Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

While a student at University of Wisconsin in 1969, Soglin attended the first Mifflin Street Block Party. Now in his seventh term as Mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, Soglin wants to shut down the annual event. For the 2012 Block Party, Sconnie sold 54 t-shirts and tank tops displaying an image of Soglin’s face and the phrase “Sorry for Partying.” Photographer Kienitz accused Sconnie of copyright infringement. Sconnie conceded starting with a photograph that Kienitz took at Soglin’s inauguration that it downloaded from the city’s website. The picture was posterized, background was removed, and Soglin’s face was turned lime green and surrounded by multi-colored writing. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the fair use statutory defense to infringement, 17 U.S.C. 107. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a shirt is no substitute for the original photograph; Kienitz does not argue that defendants reduced demand for the original work or any use that he is contemplating. Defendants removed so much of the original that, “as with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile remains.” What is left, besides a hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of his face, which cannot be copyrighted. Defendants chose the design as a form of political commentary, not for profit. View "Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC" on Justia Law

Oracle filed suit against SAP alleging that TomorrowNow, an enterprise software company recently acquired by SAP, was engaging in systematic and pervasive illegal downloading of Oracle's software. SAP stipulated to liability and the parties went to trial solely on damages. On appeal, Oracle challenged several of the district court's rulings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to SAP where the hypothetical-license damage award was based on undue speculation and Oracle failed to provide sufficient objective evidence of the market value of the hypothetical license underpinning the jury's damages award; for the same reasons, the court affirmed the district court's grant of SAP's motion for a new trial based on remittitur; and the court rejected Oracle's claim that the district court erred in limiting the second trial to damages based on a lost-profits and infringer's-profits theory, barring Oracle's pursuit of hypothetical-license damages. The court concluded that the district court, in selecting a $272 million remittitur amount, abused its discretion in selecting the $36-million lost-profits figure rather than the $120.7-million one. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to the district court for it to offer Oracle the choice between a $356.7-million remittitur and proceeding to a second trial. The court affirmed on the four rulings related to the second trial and did not reach the questions presented by the other three rulings. View "Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG" on Justia Law

After leaving Gensler, an architectural firm with projects throughout the world, where he had been a Design Director, Strabala opened his own firm, 2Define Architecture. Strabala stated online that he had designed five projects for which Gensler is the architect of record. Gensler contends that Strabala’s statements, a form of “reverse passing off,” violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1125(a). The district court dismissed, ruling that, because Strabala did not say that he built or sold these structures, he could not have violated section 43(a), reading the Supreme Court decision Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox (2003), to limit section 43(a) to false designations of goods’ origin. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gensler maintains that Strabala falsely claims to have been the creator of intellectual property. View "M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala" on Justia Law

Defendants, collectively referred to as “InterDigital,” and LG Electronics, Inc. entered into a non-disclosure agreement, titled “Agreement Governing Confidential Settlement Communications (the NDA), after LG filed a demand for arbitration with the International Centre for Dispute Resolution. InterDigital claimed that the parties did not intend to prevent the submission of pre-NDA evidence to the arbitral tribunal and disclosed in its brief to the tribunal alleged settlement communications. LG then filed this action seeking injunctive relief compelling InterDigital to withdraw its brief, claiming that InterDigital breached the NDA by submitting the documents to the arbitrators. InterDigital moved to dismiss LG’s complaint in favor of arbitration, asking the Court of Chancery to exercise its discretion under the doctrine established in McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co. to dismiss the action in favor of the earlier-filed arbitral proceeding. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action in favor of the earlier-filed arbitral proceeding under the McWane doctrine, concluding that this case met the McWane doctrine’s requirements. View "LG Elecs., Inc. v. Interdigital Commc’ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Fortres develops and sells a desktop management program called “Clean Slate” and holds a federally-registered trademark for use of that name to identify “[c]omputer software used to protect public access computers by scouring the computer drive back to its original configuration upon reboot.” When Warner Bros. Entertainment used the words “the clean slate” to describe a hacking program in the movie, The Dark Knight Rises, Fortres experienced a precipitous drop in sales of its software. Fortres sued, alleging that the use of the words “clean slate” in reference to the software in its movie infringed its trademark in violation of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125, and Indiana unfair competition law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Fortres had not alleged a plausible theory of consumer confusion, upon which all of its claims depend, and that Warner Bros.’ use of the words “the clean slate” was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the constitutional question. Juxtaposed against the weakness of all the other relevant factors, the similarity of the marks is not enough to establish confusion. Trademark law protects the source-denoting function of words used in conjunction with goods and services, not the words themselves.View "Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the marketer, distributor, and seller of 5-hour ENERGY (FHE), an “energy shot,” which is an energy drink sold and consumed in small portions. Plaintiff began selling FHE in 2004. FHE was not the first energy shot on the market, but was the first to achieve widespread success and was unique in being marketed FHE to adults as a replacement for an afternoon cup of coffee or a caffeinated soda. Plaintiff submitted “5-hour ENERGY” for trademark registration with the Patent and Trademark Office, which rejected the application in January 2005, deeming the mark too descriptive to be eligible for protection. Plaintiff placed FHE on the Supplemental Register in September 2005 and secured a trademark for “5-hour ENERGY” in August 2011. Plaintiff also protected its mark and market position through litigation. Defendants have marketed dietary supplements since the mid-1990s. In 2008, defendants began to market and sell “6 Hour Energy Shot,” in a bottle resembling the FHE bottle. In a suit under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, the district court found infringement of plaintiff’s trademark and trade dress, then entered an order of contempt after the defendants violated a permanent injunction entered. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc." on Justia Law

SoCal filed suit against Defendant Zaffina and his company, SoCal Inc., alleging violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.; the California Business and Professions Code; common law trademark infringement; and unfair competition. The court concluded that the district court did have jurisdiction over SoCal's claim under the Lanham Act; the district court properly concluded that SoCal had the capacity to bring its Lanham Act claim in federal court; SoCal had standing to sue; and SoCal's motion for summary judgment was properly served on Zaffina. On the merits, the court concluded that SoCal was entitled to summary judgment where the contested marks are protectable, SoCal owns these marks, and Zaffina's use of these marks is likely to cause confusion. The court held that unincorporated associations have the capacity to own trademarks and the district court's assumption that SoCal has the capacity to own the contested marks was correct. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment. View "S. Cal. Darts Ass'n v. Zaffina" on Justia Law

Syngenta, producer of a genetically-modified corn seed, filed suit against Bunge, an agricultural produce storage and transport company, alleging breach of an obligation under the United States Warehouse Act (USWA), 7 U.S.C. 241-256; breach of a duty to third party beneficiaries of a licensing agreement between Bunge and the federal government; and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125. The court concluded that the text of the USWA and the structure of the Act do not implicitly authorize a private cause of action for violations of a warehouse operator's fair treatment obligations; Syngenta is not a third-party beneficiary of the License Agreement and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim on the pleadings; and the court found it was necessary to remand the Lanham Act claim, in light of Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Syngenta has standing to bring the claim under the zone-of-interests test and proximate causality requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the USWA and third-party beneficiary claims, and vacated the grant of summary judgment to Bunge on the Lanham Act claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Quinta Real appealed from the district court's conclusion that expansion of Quinta Real's Mexican hotel business into the United States would result in a likelihood of consumer confusion with La Quinta. The court held that the "use in commerce" element of the Lanham Act claims under section 32 and 43(a) is not connected to the Lanham Act's jurisdictional grant in 15 U.S.C. 1121(a), which grants federal subject-matter jurisdiction without any reference to a "use in commerce" requirement. Therefore, the court concluded that there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the trademark claims. The court also concluded that the district court correctly found a likelihood of confusion, but did not provide a sufficient analysis balancing the equities in its decision to grant a permanent injunction. The court held that the defense of laches did not apply. The court affirmed in part and remanded for further assessment of the equities. View "La Quinta Worldwide v. Q.R.T.M." on Justia Law

Align’s Invisalign System, an alternative to conventional braces, uses a series of clear dental aligners that are worn sequentially over time to adjust the position of a patient’s teeth. The aligners must be custom-designed for the patient’s unique teeth. Align’s asserted patents are directed to methods and treatment plans using digital data sets. In 2005, Align’s founder and former CEO founded OrthoClear and used former Align employees to manufacture dental aligners. Align filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, alleging that OrthoClear violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing, selling for importation, or selling within the U.S., aligners that infringe Align’s patents, and by misappropriating Align’s trade secrets. A 2006 settlement required OrthoClear to assign its entire intellectual property portfolio to Align. The Commission entered the Consent Order and terminated the investigation. Suspecting that OrthoClear and others were violating the Consent Order, Align sought an enforcement proceeding. Rather than issuing an “initial determination,” the ALJ issued an order, denied a motion to terminate and scheduled a trial. The Commission concluded that the order constituted an “initial determination,” subject to its review, reversed, and terminated the enforcement proceeding, finding that the accused digital data sets were not covered by the scope of the consent order. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Commission erred in reviewing the order. View "Align Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law