Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

TAOS and Intersil were both developing ambient light sensors for electronic devices. Ambient light sensors use a silicon- or other semiconductor-based photodiode that absorbs light and conducts a current. The resulting photocurrent is detected by a sensor, and measurements of the current, a function of the ambient light, are used to adjust the brightness of an electronic screen display. One benefit is better visibility; another is improved battery efficiency. In 2004, the parties confidentially shared technical and financial information during negotiations regarding a possible merger that did not occur. Soon after, Intersil released new sensors with the technical design TAOS had disclosed in the confidential negotiations. TAOS sued for infringement of its patent, and for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and tortious interference with prospective business relations under Texas state law. A jury returned a verdict for TAOS and awarded damages on all four claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed liability for trade secret misappropriation, though on a more limited basis than TAOS presented to the jury, and affirmed liability for infringement of the asserted apparatus claims of the patent, but vacated the monetary awards. The court noted that there was no evidence of Intersil’s independent design of the photodiode array structure. View "Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

Disc’s 113 patent, entitled “Spinal Brace,” is directed to an air injectable band with a rigid panel worn around the waist. When the band is inflated it expands vertically to provide traction to the spine of the user to relieve back pain. Disc's 509 patent is entitled “Wrinkled Band Without Air Expansion Tube and its Manufacturing Method.” VGH manufactures and sells inflatable spinal brace products. Disc sued for infringement, specifically identifying VGH’s products and alleging that the products meet “each and every element of at least one claim of the 113 [or 509] Patent, either literally or equivalently.” Disc attached the asserted patents and photographs of the accused products. The following day, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, abrogating Rule 84 and Form 18, stating that the amendments “shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.” The district court dismissed Disc’s complaint with prejudice, reasoning that the change applied and that the complaint did not meet the “Iqbal/Twombly” standard articulated by the Supreme Court. The court denied Disc’s motions for reconsideration and to amend the judgment. The Federal Circuit reversed. Disc’s allegations are sufficient under the plausibility standard of Iqbal/Twombly. Disc’s disclosures provided VGH fair notice of infringement of the asserted patents. View "Disc Disease Solutions Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit considered this trademark dispute on remand. In the previous appeal, the court asked the district court to address state-law questions pertaining to the availability of attorney's fees and the ownership of a contested trademark. The district court entered orders on those questions and this appeal followed. The court held that the district court erred in determining plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees under Iowa common law. In this case, defendant's misrepresentation to the patent office was improper, but its conduct did not rise to the level of being tyrannical, cruel, or harsh under Iowa common law. Finally, the briefs and oral arguments lead the court to conclude that defendant owned a license to use the PAKSTER mark in connection with injection-molded chicken coops, injection-molded egg baskets, and injection-molded egg flats. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "East Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit considered this trademark dispute on remand. In the previous appeal, the court asked the district court to address state-law questions pertaining to the availability of attorney's fees and the ownership of a contested trademark. The district court entered orders on those questions and this appeal followed. The court held that the district court erred in determining plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees under Iowa common law. In this case, defendant's misrepresentation to the patent office was improper, but its conduct did not rise to the level of being tyrannical, cruel, or harsh under Iowa common law. Finally, the briefs and oral arguments lead the court to conclude that defendant owned a license to use the PAKSTER mark in connection with injection-molded chicken coops, injection-molded egg baskets, and injection-molded egg flats. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "East Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to PWD on a trademark infringement claim filed by ZW, another company that sells plastic bags for picking up and disposing of dog waste. The court held that ZW failed to produce any evidence from which a jury could find that consumers were likely to confuse ZW's ONEPUL wicket bags with PWD's BagSpot "one-pull" wicket bags. In regard to PWD's counterclaim that ZW's marks were invalid, the court held that there was a fact dispute as to whether the ONEPUL mark was generic or descriptive. Therefore, the court reversed as to the validity claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "ZW USA, Inc. v. PWD Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

Communique’s patent, entitled “System Computer Product and Method for Providing a Private Communication Portal,” allows a remote computer to access a personal computer via the Internet, using a “location facility” to “creat[e] a communication channel.” In 2006, Communique sued, alleging that Citrix’s GoToMyPC remote computer connection service infringed two claims. The court stayed proceedings pending resolution of inter partes reexamination. In 2013, the Patent Board confirmed the patentability of the claims over prior art references, including Citrix’s BuddyHelp computer connection service. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Returning to the district court, Citrix argued that the claims were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101, because they “only require[] generic software operating on a generic computer system to implement the abstract idea of connecting two computers.” The court rejected this argument. A jury concluded that Citrix had not established that the claims were invalid, but that Communique had not established that Citrix’s product infringed those claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed; the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that while the reexamination record could be used at trial, the jury could not be informed that Citrix had requested the reexamination. Citrix’s argument did not rest on an improper “practicing the prior art” defense, but instead correctly recognized that claim terms must be “construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.” View "01 Communique Laboratory, Inc v. Citrix Online, LLC" on Justia Law

Merck's patents claim classes of compounds, identified by structural formulas, and the administration of therapeutically effective amounts of such compounds for treating Hepatitis C. Gilead developed its own Hepatitis C treatments, marketed as Solvadi® and Harvoni®, based on the compound sofosbuvir. Gilead sought a declaratory judgment that Merck’s patents were invalid and that Gilead was not infringing. Merck counterclaimed for infringement. Gilead stipulated to infringement based on the court’s claim construction, which was not appealed. A jury trial was held on Gilead’s challenges to the patents as invalid for lack of both an adequate written description and enablement of the asserted claims, and Gilead’s defense that Merck did not actually invent the subject matter but derived it from another inventor, employed by Gilead’s predecessor. The jury ruled for Merck but the district court ruled for Gilead, finding pre-litigation business misconduct and litigation misconduct attributable to Merck, and barred Merck from asserting the patents against Gilead. The court awarded attorney’s fees, relying on the finding of unclean hands. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment based on unclean hands. The district court found, with adequate evidentiary support, two related forms of pre-litigation business misconduct attributable to Merck. The court noted clear violations of a “firewall” understanding between Gilead’s predecessor and Merck, with a direct connection to the ultimate patent litigation. View "Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

This trademark infringement action concerned whether Walmart's use of the mark "Backyard Grill" on its grills, and grilling supplies infringed on Variety's use of its registered mark, "The Backyard," and unregistered marks, "Backyard" and "Backyard BBQ." Variety appealed the district court's calculation of disgorged profits and denial of its request for a jury trial, and Walmart cross-appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Variety and award of profit disgorgement, costs, and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in Variety's favor because there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether a likelihood of confusion exists. The court vacated the district court's order granting Variety's motion for partial summary judgment and affirmed the order denying Walmart's motion for summary judgment; vacated every order entered subsequent to the summary judgment rulings; vacated the award of profit disgorgement, costs, and attorneys' fees; and dismissed the parties' respective cross-appeals pertaining to disgorgement, denial of jury trial, and award of costs and fees. View "Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

SAS sought inter partes review (35 U.S.C. 311(a)) of ComplementSoft’s software patent, alleging that all 16 of the patent’s claims were unpatentable. The Patent Office instituted review on some of the claims and denied review on the rest. The Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s argument that section 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition. The Supreme Court reversed. When the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged. Section 318(a), which states that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” is mandatory and comprehensive. The Director’s claimed “partial institution” power (37 CFR 42.108(a)) appears nowhere in the statutory text. The statute envisions an inter partes review guided by the initial petition. While section 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on whether to institute review, it does not invest him with discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass. The Director’s policy argument—that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others—is properly addressed to Congress. View "SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu" on Justia Law

Oil States sued Greene's Energy for infringement of a patent relating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. Greene’s challenged the patent’s validity in court and petitioned the Patent Office for inter partes review, 35 U.S.C. 311-319. The district court issued a claim-construction order favoring Oil States; the Board concluded that Oil States’ claims were unpatentable. The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of inter partes review. The Supreme Court affirmed. Inter partes review does not violate Article III. Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. Inter partes review falls within the public-rights doctrine. Patents are “public franchises” and granting patents is a constitutional function that can be carried out by the executive or legislative departments without “judicial determination.’ Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as granting a patent. Patents remain “subject to [the Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court. The similarities between the procedures used in inter partes review and judicial procedures does not suggest that inter partes review violates Article III. The Court noted that its decision “should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” When Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” View "Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law