Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Groeneveld sued Lubecore, claiming that Lubecore’s automotive grease pump is a “virtually identical” copy of Groeneveld’s automotive grease pump. The complaint asserted tradedress infringement in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and violation of related federal and Ohio laws. The trade-dress claim went to the jury, which found for Groeneveld and awarded it $1,225,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a company cannot use trade-dress law to protect its functional product design from competition with a “copycat” design made by another company where there is no reasonable likelihood that consumers would confuse the two companies’ products as emanating from a single source. Trademark law is designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate product manufacturers from lawful competition. View "Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This action arose from a technology-sharing relationship between companies engaged in the manufacture of industrial "sand-core" pipe for water and sewer applications. In 2002, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiffs agreed to provide Defendant with their technology for more efficient manufacturing sand-core pipe in exchange for data, reports, software, and other information developed by Defendant through use of Plaintiffs' process. Over time, the relationship between the parties disintegrated. As a result, in 2009, Plaintiffs brought this action asserting breach of contract and other causes of action related to Defendant's alleged nonperformance under their agreement. The Chancery Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, as well as claims under California Uniform Trade Secrets Act and for common law misappropriation, finding the claims were barred by laches.View "Petroplast Petrofisa Plasticos S.A. v. Ameron Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

After his divorce from Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree, which granted the parties a divorce and awarded child custody. The family court denied the motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA in part, insofar as it held the court properly awarded Respondent the copyrights and vacated the portion of the divorce decree that awarded Respondent all ownership interest in copyrights held in Petitioner's name, holding (1) the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion, as Petitioner had notice that his failure to appear at a scheduled settlement conference would result in default, and the court acknowledged that Petitioner's motion was for Hawaii Fam. Ct. R. 60(b) relief, although Petitioner had failed to cite rule 60(b) in support of the motion; and (2) the court abused its discretion in declining to set aside that part of the divorce decree that transferred Petitioner's entire ownership interest in the copyrights to Respondent in violation of federal law. The Court affirmed the divorce decree in all other respects. Remanded for a determination of the economic interest in the copyrights to which Respondent was entitled.View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

Soon after Yale Preston was employed by Pennaco Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marathon Oil Company (collectively referred to as Marathon), Preston signed an employee agreement with a disclosure and assignment of intellectual property clause. The present dispute centered around allegations of patent infringement and questions of ownership of two patents that covered a baffle system that Preston invented. The district court found that Preston was the sole inventor of the patents and that the employee agreement was a valid contract, pursuant to which Preston was required to assign his ownership interest in the patents to Marathon. At issue on appeal was the validity of the assignment of intellectual property rights given to Marathon without an additional consideration other than continued at-will employment. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that continuing the employment of an existing at-will employee constitutes adequate consideration to support an agreement containing an intellectual property-assignment provision.View "Preston v. Marathon Oil Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were three trademarks registered to Plaintiff by the secretary of state. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that its trademarks were valid and that it was entitled to the exclusive use of those marks, and claiming trademark infringement against the Arkansas Lottery Commission. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, which the circuit court denied. The Commission appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims because those claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court dismissed the Commission's interlocutory appeal without prejudice because the circuit court did not rule on the sovereign-immunity issue.View "Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Marketing" on Justia Law

This case arose out of patent infringement litigation. At issue was whether federal courts possess exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that require the application of patent law. The federal patent issue presented here was necessary, disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying state legal malpractice lawsuit. Additionally, the patent issue could be determined without creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal courts. Therefore, the court concluded that exclusive federal jurisdiction existed in this case. Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the legal malpractice claim, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed this case.View "Minton v. Gunn, et al." on Justia Law

Prime Home Care, LLC sought a permanent injunction pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-217, part of the statutes governing the protection of trade names, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-303, part of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, to prevent Pathways to Compassion, LLC from using the name "Compassionate Care Hospice." The district court granted Prime Home Care a permanent injunction and attorney fees. Pathways appealed, arguing that "Compassionate Care Hospice" was merely descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the name had acquired secondary meaning as it concerned Prime Home Care's hospice services; (2) the district court did not err when it granted Prime Home Care's request for a permanent injunction where confusion existed as a result of Pathways' use of Prime Home Care's protected trade name; and (3) the trial court did not err in granting Prime Home Care's request for attorney fees under either section 87-217 or section 87-303, and Prime Home Care was not entitled to additional attorney fees.View "Prime Home Care, LLC v. Pathways to Compassion, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

This case involved a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that stemmed from a dispute regarding assets of IFCT, a now defunct tech startup company founded by Stephen Marsh to develop potentially revolutionary micro fuel cell technology. The crux of plaintiff's argument was that the Director Defendants conducted an unfair and disloyal bidding process, whereby they favored the Echelon-backed bid and refused to follow up on or negotiate with other superior bids. As a result, IFCT missed its chance to sell its assets at the peak of their value and was forced to sell its assets at a discount in bankruptcy. Given that the Director Defendants have conceded the applicability of entire fairness review and given the fact-intensive nature of that review, the court found that the Director Defendants have not met their burden at this stage to achieve summary judgment against Encite. The court also found that material facts remained as to the liability of Echelon for aiding and abetting the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the Director Defendants and therefore, the court denied Echelon's motion for summary judgment on that claim. The court finally found that material facts also remained regarding Echelon's third party claims, and so denied Marsh's motion for summary judgment.View "Encite, LLC v. Soni, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants sued GLC and SGI asserting trademark infringement, deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract stemming from GLC's "Money Bags" lottery games of 2005 and 2007. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit raising claims that arose outside the Georgia Tort Claims Act and whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that OCGA 10-1-440 required the bona fide use of a trademark to make out a claim concerning the trademark's infringement? The court held that because sovereign immunity applied to state instrumentalities, GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense in this case. The court also held that there was no error in the interpretation of OCGA 10-1-440(b) by the Court of Appeals where appellants have not made "bona fide" use of their MONEYBAG$ mark in commerce sufficient to establish protectable rights in the mark. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.View "Kyle, et al. v. Georgia Lottery Corp., et al." on Justia Law