Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Dyson Technology, Ltd., a UK-based company, filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against multiple e-commerce stores for selling counterfeit Dyson products. Dyson sought remedies under the Lanham Act, which allows trademark holders to recover profits, damages, and costs from infringing parties. The defendants did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment in Dyson's favor. However, the district court awarded only $1,000 in statutory damages and denied Dyson's request to recover the infringing sellers' profits, stating that Dyson had only provided evidence of revenue, not profits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled the initial case. The court's decision to limit Dyson's award was based on its interpretation that revenue and profits are not the same, and it declined to assume that all revenue equaled profits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Lanham Act. According to the Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to the defendant's profits, and the defendant bears the burden of proving any costs or deductions. The appellate court found that Dyson's evidence of revenue was sufficient to establish profits, as the defendants did not provide evidence to the contrary. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the district court to adjust the award if deemed just based on the case's circumstances. View "Dyson Technology Limited v David 7 Store" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the named inventors of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/005,678, which is directed to logistics systems and methods for the transportation of goods. The application was rejected by an Examiner under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by a published patent application (Lettich) and under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lettich in view of another reference (Rojek). The inventors appealed the rejection to the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board).The Board initially reversed the Examiner's rejections but later granted the Examiner's request for rehearing, determining that Lettich did qualify as prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e). The Board then sustained the Examiner's anticipation and obviousness rejections. The inventors appealed the Board's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board conducted an incomplete analysis in determining whether Lettich qualifies as prior art under § 102(e). Specifically, the court held that it is not sufficient to show that a single claim in the prior art application is supported by the provisional application; the specific portions of the application relied on in the rejection must also be supported by the provisional application. The court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further analysis to determine whether the Lettich Provisional Application provides written description support for the specific disclosures in Lettich that the Examiner identified and relied on in the prior art rejections. View "In Re RIGGS " on Justia Law

Wash World Inc. sought to reverse a final judgment that it infringed Belanger Inc.'s 8,602,041 patent. Wash World contended that the district court erred in not construing three claim terms and that Belanger could not prove infringement under the correct constructions. Wash World also disputed the jury's decision to award Belanger $9.8 million in lost profits damages and requested a remittitur of approximately $2.6 million. Belanger argued that Wash World forfeited these issues by not preserving them in the district court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled that no construction was needed for the disputed terms and denied Wash World's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. The jury found that Wash World’s Razor EDGE car wash system infringed Belanger’s patent and awarded $9.8 million in lost profits and $260,000 in reasonable royalties. The district court denied Wash World’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Wash World forfeited its arguments regarding the constructions of "outer cushioning sleeve" and "predefined wash area" by not presenting them adequately in the district court. However, the court agreed with the district court's construction of "dependingly mounted" and affirmed the judgment of infringement.On the issue of damages, the Federal Circuit concluded that the jury's award improperly included $2,577,848 for convoyed sales, which lacked sufficient evidence of a functional relationship with the patented product. The court vacated the damages portion of the judgment and remanded with instructions to remit the damages by $2,577,848, resulting in a total award of $7,482,152 in favor of Belanger. View "WASH WORLD INC. v. BELANGER INC. " on Justia Law

Maquet Cardiovascular LLC owns U.S. Patent No. 10,238,783, which relates to an intravascular blood pump system designed to improve the deployment of blood pumps within a patient's circulatory system. The patent aims to address the difficulties associated with guiding blood pumps to the appropriate position using supplemental guiding mechanisms. Instead, it employs integrated guide mechanisms located on the device itself. Maquet sued Abiomed Inc. and its affiliates for infringing claims of the '783 patent and U.S. Patent No. 9,789,238.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts construed certain claim terms of the '783 patent, including "guide mechanism comprising a lumen" and "guide wire" terms. The court included negative limitations in its constructions based on the prosecution history of related patents. The parties stipulated to non-infringement based on these constructions, leading the district court to enter a final judgment of non-infringement for both patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim constructions. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in applying prosecution disclaimer to the "guide mechanism comprising a lumen" term in claim 1 of the '783 patent, as the prosecution history of the related '238 patent was not relevant due to differences in claim language. The court also found that the district court erred in construing the "guide wire" terms in claims 1 and 24 of the '783 patent, as Maquet did not make a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope during the prosecution of the '728 patent.The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's judgment of non-infringement as to the '783 patent and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment of non-infringement as to the '238 patent was left undisturbed. View "MAQUET CARDIOVASCULAR LLC v. ABIOMED INC. " on Justia Law

Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc. ("Actavis") filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) with the FDA to market generic versions of branded drugs. The manufacturers of these branded drugs, who hold New Drug Applications (NDAs) and patents, sued Actavis for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Act considers the submission of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification as an act of patent infringement if it seeks FDA approval before the expiration of the patents. Actavis incurred significant litigation expenses defending these suits and deducted these expenses as ordinary business expenses on its tax returns.The IRS disagreed, treating these expenses as capital expenditures related to the acquisition of an intangible asset (FDA approval) and issued Notices of Deficiency. Actavis paid the assessed taxes and sued in the Court of Federal Claims for a refund, arguing that the litigation expenses were deductible. The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of Actavis, holding that the litigation expenses were deductible as ordinary business expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court considered whether the litigation expenses were ordinary business expenses or capital expenditures. Applying both the "origin of the claim" test and the IRS regulation under C.F.R. § 1.263, the court concluded that the expenses were deductible. The court found that the origin of the claim was the patent infringement suit, not the pursuit of FDA approval, and that the litigation did not facilitate the acquisition of the FDA-approved ANDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, allowing Actavis to deduct the litigation expenses as ordinary business expenses. View "ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

AMP Plus, Inc., doing business as ELCO Lighting, appealed a final written decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) which found that ELCO failed to show claim 22 of U.S. Patent No. 9,964,266 was unpatentable as obvious. The patent, owned by DMF, Inc., relates to a compact recessed lighting system that can be installed in a standard electrical junction box. The key issue on appeal was whether claim 22, which includes a limitation referred to as "Limitation M," was obvious.The PTAB initially found that claim 17 of the patent was anticipated by prior art, but did not explicitly address the patentability of claim 22. ELCO appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case for the PTAB to address the arguments concerning claim 22. On remand, the PTAB concluded that ELCO failed to show the unpatentability of claim 22, noting that ELCO's petition lacked sufficient analysis and evidence to establish that the marine recessed lighting system disclosed in the prior art could be installed in a building, as required by Limitation M.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the PTAB's decision. The court held that ELCO's petition did not adequately address the specific requirement of Limitation M and that the evidence cited did not support the installation of the marine lighting system in a building. The court also rejected ELCO's argument that claim 22 was anticipated by the same prior art that anticipated claim 17, as this argument was not raised in the original petition. The court concluded that the PTAB's determination was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the decision. View "AMP PLUS, INC. v. DMF, INC. " on Justia Law

Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (DFG) has operated loan financing and check cashing businesses under the name MONEY MART since the 1980s. In 2010, DFG began expanding its services to include pawn brokerage and pawn shop services, using the MONEY MART mark in commerce for these services starting in 2012. DFG registered two marks in 2013, which were officially registered in 2014. Brittex Financial, Inc. (Brittex) has operated pawn shops in Texas under the names MONEY MART PAWN and MONEY MART PAWN & JEWELRY since the 1990s and has common law rights in these marks.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) initially denied Brittex’s petition to cancel DFG’s registrations, concluding that DFG had priority due to its earlier use of the MONEY MART mark for loan financing services. Brittex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision, finding that pawn services are not covered by loan financing services. On remand, the TTAB held that Brittex had priority for pawn services and that DFG could not rely on the zone of natural expansion doctrine to claim priority. The TTAB also found a likelihood of confusion between the marks and partially granted the petition for cancellation, requiring the deletion of "pawn brokerage and pawn shops" from DFG’s registrations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the TTAB’s decision. The court held that the zone of natural expansion doctrine is purely defensive and cannot be used to establish priority offensively. The court also found that DFG’s tacking argument was forfeited as it was not raised before the TTAB. Additionally, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s findings on the likelihood of confusion, including the similarity of the marks and the strength of Brittex’s mark. The court affirmed the TTAB’s partial cancellation of DFG’s trademark registrations. View "DOLLAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. v. BRITTEX FINANCIAL, INC. " on Justia Law

Westmont Living, Inc., a California corporation operating retirement communities and assisted living facilities, filed a lawsuit against Retirement Unlimited, Inc. (RUI), a Virginia corporation, alleging trademark infringement. Westmont Living claimed that RUI's use of the name "The Westmont at Short Pump" for its new facility in Virginia created a likelihood of confusion with Westmont Living's federally registered "Westmont Living" trademarks, violating the Lanham Act and related laws. Westmont Living sought an injunction and damages.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of RUI, concluding that consumer confusion was impossible because the parties operated in entirely distinct geographic markets. The court relied on the Second Circuit's decision in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., which held that no likelihood of confusion exists when parties use their marks in separate and distinct markets.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by relying solely on the geographic separation of the parties' physical facilities without considering other relevant factors that might bear on the likelihood of confusion. The court emphasized that modern advertising and the national scope of both parties' marketing efforts necessitate a broader analysis. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the various factors relevant to determining the likelihood of confusion, including the parties' competitive marketing, the locations from which they solicit and draw customers, and the scope of their reputations. View "Westmont Living, Inc. v. Retirement Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law

A computer scientist, Dr. Stephen Thaler, created an artificial intelligence system called the "Creativity Machine," which autonomously generated an artwork titled "A Recent Entrance to Paradise." Dr. Thaler submitted a copyright registration application to the United States Copyright Office, listing the Creativity Machine as the sole author and himself as the owner. The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its policy that only works authored by humans are eligible for copyright protection.Dr. Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court affirmed the Copyright Office's denial, holding that human authorship is a fundamental requirement under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court also rejected Dr. Thaler's argument that he should own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as the work was never eligible for copyright protection in the first place. Additionally, the court found that Dr. Thaler had waived his argument that he should be considered the author because he created and used the Creativity Machine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Copyright Act requires all eligible works to be authored by a human being. Since Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine, a non-human entity, as the sole author, the application was correctly denied. The court did not address the argument that the Constitution requires human authorship, nor did it consider Dr. Thaler's claim that he is the author by virtue of creating and using the Creativity Machine, as this argument was waived before the agency. View "Thaler v. Perlmutter" on Justia Law

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought a preliminary injunction against Amgen Inc., alleging that Amgen's biosimilar product, ABP 938, infringed its U.S. Patent 11,084,865. The patent covers a pharmaceutical formulation containing a fusion protein known as aflibercept, used in Regeneron's EYLEA® product for treating angiogenic eye disorders. Regeneron argued that Amgen's product, which does not contain a separate buffer component, infringed its patent claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied Regeneron's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Regeneron failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, as the claims of the '865 patent required the VEGF antagonist and buffer to be separate components. The court applied the precedent from Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, which states that when a claim lists elements separately, the clear implication is that those elements are distinct components. The court determined that the intrinsic evidence, including the claims and specification, supported the conclusion that the VEGF antagonist and buffer must be separate components.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that the claims and specification of the '865 patent required the VEGF antagonist and buffer to be distinct components. The court found that the intrinsic evidence was clear and unambiguous, and the extrinsic evidence did not overcome the presumption of separateness. Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that Regeneron had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, and the denial of the preliminary injunction was appropriate. View "Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law