Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

In 2018, John Burns and Rajeev Arora, representing Moca Financial Inc., engaged in discussions with Manoj Baheti, represented by Yash Venture Holdings, LLC, about a potential investment. The alleged agreement was that Yash would provide $600,000 worth of software development in exchange for a 15% non-dilutable ownership interest in Moca. However, subsequent documents and communications indicated ongoing negotiations and changes in terms, including a reduction of Yash's proposed stake and a shift from software development to a cash investment. Yash eventually refused to sign the final documents, leading to the current litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed most of Yash's claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and securities fraud, but allowed the equitable estoppel and copyright infringement claims to proceed. Yash later voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims, and the district court entered final judgment, prompting Yash to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Yash did not adequately allege the existence of an enforceable contract, as there was no meeting of the minds on the material term of whether the ownership interest was non-dilutable. Consequently, the breach of contract claim failed. Similarly, the promissory estoppel claim failed due to the lack of an unambiguous promise. The fraud and securities fraud claims were also dismissed because they relied on the existence of a non-dilutable ownership interest, which was not sufficiently alleged. Lastly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims failed as there was no enforceable stock subscription agreement to establish a fiduciary duty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Yash Venture Holdings, LLC v. Moca Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) and Apple Inc. WARF accused Apple of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,781,752 (the '752 patent) with its A7 and A8 processors in a lawsuit filed in 2014 (WARF I). WARF later filed a second lawsuit (WARF II) accusing Apple's A9 and A10 processors of infringing the same patent. In WARF I, the jury found that Apple’s A7 and A8 processors literally infringed the '752 patent. However, Apple appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict, finding that no reasonable jury could find literal infringement under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "particular" as used in the patent claims.In the district court for WARF I, WARF had abandoned its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in exchange for Apple not presenting certain evidence at trial. After the Federal Circuit's reversal, WARF sought to reassert the doctrine-of-equivalents theory, but the district court denied this request, citing WARF's prior abandonment and the preclusive effect of the Federal Circuit's interpretation of "particular."In WARF II, the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal in WARF I. After the Federal Circuit's decision, WARF attempted to continue WARF II under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court found that WARF I precluded WARF from proceeding in WARF II, citing issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, which prevents repeated litigation of the same issue against the same party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in both WARF I and WARF II. The court held that WARF had waived its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in WARF I and that issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine barred WARF II. The court concluded that the A7/A8 and A9/A10 processors were essentially the same for the purposes of preclusion and that literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents are part of the same overall issue of infringement. View "WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law

C.R. Bard, Inc. (Bard), a medical device company, held patents on a vascular graft and entered into a licensing agreement with Atrium Medical Corporation (Atrium) to settle a patent infringement lawsuit. The agreement required Atrium to pay Bard a 15% per-unit royalty on U.S. sales until the U.S. patent expired in 2019 and on Canadian sales until the Canadian patent expired in 2024. Additionally, Atrium was to pay a minimum royalty of $3.75 million per quarter until the FDA approved the iCast stent for vascular use or rescinded its approval for all uses. Atrium ceased minimum royalty payments after the U.S. patent expired, leading Bard to sue for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held a bench trial and found that the minimum royalty provision was primarily intended to compensate Bard for U.S. sales, thus constituting patent misuse under Brulotte v. Thys Co. The court concluded that the provision violated Brulotte because it effectively extended royalties beyond the patent's expiration based on the parties' motivations during negotiations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court clarified that the Brulotte rule requires examining whether a contract explicitly provides for royalties on the use of a patented invention after the patent's expiration. The court held that the licensing agreement did not violate Brulotte because it provided for U.S. royalties only until the U.S. patent expired and Canadian royalties until the Canadian patent expired. The minimum royalty payments were not tied to post-expiration use of the U.S. patent but were instead based on Canadian sales, which continued to be valid under the Canadian patent. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by considering the parties' subjective motivations and reversed the judgment for Atrium on Bard’s breach of contract claim. View "C.R. BARD, INC. V. ATRIUM MEDICAL CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, sued DISH and related Sling entities for alleged infringement of three patents related to digital data compression. The district court found the asserted claims of one patent ineligible as abstract under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court denied, opting to rehear invalidity arguments after claim construction. The district court later stayed the case pending inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, which resulted in some claims being found unpatentable. The stay was lifted after the IPR proceedings concluded, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment of invalidity for the remaining patent claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants, citing six "red flags" that should have warned Realtime that its case was flawed. These included prior court decisions finding similar claims ineligible, Board decisions invalidating related patent claims, non-final office actions rejecting claims in the reexamination of the patent at issue, a notice letter from DISH warning of potential fees, and expert opinions from DISH’s witness. The district court found that the totality of these circumstances rendered the case exceptional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. The appellate court found that some of the red flags cited by the district court should not have been given weight, such as the Adaptive Streaming decision and the Board’s decisions on different patents. The court also noted that the district court failed to adequately explain how certain factors, like the notice letter and expert opinions, constituted red flags. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the attorneys’ fees award in light of the appellate court’s findings. View "REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING LLC v. SLING TV, L.L.C. " on Justia Law

Platinum Optics Technology Inc. (PTOT) appealed a final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) regarding U.S. Patent No. 9,354,369, owned by Viavi Solutions Inc. The patent relates to optical filters with specific properties of hydrogenated silicon. PTOT challenged the patent's claims, arguing they were unpatentable due to obviousness based on prior art references. The PTAB ruled against PTOT, finding that the prior art did not render the claims unpatentable.Previously, Viavi had sued PTOT for patent infringement in two cases in the Northern District of California. The claims related to the '369 patent were dismissed with prejudice in both cases. PTOT then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the '369 patent, leading to the PTAB's decision that PTOT failed to prove the claims were unpatentable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PTOT argued it had standing to appeal based on potential future infringement liability from continuing to supply bandpass filters and developing new models. However, the court found PTOT's arguments speculative and insufficient to establish an injury in fact. The court noted that the previous lawsuits were dismissed with prejudice, and PTOT did not provide concrete plans or specific details about new products that might infringe the '369 patent.The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, concluding that PTOT failed to demonstrate a substantial risk of future infringement or a likelihood that Viavi would assert a claim of infringement. Therefore, PTOT did not have standing to appeal the PTAB's decision. View "PLATINUM OPTICS TECHNOLOGY INC. v. VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC. " on Justia Law

Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (MGP) sued Ruthie Allyn Davis and associated entities for copyright infringement, alleging that Davis used Michael Grecco’s copyrighted photos without a license. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed MGP’s complaint, reasoning that MGP, being a sophisticated plaintiff in detecting and litigating infringements, should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. The district court concluded that MGP’s claims were time-barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations provision.The district court’s decision was based on the premise that sophisticated plaintiffs cannot benefit from the discovery rule, which determines when a claim accrues. The court held that MGP’s sophistication in detecting infringements meant it should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, offering MGP the opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a separately occurring act of infringement within the limitations period, which MGP declined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s application of the discovery rule. The appellate court held that the discovery rule, not the injury rule, determines when a copyright infringement claim accrues, regardless of the plaintiff’s sophistication. The court emphasized that there is no “sophisticated plaintiff” exception to the discovery rule or to a defendant’s burden to plead and prove a statute-of-limitations defense. The appellate court found that it was not clear from the face of the complaint that MGP’s claims were time-barred and vacated the district court’s dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. RADesign, Inc." on Justia Law

Simply Wireless, Inc., a Virginia telecommunications company, sued T-Mobile US, Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. for trademark infringement, alleging that T-Mobile had infringed on its common law trademark "SIMPLY PREPAID." Simply Wireless had used the trademark from 2002 to 2008 and resumed its use in 2012. T-Mobile began using the same trademark in 2014 and applied to register it with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Simply Wireless filed a competing application and subsequently launched a revamped website under the trademark.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to T-Mobile, ruling that Simply Wireless had abandoned the trademark due to nonuse from 2009 to 2011. The court found that Simply Wireless had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment, which is triggered by three consecutive years of nonuse under 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Simply Wireless appealed, arguing that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's summary judgment order. The appellate court found that Simply Wireless had presented sufficient evidence, including a detailed declaration from its CEO and corroborating documents, to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse. The court emphasized that the intent-to-resume-use inquiry is an intensely factual question and rarely amenable to summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit also rejected T-Mobile's alternative argument that the statutory abandonment test does not apply to common law trademarks, affirming that the test is applicable.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simply Wireless, Inc v. T-Mobile US, Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the validity of several patents related to the drug eluxadoline, marketed as Viberzi®, which is used to treat irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea (IBS-D). Allergan USA, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Allergan") hold patents for the drug and its formulations. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited and MSN Laboratories Private Ltd. (collectively, "Sun") sought to market a generic version of Viberzi, leading to litigation over the validity of Allergan's patents.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and found that claim 40 of U.S. Patent 7,741,356 (the '356 patent) was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting (ODP) over claims in two later-filed, later-issued patents (the '011 and '709 patents). The district court also found that the claims of four other patents (the '179, '291, '792, and '516 patents) were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written description, as they did not adequately describe formulations without a glidant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's determination that claim 40 of the '356 patent was invalid for ODP, holding that a first-filed, first-issued, later-expiring claim cannot be invalidated by a later-filed, later-issued, earlier-expiring reference claim with a common priority date. The court also reversed the district court's finding that the asserted claims of the '179, '291, '792, and '516 patents lacked written description, concluding that the specification reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors had possession of a formulation without a glidant.The Federal Circuit's main holdings were that claim 40 of the '356 patent is not invalid for ODP and that the asserted claims of the '179, '291, '792, and '516 patents satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The court reversed the district court's judgment of invalidity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Laboratories Private LTD." on Justia Law

Bruce Molzan, a well-known chef, filed a lawsuit against Bellagreen Holdings, LLC, and other associated entities and individuals, alleging trademark infringement and other claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Molzan claimed that he had been using the "RUGGLES" trademarks for over forty years and that the defendants misused these trademarks after a forced sale of his restaurants. He alleged that the defendants continued to use the "RUGGLES GREEN" trademark and domain name without authorization, causing consumer confusion.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all of Molzan's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Molzan's allegations were conclusory and did not establish a connection between the defendants and the third-party websites causing the confusion. The court also determined that the Settlement Agreement between the parties addressed the alleged infringements and provided a remedy for such transgressions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Molzan's complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations that made his claims facially plausible. The court noted that the allegations established a likelihood of confusion due to the defendants' continued use of the "RUGGLES" trademarks. The court also found that the district court erred in assuming the veracity of the defendants' assertions over Molzan's well-pleaded allegations. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Molzan's federal and state trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and state trademark dilution claims. The court also reversed the dismissal of Molzan's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the Web Defendants and the denial of Molzan's motion for leave to amend his complaint. View "Molzan v. Bellagreen Holdings" on Justia Law

Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid. View "CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law