Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a dispute between the parties over licensing agreements involving the motion picture Gone in 60 Seconds. The trial court entered judgment for Classic and ordered that Eleanor Licensing retain possession of a vehicle identified as "Eleanor No. 1," which had been manufactured by Classic pursuant to a licensing agreement between the parties; quieting title to the vehicle in Eleanor Licensing; directing Classic to perform according to the terms of the licensing agreement and transfered legal title to Eleanor No. 1 to Eleanor Licensing; and awarding damages and attorney fees. The court held that the November 1, 2007 License Agreement was supported by adequate consideration; the contract-based claims, to the extent otherwise valid, were barred by the statute of limitations; the causes of action for return of personal property and quiet title were timely filed; the alter ego finding was not supported by substantial evidence; Jason Engel was properly named as a defendant in the causes of action to quiet title and for return of personal property; Tony Engel was a proper defendant in the quiet title cause of action; and the Engels were not liable for attorney fees. The court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment and postjudgment order. View "Eleanor Licensing LLC v. Classic Recreations LLC" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals stemmed from a jury's finding that Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and Clifford Harris, Jr.'s song "Blurred Lines," the world's bestselling single in 2013, infringed Frankie Christian Gaye, Nona Marvisa Gaye, and Marvin Gaye III's copyright in Marvin Gaye's 1977 hit song "Got To Give It Up." The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The panel held that "Got To Give It Up" was entitled to broad copyright protection because musical compositions were not confined to a narrow range of expression; the panel accepted, without deciding, the merits of the district court's ruling that the scope of defendants' copyright was limited, under the Copyright Act of 1909, to the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office, and did not extend to sound recordings; the district court's order denying summary judgment was not reviewable after a full trial on the merits; the district court did not err in denying a new trial; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting portions of expert testimony; the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence; the awards of actual damages and profits and the district court's running royalty were proper; the district court erred in overturning the jury's general verdict in favor of Harris and the Interscope Parties; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gayes' motion for attorney's fees; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs among the parties. View "Williams v. Gaye" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit appealed the district court's dismissal of Great Minds' copyright infringement action against FedEx. The court found that Great Minds' license did not explicitly address whether licensees may engage third parties to assist them in exercising their own noncommercial use rights under the license. The court held that, in view of the absence of any clear license language to the contrary, licensees may use third‐party agents such as commercial reproduction services in furtherance of their own permitted noncommercial uses. In this case, because FedEx acted as the mere agent of licensee school districts when it reproduced Great Minds' materials, and because there was no dispute that the school districts themselves sought to use Great Minds' materials for permissible purposes, FedEx's activities did not breach the license or violate Great Minds' copyright. View "Great Minds v. FedEx Office & Print Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit appealed the district court's dismissal of Great Minds' copyright infringement action against FedEx. The court found that Great Minds' license did not explicitly address whether licensees may engage third parties to assist them in exercising their own noncommercial use rights under the license. The court held that, in view of the absence of any clear license language to the contrary, licensees may use third‐party agents such as commercial reproduction services in furtherance of their own permitted noncommercial uses. In this case, because FedEx acted as the mere agent of licensee school districts when it reproduced Great Minds' materials, and because there was no dispute that the school districts themselves sought to use Great Minds' materials for permissible purposes, FedEx's activities did not breach the license or violate Great Minds' copyright. View "Great Minds v. FedEx Office & Print Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Alcon Laboratories Holding Corporation, a developer of artificial lenses, was exploring electroactive intraocular lens (“EAIOL”) that used electric power and changes in eye pupil size to “trigger” the focus of an artificial lens. Elenza, Inc. and Alcon decided to jointly pursue the technology, first by signing a Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”), followed by a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”). Unfortunately, the project fizzled after Elenza failed to meet development milestones in the SPA. Much to Elenza’s surprise, two years later, Alcon filed a patent application for an EAIOL and announced that it was working with Google, Inc. to develop an EAIOL. Elenza filed suit in Delaware, claiming Alcon breached its agreements with Elenza and misappropriated Elenza’s EAIOL trade secrets. Before trial, the Superior Court granted in part Alcon’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Elenza failed to support its trade secret claims. The court also limited Elenza’s damage claims. The contract claims went to trial, and a jury found against Elenza on all claims. On appeal, Elenza argued to the Delaware Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred when it granted summary judgment on its trade secret claims. According to Elenza, at the summary judgment stage, its trade secret disclosures were sufficient to prove that trade secrets existed and that Alcon used or disclosed those secrets in its later development efforts. The Supreme Court did not reach Elenza’s claim on appeal that it raised disputed factual issues about the existence of trade secrets because the Court agreed with the Superior Court that, at summary judgment, Elenza failed to support its claim that Alcon improperly used or disclosed any of Elenza’s alleged trade secrets. View "Elenza, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories Holding Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Alcon Laboratories Holding Corporation, a developer of artificial lenses, was exploring electroactive intraocular lens (“EAIOL”) that used electric power and changes in eye pupil size to “trigger” the focus of an artificial lens. Elenza, Inc. and Alcon decided to jointly pursue the technology, first by signing a Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”), followed by a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”). Unfortunately, the project fizzled after Elenza failed to meet development milestones in the SPA. Much to Elenza’s surprise, two years later, Alcon filed a patent application for an EAIOL and announced that it was working with Google, Inc. to develop an EAIOL. Elenza filed suit in Delaware, claiming Alcon breached its agreements with Elenza and misappropriated Elenza’s EAIOL trade secrets. Before trial, the Superior Court granted in part Alcon’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Elenza failed to support its trade secret claims. The court also limited Elenza’s damage claims. The contract claims went to trial, and a jury found against Elenza on all claims. On appeal, Elenza argued to the Delaware Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred when it granted summary judgment on its trade secret claims. According to Elenza, at the summary judgment stage, its trade secret disclosures were sufficient to prove that trade secrets existed and that Alcon used or disclosed those secrets in its later development efforts. The Supreme Court did not reach Elenza’s claim on appeal that it raised disputed factual issues about the existence of trade secrets because the Court agreed with the Superior Court that, at summary judgment, Elenza failed to support its claim that Alcon improperly used or disclosed any of Elenza’s alleged trade secrets. View "Elenza, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories Holding Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Acceleron’s 021 patent is directed to a computer network appliance containing a number of hot-swappable components that can be removed and replaced without turning off or resetting the computer system as a whole. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review of the patent based on Dell’s petition under 35 U.S.C. 311, citing a prior art reference, Hipp, that is directed to a high-density server network in which a large number of web server processing cards are installed within a single chassis. The Federal Circuit remanded to allow Acceleron to respond to Dell’s evidence, which had been first presented at oral argument. On remand, the Board declined to consider both Dell’s new argument and Acceleron’s proposed response. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board was not required to consider Dell’s new evidence presented during oral argument and did not abuse its discretion by not considering Dell’s new evidence on remand. The Board’s determination that Hipp does not anticipate claim 3 of the patent was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC" on Justia Law

Power’s 876 patent, “Frequency Jittering Control for Varying the Switching Frequency of a Power Supply,” describes a technique for reducing electromagnetic interference noise “by jittering the switching frequency of a switched mode power supply.” Power sued Fairchild, alleging willful infringement, arguing that the term “coupled” in claim 1, in light of the specification and surrounding claim language, required two circuits to be connected in a manner “such that voltage, current or control signals pass from one to another” and that the “recited coupling” between the counter and the digital to analog converter must be “present for the purposes of control.” The court agreed, emphasizing that the term “coupled” did not “require a direct connection or . . . preclude the use of intermediate circuit elements.” The Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of nonobviousness. The Patent and Trademark Office commenced ex parte reexamination. The board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as anticipated. The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that the board is not generally bound by a prior judicial claim construction and, in reexamination applies a different claim construction standard but that because Power's principal argument was tied to the court’s claim construction, the board was obligated to evaluate that construction and determine whether it was consistent with the broadest reasonable construction. On remand, the board again affirmed the examiner’s rejections. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the board’s rejections were based on an unreasonably broad claim construction. View "In re: Power Integrations, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for defendants and its order denying attorneys' fees in a copyright case alleging infringement of pornographic content. The panel held that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor applied to defendants because the material at issue was stored at the direction of the users and defendants did not have actual or apparent knowledge that the clips were infringing. Furthermore, defendants expeditiously removed the infringing material once they received actual or red flag notice of the infringement, they did not receive financial benefit, and they had a policy to exclude repeat infringers. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a California state law claim, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorneys' fees to defendants. View "Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith & Nephew’s patent relates to an endoscope and method to remove uterine tissue; it claims priority to an earlier-filed PCT application by the same inventor with a nearly identical specification. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that S&N’s earlier-filed PCT application has sufficient written description to make it a priority document instead of an invalidating obviousness reference. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the finding that the PCT application reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the “first channel having a light guide permanently affixed therein.” The court also upheld the Board’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as a “degreed engineer having at least 5 years of experience designing and developing devices used in minimally invasive surgery (endoscopes, resectoscopes, shavers, tissue removal devices, etc.).” View "Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law