Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

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WesternGeco owns patents for a system used to survey the ocean floor. ION sold a competing system, built from components manufactured in the U.S., then shipped abroad for assembly into a system indistinguishable from WesternGeco’s. WesternGeco sued for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1) and (f)(2). The jury awarded WesternGeco royalties and lost profits under section 284. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that WesternGeco’s award for lost profits was a permissible domestic application of section 284 of the Patent Act, not an impermissible extraterritorial application of section 271. To determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, courts must identify the statute’s "focus” and ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in U.S. territory. If so, the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. When determining the statute’s focus, the provision at issue must be assessed in concert with other provisions. Section 284, the general damages provision, focuses on “the infringement.” The “overriding purpose” is “complete compensation” for infringements. Section 271 identifies several ways that a patent can be infringed; to determine section 284’s focus in a given case, the type of infringement must be identified. Section 271(f)(2) was the basis for WesternGeco’s claim and damages. That provision regulates the domestic act of “suppl[ying] in or from the United States,” and vindicates domestic interests, The focus of section 284 in a case involving infringement under section 271(f)(2) is the act of exporting components from the U.S., so the relevant conduct occurred in the U.S. Damages are not the statutory focus but are merely the means by which the statute remedies infringements. The overseas events giving rise to the lost-profit damages here were merely incidental to the infringement. View "WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CoreLogic in an action brought under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Plaintiffs, professional real estate photographers, alleged that CoreLogic removed copyright management information from their photographs and distributed their photographs with the copyright management information removed, in violation of 17 U.S.C. 1202(b)(1)–(3). The panel held that section 1202(b) requires an affirmative showing that the defendant knew the prohibited act would induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement. In this case, plaintiffs failed to make the required affirmative showing because they failed to produce evidence showing that CoreLogic knew its software carried even a substantial risk of inducing, enabling, facilitating, or concealing infringement, let alone a pattern or probability of such a connection to infringement. The panel affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' discovery request and the award of fees. View "Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc." on Justia Law

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Royal Crown (RC) and The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) compete in the beverage market. Both companies and others distribute beverages that use ZERO as an element of their marks. When RC sought trademark protection for DIET RITE PURE ZERO and PURE ZERO, it disclaimed the term ZERO apart from the marks as a whole. TCCC has used ZERO as an element in its marks for at least 12 different beverage products sold in the U.S. The Patent and Trademark Office requested that TCCC disclaim the term “zero” because the term merely “describes a feature of the applicant’s goods, namely, calorie or carbohydrate content of the goods.” TCCC responded that the term had acquired distinctiveness under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(f). The PTO accepted TCCC’s Section 2(f) submissions and approved the marks for publication without requiring disclaimers. The Board concluded that RC failed to demonstrate that ZERO is generic for the genus of goods identified in TCC's applications; that survey evidence indicated that TCCC’s ZERO marks had acquired distinctiveness; and that TCCC’s use of ZERO in connection with soft drinks was substantially exclusive, given the “magnitude of TCCC’s use.” The Board dismissed RC’s oppositions. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board erred in its legal framing of the question of the claimed genericness of TCCC’s marks, and failed to determine whether, if not generic, the marks were at least highly descriptive. View "Royal Crown Co., Inc.. v. The Coca-Cola Co." on Justia Law

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Sirona’s 006 patent “relates to a method for producing a drill assistance device,” a drill template, “to precisely place a pilot hole for a tooth implant, wherein the pilot hole for the tooth implant is aligned relative to the teeth that still remain in the jaw.” The specification discloses taking X-ray images of the jaw and taking a three-dimensional optical image of the visible surfaces of the jaw and teeth. These images are compiled into “measured data records” and correlated. From this correlation, the position for the implant is determined and a drill template is prepared. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found claims 1–8 of unpatentable as obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103, over the combination of a German Patent (Bannuscher) and a U.S. Patent (Truppe), and denied Sirona’s contingent motion to amend the claims. The Board found patentable claims 9–10. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports that claims 1–8 would have been obvious over the combination of Bannuscher and Truppe; the Board’s unpatentability determination did not deviate from the grounds alleged in the petition. Petitioners failed to demonstrate claims 9–10 were unpatentable. The court vacated the denial of the contingent motion to amend and remanded. View "Sirona Dental Systems GMBH v. Institut Straumann AG" on Justia Law

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FastShip’s patents, entitled “Monohull Fast Sealift or Semi-Planing Monohull Ship,” relate to a “fast ship whose hull design in combination with a waterjet propulsion system permits, for ships of about 25,000 to 30,000 tons displacement with a cargo carrying capacity of 5,000 tons, transoceanic transit speeds of up to 40 to 50 knots in high or adverse sea states.” FastShip sued the government, alleging patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. 1498. FastShip alleged that the Navy’s Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships, LCS-1 and LCS-3, infringed various claims. Following the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion construing various terms, the government successfully moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the LCS3 was not “manufactured” by or for the government within the meaning of section 1498 before the patents expired. The court held that LCS-1 infringed the claims and awarded FastShip $6,449,585.82 in damages plus interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed, modifying the damages award. The court interpreted “manufactured” in section 1498 in accordance with its plain meaning, such that a product is “manufactured” when it is made to include each limitation of the thing invented and is therefore suitable for use; although other portions of LCS-3 had been completed, the “waterjet” and “hull” limitations had not been completed before the patent’s expiration. View "FastShip, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

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More than 95% of the world’s bourbon comes from Kentucky. One distiller, Colonel Edmund Haynes Taylor, Jr., was called “the most remarkable man to enter the whiskey industry during the post-Civil War years.” Taylor built the Old Taylor Distillery in 1887 in Woodford County, to resemble a medieval limestone castle. The distillery fell into financial ruin and changed hands several times after the Colonel’s death. Production ceased in 1972. In 2014, Peristyle purchased the Old Taylor distillery, planning to renovate and resume bourbon production there. Peristyle renamed the property “Castle & Key” and intends to do business under that name, including marketing its bourbons and whiskeys. During the renovation period, the company regularly referred to its location at “the Former Old Taylor Distillery” or simply “Old Taylor.” Sazerac, which owns the trademark rights to “Old Taylor” and “Colonel E.H. Taylor” and produces bourbons under both names, sued Peristyle, alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Lanham Act as well as common law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and passing-off violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Peristyle, which used the Old Taylor name descriptively and in good faith, qualifying for shelter under the Lanham Act’s fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). View "Sazerac Brands, LLC v. Peristyle, LLC" on Justia Law

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Stone sued Cook in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of the 327 patent, which relates to a basket-type medical device used to remove stones from biological systems. Venue was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. Cook deposed the patent’s inventor, who stated, regarding the addition of the “sheath movement element” in claim 1 to overcome an examiner’s rejection, “I realize there is nothing novel about it.” Cook then petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office for inter partes review of all claims. Following the institution of IPR, one of Stone’s managing members offered to license the 327 patent to Cook for $150,000.00 but negotiations broke down. The Patent Board canceled all of the patent’s claims. Following a dismissal with prejudice, the court denied Cook’s motion for attorney fees, 35 U.S.C. 285. The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing the case was not “exceptional” and that Stone lacked any type of “clear notice” of the 327 patent’s invalidity by service of Cook’s invalidity contentions. While one might view Stone’s litigating position as weak given the inventor’s deposition testimony regarding the novelty and origin of claim 1’s sheath handle element, exceptionality is not assessed by a strong or even correct litigating position. View "Stone Basket Innovations, LLC v. Cook Medical LLC" on Justia Law

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Medtronic manufactures surgical systems and tools used in spinal surgeries. Spine surgeon Dr. Barry sued Medtronic for patent infringement. Medtronic then petitioned for, and the Patent Board instituted, inter partes review (IPR) proceedings for all claims in both patents. The Board concluded that Medtronic had not proven that the challenged patent claims are unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports that the challenged claims would not have been obvious over two references. The court vacated the Board’s conclusion that certain other references, including a video entitled “Thoracic Pedicle Screws for Idiopathic Scoliosis” and slides entitled “Free Hand Thoracic Screw Placement and Clinical Use in Scoliosis and Kyphosis Surgery” were not prior art because the Board did not fully consider all the factors for determining whether they were publicly accessible. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently held that the statute does not permit a partial institution leading to a partial final written decision and that the final written decisions relating to this appeal do not address every ground raised in the petitions, so the Board will consider the previously non-considered grounds on remand. View "Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry" on Justia Law

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PGS’s patent describes and claims methods and systems for performing “marine seismic surveying” to determine the structure of earth formations below the seabed. WesternGeco, a competitor of PGS’s, filed three petitions requesting inter partes reviews (IPRs) of claims 1– 38 of the patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted three IPRs, but it specified for review only some of the claims WesternGeco challenged and only some of the grounds for WesternGeco’s challenges. The Board ruled partly for PGS and partly for WesternGeco on the reviewed claims and grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed that certain claims of the patent are unpatentable for obviousness. Although precedent now makes clear that the Board erred in limiting the scope of the IPRs it instituted and hence the scope of its final written decisions, the court found that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of the Board’s final written decisions without reviving the “non-instituted” claims and grounds. View "PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, members of a musical group called "Sly Slick & Wicked," filed suit alleging that Dynatone and others collected royalties from the sampling of their song, "Sho' Nuff" in 2013 and that plaintiffs were entitled to those royalty payments. The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that a repudiation of plaintiffs' claims with respect to the original terms constituted a repudiation of the renewal terms. In this case, plaintiffs did not have reasonable notice that defendants had filed a registration in the capacity of employer for hire. Therefore, the registration did not constitute effective repudiation, triggering an obligation for plaintiffs to bring suit. Accordingly, the court vacated this portion of the judgment. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law accounting claim for failure to allege a fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings as to plaintiffs' renewal term copyright claims. View "Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing Co." on Justia Law