Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

HPA filed suit against Lessard, Clark, Penrose, and Northwestern, alleging that the design, development, ownership, and construction of Two Park Crest, an apartment building in McLean, Virginia, infringed HPA’s architectural copyright embodied in Grant Park, a condominium building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, primarily because no reasonable jury could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs are substantially similar. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering expert reports where the reports were were sworn to in declarations; at bottom, HPA failed to carry its burden of identifying a specific similarity between the Two Park Crest design and the protected elements of its Grant Park design; because HPA failed to present nonconclusory evidence that the designs are extrinsically similar, the court rejected HPA’s claim that the district court failed to credit its extrinsic-similarity evidence; and the court rejected HPA's claims that the district court misapplied relevant copyright law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Humphreys & Partners Architects v. Lessard Design, Inc." on Justia Law

Marvel Entertainment’s corporate predecessor agreed to purchase Kimble’s patent for a Spider-Man toy in exchange for a lump sum plus a 3% royalty on future sales. The agreement set no end date for royalties. As the patent neared the end of its statutory 20-year term, Marvel discovered Brulotte v. Thys Co., in which the Supreme Court held that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires and sought a declaratory judgment that it could stop paying Kimble royalties. The district court granted relief. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed, adhering to Brulotte. A patent typically expires 20 years from its application date. 35 U S.C. 154(a)(2). At that point, the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to the public. The Brulotte rule may prevent some parties from entering into deals they desire, but parties can often find ways to achieve similar outcomes. Congress, moreover, has had multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte and has even rejected bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per se rule with the rule of reason standard. Congress, not the Court, gets to make patent policy. View "Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

DRI filed suit against LIA and Ashley under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), alleging that an advertisement placed in a trade magazine by Ashley, and two statements made by the director of LIA's research laboratory, which ran in articles in the same publication, were false and misleading. On appeal, DRI challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for LIA and Ashley on DRI's false advertising claim. The court agreed with the district court that DRI failed to substantiate a claim that the Ashley Ad is either literally false or impliedly false; that DRI failed to provide sufficient support for a false advertising claim with respect to the director’s statement in the Gunin Article; and that DRI failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the director's statement in the Andrews Article was a false or misleading representation of fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus." on Justia Law

Devin Copeland, a musician, filed suit under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., against Justin Bieber and Usher Raymond IV, alleging that three recorded songs by defendants, each titled "Somebody to Love," infringe upon Copeland's copyright over his own, earlier song of the same name. On appeal, Copeland challenged the dismissal of his claim. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Copeland's song and defendants' songs sufficiently similar to give rise to liability for infringement. At issue was whether the songs at issue, assessed from the perspective of the intended audience - here, the general public - and taking into account their “total concept and feel,” are sufficiently intrinsically similar to give rise to a valid infringement claim. After listening to the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs as wholes, the court concluded that their choruses are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the songs intrinsically similar. Further, the choruses of the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs are sufficiently important to the songs’ overall effect that they may be the basis for a finding of intrinsic similarity. The court declined to reach Copeland’s other arguments. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copeland v. Bieber" on Justia Law

Sorensen is the CEO of Inhibitor Technology, which produces rust-inhibiting products containing volatile corrosion inhibitor (VCI), branded with the federally registered trademark THE INHIBITOR. That word mark is owned by Sorensen; he also claims common law trademark rights in a design mark associated with his products, an orange-and-black crosshair. The WD-40 Company, maker of the spray lubricant, introduced the new WD-40 Specialist product line. Sorensen claimed that the branding for those products infringed upon his marks. WD-40 Specialist Long-Term Corrosion Inhibitor, which contains VCI and has a purpose similar to that of Sorensen’s products, contains on its packaging both the word “inhibitor” and an orange crosshair. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that WD-40’s use of the word “inhibitor” was a non-trademark descriptive fair use of the word. As to the crosshair mark, the court found that Sorensen had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to a likelihood of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The most important factors: similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evidence of actual confusion, weigh in favor of WD-40. No consumer would think that the marks are similar. The court noted the” clear weakness of Sorensen’s marks,” which appear inconsistently on his products. View "Sorensen v. WD-40 Co." on Justia Law

Berger manufactures, imports, and sells watches, clocks, and personal care products. It filed an intent-to-use application at the Patent and Trademark Office, to register the mark “iWatch” for 30 different goods in the general categories: watches, clocks, and goods related to watches or clocks. Berger declared “a bona fide intention to use or use through [Berger’s] related company or licensee the mark in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services.” The PTO approved the application for publication. Swatch filed an opposition, claiming that “iWatch” is confusingly similar to its mark, “Swatch,” and that Berger lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce (15 U.S.C. 1051(b)(1)). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board considered the testimony of Berger’s owner and CEO that he did not expect the iWatch mark to be used for clocks and personal care products. His paralegal testified that she was told that the list was intended to “leave all doors open.” The Board concluded that Berger lacked intent to use the mark on clocks and related goods and lacked a genuine plan to commercialize the mark on watches, but only intended to reserve a right in the mark. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the conclusion supported by substantial evidence. View "M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc. v. Swtch AG" on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that for many years the commercial filmmaking wing of the NFL used the names, images, likenesses, and identities of former NFL players in videos to generate revenue and promote the NFL. It asserted claims for false endorsement (Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125), common law and statutory rights of publicity claims under several states' laws, and unjust enrichment. The court approved a settlement calling for: creation of the Common Good Entity, a non-profit organization; payment of up to $42 million to the Common Good Entity over eight years; establishment of the Licensing Agency; payment of $100,000 worth of media value to the Licensing Agency each year until 2021; (5) Payment of attorneys' fees and settlement administration expenses; a reserve for the NFL's potential fees and costs involving class members who opt out; and class members' perpetual release of claims and publicity rights for the NFL and related entities to use. The Common Good Entity is "dedicated to supporting and promoting the health and welfare of Retired Players and other similarly situated individuals." Six players (the class had about 25,000 members) objected. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate despite not providing for a direct financial payment to each class member. View "Marshall v. Nat'l Football League" on Justia Law

A jury found that Samsung smartphones infringed and diluted Apple’s patents and trade dresses amd awarded Apple $290,456,793. The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict on the design patent infringements, the validity of two utility patent claims, and the damages awarded for the design and utility patent infringements, but reversed findings that the asserted trade dresses are protectable. Apple claimed elements from its iPhone 3G and 3GS products to define an asserted unregistered trade dress: a rectangular product with four evenly rounded corners; a flat, clear surface covering the front of the product; a display screen under the clear surface; substantial black borders above and below the display screen and narrower black borders on either side of the screen; and when the device is on, a row of small dots on the display screen, a matrix of colorful square icons with evenly rounded corners within the display screen, and an unchanging bottom dock of colorful square icons with evenly rounded corners set off from the display’s other icons. The registered trade dress claims the design details in each of the 16 icons on the iPhone’s home screen framed by the iPhone’s rounded-rectangular shape with silver edges and a black background. View "Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

PV applied to register PRETZEL CRISPS in standard character format for “pretzels” on an intent-to-use basis under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051. The trademark examiner refused registration on the Principal Register, finding the proposed mark merely descriptive. PV: amended its identification of goods to “pretzel crackers;” disclaimed the exclusive right to use “pretzel” apart from the mark as a whole; and obtained registration on the Supplemental Register. Years later, PV again sought to register PRETZEL CRISPS on the Principal Register, identifying October, 2004 as its first use of the mark in commerce, disclaiming the exclusive right to use the term “pretzel” apart from the mark as shown, and claiming acquired distinctiveness in the mark as a whole. Frito-Lay filed opposition, arguing that the term PRETZEL CRISPS is generic for pretzel crackers and not registrable and that PRETZEL CRISPS is highly descriptive of a type of cracker product and has not acquired distinctiveness. Frito-Lay also moved to cancel the supplemental registration. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board granted the petition for cancellation, finding that “pretzel crisps” was a compound term, not a phrase, and was generic. The Federal Circuit vacated: the Board overlooked or disregarded a genericness survey as to which it apparently found no flaw and applied the incorrect legal standard in assessing whether the term was generic. View "Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay of N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Cypress sued, alleging that Maxim, had misappropriated a trade secret, or was in the process of doing so, by seeking to hire away specialists in touchscreen technology, a field in which Cypress and Maxim compete. Maxim responded that it was entitled to solicit prospective employment candidates in Cypress’s workforce and that there was no evidence it had acquired, or was seeking to acquire, any trade secret. After failing to secure temporary injunctive relief, and failing to obtain an order placing under seal evidence derived by Maxim from public sources, Cypress dismissed the action. The trial court awarded Maxim attorney fees under Civil Code 3426.4, which authorizes such an award to the prevailing party where a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is found to have been made in bad faith. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that the finding of bad faith was amply supported by evidence that defendants did no more, and Cypress accused them of no more, than attempting to recruit the employees of a competitor. Cypress dismissed the suit to avoid an adverse determination on the merits. View "Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc." on Justia Law