search Rukavina’s email account and residence. Rukavina was charged with criminal theft of trade secrets.PPG filed a civil action against TMG, under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)-(d) and Pennsylvania law. TMG did not respond to the complaint, nor did it answer requests for admissions. More than a year after TMG should have appeared the clerk entered a default. PPG asserted actual damages of $9,909,687.31. Four months later, TMG appeared and unsuccessfully moved to set aside the default. The court held that PPG had sufficiently established TMG’s liability and was entitled to treble damages, an injunction, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. The court found that $8,805,929 of the claimed actual damages were supported by sufficient evidence and entered judgment for $26,417,787.The Third Circuit affirmed. TMG effectively conceded the complaint’s allegations. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it can be appropriate to measure unjust enrichment from a misappropriated trade secret by looking at development costs that were avoided but would have been incurred if not for the misappropriation. The district court carefully analyzed such evidence; its methodology and conclusion are sound. View "PPG Industries Inc v. Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co Ltd" on Justia Law

Since 2004, Nichino has offered a trademarked pesticide, “CENTAUR.” Valent trademarked a competing product, “SENSTAR,” in 2019, with a similar logo. Both pesticides are used by farmers in the same geographic areas against many of the same insects. SENSTAR is a liquid, a unique combination of two active chemicals. CENTAUR is manufactured as a solid, packed into bags and cases.Nichino sued for trademark infringement, seeking a preliminary injunction. The court applied the newly-effective Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) Pub. Law 116-260, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm favoring a plaintiff who has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement claim. The district court found Nichino narrowly demonstrated its infringement claim would likely succeed, though “there is not an abundance of evidence of likelihood of confusion,” applied a 10-part, non-exhaustive analysis of likely confusion, then denied a preliminary injunction.The Third Circuit affirmed. The TMA’s rebuttable presumption requires courts considering a trademark injunction to assess the plaintiff’s evidence only as it relates to a likelihood of success on the merits. If that evidence does establish likely trademark infringement, the TMA is triggered, and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the consumer confusion is unlikely to cause irreparable harm. If a defendant successfully rebuts the TMA’s presumption by making this slight evidentiary showing, the presumption has no effect. View "Nichino America Inc v. Valent USA LLC" on Justia Law

Pyrotechnics manufactures and sells hardware (a control panel and a field module) and software that control fireworks displays under the “FireOne” brand. Since around 1995, Pyrotechnics’s hardware has used a proprietary protocol. Pyrotechnics’s Romanian competitor, fireTEK, reverse-engineered Pyrotechnics’s hardware to learn its communication protocol. In 2018, fireTEK developed a router that could send analog signals to Pyrotechnics’s field module just like those sent by Pyrotechnics’s control panel.; fireTEK promoted its router as a replacement for Pyrotechnics’s control panel. Pyrotechnics filed a seven-page document describing its protocol (Deposit Copy) with the U.S. Copyright Office and received a Certificate of Registration, indicating the copyrighted work is “text.” Pyrotechnics asserts that it submitted the Deposit Copy as “identifying material” for its protocol under 37 C.F.R. 202.20(c)(2)(viii). Pyrotechnics claims the protocol was first published when it was embedded inside its hardware in 1995.Pyrotechnics sued fireTEK for copyright infringement, tortious interference with prospective contractual relations, and unfair competition, 17 U.S.C. 411(a). The district court entered an injunction. The Third Circuit vacated, finding the copyright invalid. Pyrotechnics’s digital message format is an uncopyrightable idea and the individual digital messages described in the Deposit Copy are insufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection. View "Pyrotechnics Management Inc v. XFX Pyrotechnics LLC" on Justia Law

Vitamin Energy is the defendant in 5-hour Energy’s 2019 lawsuit under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, false advertising, and trademark dilution; 5-hour also made claims under Michigan law for trademark infringement, indirect trademark infringement, and unfair competition. Vitamin Energy was insured by Evanston. In a declaratory judgment action, the district court decided Evanston had no duty to defend. The Third Circuit vacated. Pennsylvania law imposes on insurers a broad duty to defend lawsuits brought against those they insure. An insured’s burden to establish its insurer’s duty to defend is light, and Vitamin Energy has carried it. The policy excludes coverage for Advertising Injury, defined as an injury “arising out of oral or written publication of material that libels or slanders.” While some allegations of the complaint involve disparagement, others do not. An underlying complaint need only contain at least one allegation that falls within the scope of the policy’s coverage for the duty to defend to be triggered. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Similarly, exclusions for suits based on “Intellectual Property,” “Incorrect Description,” “Failure to Conform,” and “Knowing” actions do not defeat the duty to defend. View "Vitamin Energy LLC v. Evanston Insurance Co" on Justia Law

In 2019, Mallet learned that Bundy was its newest competitor in the sale of baking release agents, the lubricants that allow baked goods to readily separate from the containers in which they are made. Bundy was well-known for other commercial baking products when it launched a new subsidiary, Synova, to sell baking release agents. Synova hired two Mallet employees, both of whom had substantial access to Mallet’s proprietary information. That information from Mallet helped Synova rapidly develop, market, and sell release agents to Mallet’s customers.Mallet sued, asserting the misappropriation of its trade secrets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction. restraining Bundy, Synova, and those employees from competing with Mallet. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for further consideration of what, if any, equitable relief is warranted and what sum Mallet should be required to post in a bond as “security … proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” A preliminary injunction predicated on trade secret misappropriation must adequately identify the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets. If the district court decides that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted, the injunction must be sufficiently specific in its terms and narrowly tailored in its scope. View "Mallet & Co., Inc. v. Lacayo" on Justia Law