Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

In 1997 Wawrzynski was awarded the 990 patent, entitled “Method of Food Article Dipping and Wiping in a Condiment Container.” The description illustrates a condiment container that has a flexible cap with a slitted opening. A user introduces a food article, such as a French fry, into the container through the slit and dips it into the condiment. As the food article is removed, the flexible cap wipes away excess condiment , reducing the likelihood of a drip or spill. . Wawrzynski presented his “Little Dipper” concept, permitting a consumer to either dip or squeeze, to Heinz in a 2008. Heinz indicated that the company was not interested in the product, but months later, released its new “Dip & Squeeze®” packet. Wawrzynski filed a lawsuit asserting breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment. Heinz counterclaimed that Heinz did not infringe the patent and that the patent was invalid. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that federal patent law preempted the state law claims and that Wawrzynski failed to prove infringement. The Federal Circuit transferred to the Third Circuit, stating that its subject matter jurisdiction over patent disputes derives solely from the complaint, not from any counterclaim. View "Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

Accenture alleged infringement of its patent, which describes a “computer program ... for handling insurance-related tasks” and discloses software components of the program, including a “data component that stores, retrieves and manipulates data” and a client component that “transmits and receives data to/from the data component.” The client component includes a business component that “serves as a data cache and includes logic for manipulating the data.” The program also describes a controller component to handle program events and an adapter component to interface with a data repository. The district court found all of the claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101. Accenture appealed only with respect to claims 1–7, directed to a system for generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization, but did not appeal the similar method claims 8–22. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the system claims at issue recite patent-ineligible subject matter both because Accenture was unable to point to any substantial limitations that separate them from the similar, patent-ineligible method claim and because the system claim does not, on its own, provide substantial limitations to the claim’s patent-ineligible abstract idea.View "Accenture Global Servs. GMBH v. Guidewire Software, Inc." on Justia Law

Bayer’s patent concerns genetically modifying plants to confer resistance to a common herbicide (2,4-D) by inserting a particular DNA segment into plant cells, which reproduce to create new cells that contain that gene. Those cells produce an enzyme that catalyzes a biochemical reaction with 2,4-D in which the herbicide is broken down into something harmless to the plant. A plant with the gene survives 2,4-D application while surrounding weeds do not. At the time of the patent application, the inventors had sequenced one gene coding for one enzyme, using a test supposedly capable of finding other, similar genes. In writing the application, they claimed a broad category based on the function of the particular enzyme, defining the category by using a term with established scientific meaning. Years before the patent issued, experiments showed that the term did not apply to the particular enzyme whose gene was sequenced, but Bayer did not change its claim language. When Bayer sued Dow for infringement, Bayer recognized that the term’s established scientific meaning, did not cover the accused product, which was, itself, different from the enzyme whose gene Bayer’s inventors had sequenced. Bayer argued for broad functional claim construction. The district court entered summary judgment of noninfringement, citing particularly the great breadth of the asserted functional construction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences, LLC" on Justia Law

New York based Stone Lion manages a hedge fund that focuses on credit opportunities. Lion, a United Kingdom private equity firm, invests primarily in companies that sell consumer products. Lion has two marks registered with the Patent and Trademark Office and started using the marks in the U.S. in 2005. Lion filed applications for “LION CAPITAL” and “LION” in 2005 and 2007, respectively, for services including “financial and investment planning and research,” “investment management services,” “capital investment consultation,” “equity capital investment,” and “venture capital services” Lion has priority over Stone Lion with respect to those marks. In August 2008, Stone Lion filed an intent-to-use application for the mark “STONE LION CAPITAL,” proposing to use the mark in connection with “financial services, namely investment advisory services, management of investment funds, and fund investment services.” Lion opposed the registration under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), alleging that the proposed mark would likely cause confusion with Lion’s registered marks when used for Stone Lion’s recited financial services. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board conducted the likelihood of confusion inquiry pursuant to 13 factors and refused registration. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Board had substantial evidence to support its conclusion. View "Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital, LLP" on Justia Law

In 2006, Allen and Gillman agreed to adapt Allen’s electronic payment system, then used in the automotive industry, to process health care claims. Their contracts provided that Allen’s company, StoneEagle, owned the new system technology. StoneEagle licensed the technology to Talon, which was responsible for marketing. Allen applied for a patent on the system, listing himself as the sole inventor. Gillman had some role in drafting the application and in the application process. Although not listed as an inventor, Gillman had an ownership interest in the patent application until at least July 2010, when he assigned his interest to StoneEagle. The patent issued in September 2010. By 2011, the relationship had soured. StoneEagle sought a declaratory judgment that Allen was the sole inventor and owner of the patent and asserted state law trade secret misappropriation claims. The court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting use or disclosure of StoneEagle’s trade secrets and confidential information. StoneEagle terminated the license agreement, but Talon and Gillman allegedly started a competing venture. The district court denied a contempt order and clairifed the injunction. The Federal Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case when StoneEagle initiated the lawsuit because it did not did not allege an actual controversy concerning inventorship. View "Stoneeagle Servs., Inc. v. Gillman" on Justia Law

Hauge and his former employer, ERI, disputed ownership of intellectual property rights related to “pressure exchangers,” a type of energy recovery device used in reverse osmosis. In 2001 they entered into an Agreement. The district court adopted the Agreement, holding that ERI was to be the sole owner of three U.S. patents and one pending patent application. After expiration of the Agreement’s non-compete clause, in 2004, Hauge filed a patent application, titled “Pressure Exchanger,” and a utility application. The patent issued in 2007, describing “[a] pressure exchanger for transferring pressure energy from a high-pressure fluid stream to low-pressure fluid stream.” In 2009, Hauge’s new company, Isobarix, unsuccessfully attempted to reach a new agreement with ERI. Isobarix began selling a pressure exchanger, called “XPR.” Hauge entered into a consulting agreement with two ERI employees. ERI sought an Order to Show Cause, in 2012, submitting an expert’s declaration that Isobarix was using pressure exchanger technology from pre-March 19, 2001 in design and manufacture of XPR, which is “virtually identical to the ERI pressure exchanger” in operation. The court entered a Contempt Order, finding that allowing Hauge to develop new products using technology he assigned to ERI solely because the new inventions post-date the Agreement would render the Agreement useless. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Hauge did not violate the “four corners” of the 2001 Order. View "Energy Recovery, Inc. v. Hauge" on Justia Law

Alaska Stock, a stock photography agency, registered large numbers of photographs at a time under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., listing only some of the authors and not listing titles for each photograph. Alaska Stock licensed Houghton Mifflin to use pictures it had registered, for fees based on the number of publications. After Houghton Mifflin greatly exceeded the number of publications it had paid for, Alaska Stock filed suit for injunctive relief, actual and statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court concluded that Alaska Stock successfully registered the copyright both to its collections and to the individual images contained therein; the statute required identification of the author and title of the "work," which was the collective work, and extended registration to the component parts if the party registering the collective work owned the copyright to the component parts, as Alaska Stock did; the procedure applied for over three decades by the Register of Copyrights to registration by stock photo agencies complied with the statutory requirements and did not violate any clear requirement to list individual authors and titles of the components within the work; the Register of Copyrights' reading that a collection of stock photos may be registered without individual titles, and without naming more than three of the authors and merely designating the number of authors, pursuant to an assignment in the language Alaska Stock used, was reasonable and persuasive; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal. View "Alaska Stock v. Houghton Mifflin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, UPRS and Bernard Gelb, authorized the clients of defendant to file a legal complaint and exhibits that were written and compiled by Gelb and in which UPRS and Gelb claimed copyright. Plaintiffs contend that defendant's subsequent amendment of the original documents and filing of amended pleadings infringed their copyrights. At issue was whether the holder of a copyright in a litigation document who has authorized a party to a litigation to use the document in the litigation could withdraw the authorization after the document had already been introduced into the litigation and then claim infringement when subsequent use was made of the document in the litigation. The court held that such an authorization necessarily conveyed, not only to the authorized party but to all present and future attorneys and to the court, an irrevocable authorization to use the document in the litigation thereafter.View "Unclaimed Property Recovery Service, Inc. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Lovely Skin filed suit against Ishtar, alleging four counts of trademark infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1127, and common law unfair competition and injury to business reputation in violation of Nebraska law. Ishtar counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the registrations of Lovely Skin's two trademarks. The court concluded that Ishtar did not demonstrate that Lovely Skin's trademarks were not registrable because they lacked acquired distinctiveness at the time of their registrations. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment canceling the registrations of LOVELYSKIN and LOVELYSKIN.COM. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in considering all of the SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Company factors and determining that no likelihood of confusion existed between Lovely Skin's trademarks and Ishtar's website. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for Ishtar on all four counts. View "Lovely Skin, Inc. v. Ishtar Skin Care Products, LLC" on Justia Law

Bass, a professor of biochemistry at UUtah, studies RNA interference (RNAi), a phenomenon in which RNA plays a role in silencing expression of individual genes. Her employment contract assigns all patent rights arising from her work to UUtah. Tuschl, a researcher employed by UMass, is also active in RNAi research. Bass claims that Tuschl’s patents disclosed and claimed her conception. UUtah believes that Bass is the sole or a joint inventor of the Tuschl patents. UUtah asked assignees of those patents to cooperate in petitioning the U.S Patent and Trademark Office to correct the inventorship by adding Bass as an inventor. Defendants declined and UUtah filed suit under 35 U.S.C. 256. UMass moved to dismiss, arguing that because UUtah and UMass were both arms of the state, the dispute fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. UUtah amended its complaint, replacing UMass with four UMass officials. The district court rejected jurisdictional, failure to join an indispensable party (UMass), and sovereign immunity arguments, reasoning that relief under section 256 is prospective in nature, not retroactive remedy and that correction of inventorship was not a core sovereign interest sufficient to make this a dispute between states. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Univ of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V." on Justia Law