Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

R+L claimed infringement of the 078 patent, which generally relates to an improved method of consolidating freight into trailers to optimize delivery efficiencies for the loads in each trailer. While the case was pending, R+L filed for ex parte reexamination of the patent. Although the patent survived, R+L added language to all of the claims at issue. Because the district court determined that the new claims were not substantially identical to the initial claims of the 078 patent, and because there was no dispute that Qualcomm ceased its allegedly infringing activity before the reexamination certificate issued, R+L stipulated to final judgment, dismissing its infringement claim against Qualcomm. R+L appealed the determination that the amendments made during reexamination resulted in a substantive change in claim scope. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that amended claim 1 is not “substantially identical” to original claim under 35 U.S.C. 252, so R+L is not entitled to infringement damages prior to issuance of the reexamination certificate. View "R+L Carriers, Inc.. v. Qualcomm, Inc." on Justia Law

Norbero Colon Lorenzana (Colon) was working for South American Restaurant Corporation (SARCO), a franchisee and operator of Church’s Chicken locations in Puerto Rico, when he suggested to his superiors the concept for a new chicken sandwich that could be included on Church’s menu. Church’s subsequently began selling the item, which it called the “Pechu Sandwich.” SARCO subsequently received a certificate of registration from the Puerto Rico Department of State trademarking the name “Pechu Sandwich” and also received a federal trademark registration for the name “Pechusandwich.” Colon brought suit alleging violations of the Lanham Act and Copyright Act. SARCO filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that neither the name “Pechu Sandwich” nor the recipe are eligible for copyright protection; and (2) that Colon failed to sufficiently plead that SARCO committed fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark for the Pechu Sandwich. View "Colon-Lorenzana v. South American Restaurants Corp." on Justia Law

Varsity manufactures cheerleading and athletic apparel. Its designers sketch concepts: “original combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes,” but do not consider functionality or the ease of actually producing a uniform. Varsity decides whether to implement the completed design concept. Varsity advertises in catalogs and online, inviting customers to choose a design concept before selecting the shape, colors, and braiding for the uniform. Varsity received copyright registration for “two-dimensional artwork” for some designs. Star sells sports and cheerleading uniforms and advertised cheerleading uniforms that looked similar to five of Varsity’s registered designs. Varsity sued, alleging violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101. The court entered summary judgment in Star’s favor, concluding that Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable because their graphic elements are not physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of a uniform because the “colors, stripes, chevrons, and similar designs” make the garment “recognizable as a cheerleading uniform.” The court did not address whether Varsity’s designs were unprotectable as unoriginal. The Sixth circuit reversed, finding that the graphic features of Varsity’s designs are more like fabric design than dress design, and are protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act View "Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC" on Justia Law

Konig’s SRI Employment Agreement, stated: I agree ….To promptly disclose… all discoveries, improvements, and inventions, including software … during … my employment, and … to effect transfer of ownership … to SRI . . . . I understand that termination of this employment shall not release me from my obligations. While employed by SRI, Konig started generating documents relating to a personalized information services idea called “Personal Web” and formed a company, Utopy. Konig left SRI and filed a provisional patent application in 1999; the 040 patent issued in 2005. In 2001, Konig asked an SRI scientist to test the Utopy products. The 040 patent was eventually assigned to PUM. Konig filed another patent application in 2008. PUM was the assignee; the 276 patent issued in 2010. In 2009, PUM sued Google, asserting infringement. PUM provided interrogatory responses that asserted that the conception of the inventions was while Konig was still at SRI. Google had acquired “any rights” that SRI had and counterclaimed breach of contract. The court stated that no reasonable juror could have found that the injury was “inherently unknowable,” applied the three-year limitations period for contracts claims, and granted PUM judgment on the counterclaim. The court also entered judgment of invalidity and noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that the claim construction had no effect on the outcome and declining to issue an advisory opinion. View "Personalized User Model, LLP v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Best designs and markets exit signs and emergency lighting. Pace manufactured products to Best’s specifications. Best’s founder taught Pace how to manufacture the necessary tooling. There was no contract prohibiting Pace from competing with Best. By 2004, Best was aware that Pace was selling products identical to those it made for Best to Best’s established customers. Several other problems arose between the companies. When they ended the relationship, Pace was in possession of all of the tooling used to manufacture Best’s products and the cloned products, and Best owed Pace almost $900,000 for products delivered. Pace filed a breach of contract suit. Best requested a setoff of damages for breach of warranty and counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud. Pace claimed that Best had misappropriated Pace’s trade secrets and had tortiously interfered with Pace’s contracts. The district court found that Best had breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay, but that Pace was liable for breach of warranties, breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Pace is liable for breach of contract and tortious interference, but reversed or vacated as to the trade secrets, Lanham Act, conversion, and warranties claims. View "Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2011, while its patent application was pending with the USPTO, U.S. Water Services, which “sell[s] water treatment and purification equipment, materials, and services,” especially “to ethanol process technologies,” sued its competitor, ChemTreat, for misappropriation of trade secrets. In October 2011, the USPTO issued the 244 patent covering a method to reduce the formation of insoluble scale deposits during the production of ethanol using enzyme, phytase, in its “pHytOUT® system.”Three days before U.S. Water and ChemTreat settled the misappropriation claim, ChemTreat filed counterclaims requesting declaratory judgments of noninfringement and invalidity of the 244 patent. The suit was filed before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, took effect, so the counterclaims independently did not establish appellate jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit. The district court granted ChemTreat summary judgment as to the noninfringement counterclaim and dismissed the invalidity counterclaim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Evaluating the “totality of [the] circumstances,” the district court did not err in finding the misappropriation action, together with U.S. Water’s statements to its customers and supplier, produced an objective, “reasonable apprehension of suit,” and did not err in concluding declaratory judgment subject matter jurisdiction existed. The decision did not constitute an advisory opinion. View "U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc." on Justia Law

Nippon Steel filed suit, charging POSCO with patent infringement and unfair competition. The court entered a protective order prohibiting cross-use of confidential materials which “shall be used by the receiving Party solely for purposes of the prosecution or defense of this action.” POSCO later produced several million pages of documents containing confidential information. Nippon also sued POSCO (based in Korea) in Japan for alleged trade secret misappropriation. POSCO filed a declaratory judgment action in Korea. Discovery in U.S. federal courts is more generous than in Japan and Korea, so Nippon moved the court to modify its discovery protective order for the purposes of providing foreign counsel in the Japanese and Korean actions approximately 200 pages of proprietary documentation relating to POSCO’s manufacturing process. Based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the balancing framework for modifying discovery orders, a special master concluded that modification should be granted, subject to restrictions to keep the information confidential. Among the restrictions: “[b]efore the documents may be submitted to a foreign court, the court must identify the information and agree that it would be maintained as confidential and restricted from third party access.” The district court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Posco" on Justia Law

Juice Generation, which operates New York City juice bars, applied to the Patent and Trademark Office to register a mark consisting of “PEACE LOVE AND JUICE,” 15 U.S.C. 1051(b), and a design for use with its juice bar services. GS Enterprises opposed the application on the ground that the mark was likely to cause confusion with its own family of marks, all of which contain the phrase “PEACE & LOVE” and are registered for use with restaurant services. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sustained the opposition and refused to register Juice Generation’s mark. The Federal Circuit remanded, finding that the Board did not adequately assess the weakness of GS’s marks and did not properly consider the three-word combination of Juice Generation’s mark as a whole in comparing it to the two-word combination in GS’s marks. View "Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Capital is a Delaware holding company, whose subsidiaries, Arrowood Indemnity and Arrowood Surplus Lines Insurance, provide insurance and investment-related financial services throughout the United States under the Arrowpoint Capital name. Capital unsuccessfully sought to enjoin AAM from using a logo or word mark employing the name “Arrowpoint” in connection with any investment-related products and services. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the lower court employed an overly narrow interpretation of the kind of confusion that is actionable under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114. The court .failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, or to adequately set forth its rationale for discounting Capital’s evidence, or to hear oral argument, View "Arrowpoint Capital Corp v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

MTM filed suit against online retailer Amazon under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., alleging that Amazon had infringed MTM's trademark. MTM argues that initial interest confusion might occur because Amazon lists the search term used – here the trademarked phrase “mtm special ops” – three times at the top of its search page. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon. The court considered five non-exhaustive Sleekcraft factors to determine whether a trademark gives rise to a likelihood of confusion: the strength of the mark, relatedness/proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, defendant’s intent, and the degree of care exercised by purchasers. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion under the initial interest confusion theory. Finally, the court held that the customer-generated use of a trademark in the retail search context is a use in commerce. In this case, Amazon's purpose is not less commercial just because it is selling wares, not advertising space. Therefore, the court declined to affirm the district court on the alternative ground that Amazon’s use is not a use in commerce. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law