Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Bancorp owns the 792 and 037 patents, for tracking value of life insurance policies in separate accounts, under which the policy owner pays a premium beyond that required for the death benefit and specifies types of assets in which additional funds are invested. Corporations use the policies to insure employees’ lives and fund retirement benefits on a tax-advantaged basis. The value of a separate account policy fluctuates; owners must report the value of their policies. The patents provide a computerized means for tracking book and market values and calculating stable value guarantee. Bancorp sued Sun Life for infringement. In another suit, the court invalidated the 792 patent for indefiniteness. Bancorp and Sun Life stipulated to conditional dismissal on collateral estoppel. The Federal Circuit reversed the other case. The district court vacated dismissal then granted summary judgment of invalidity under section 101 (ineligible abstract ideas) without addressing claim construction and analyzing each claim as a process claim. Applying “the machine-or-transformation test,” specified computer components are only objects on which claimed methods operate, and the central processor is a general purpose computer programmed in an unspecified manner for a process that can be completed manually. The claims “do not transform the raw data into anything other than more data and are not representations of any physically existing objects.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada" on Justia Law

RTI owns patents relating to the automatic routing of telephone calls based upon cost. Aware of infringement by Speakeasy, a telecommunications company, RTI offered to release Speakeasy from liability in exchange for a one-time payment under RTI’s tiered pricing structure. In 2007, the companies entered a “Covenant Not to Sue” with a payment of $475,000 to RTI, and a provision barring Speakeasy from challenging, or assisting others in challenging, the validity of the patents. The agreement defined “Speakeasy” to include both Speakeasy and Best Buy, which had previously announced plans to acquire Speakeasy. Three years later, Best Buy announced a plan to sell Speakeasy and merge it into Covad. RTI again learned of an infringement and notified Covad. Covad sought a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid. The action was later dismissed voluntarily. RTI initiated the present lawsuit. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of licensee estoppel, under which a licensee of intellectual property “effectively recognizes the validity of that property and is estopped from contesting its validity,” is unenforceable in the context of challenges to patents, and that the no-challenge clause was contrary to the public interest in litigating the validity of patents. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc." on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

Intercollegiate Broadcasting, Inc. appealed a final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) setting the default royalty rates and terms applicable to internet-based webcasting of digitally recorded music. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the positions of the CRJs, as currently constituted, violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. To remedy that violation, the Court followed the Supreme Court's approach in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. by invalidating and severing the restrictions on the Librarian of Congress's ability to remove CRJs. The Court concluded that with such removal power in the Librarian's hands, the CRJs are "inferior" rather than "principal" officers, and no constitutional problem remained. Because of the Appointments Clause violation at the time of the decision, the Court vacated and remanded the determination challenged here. View "Intercollegiate Broad. v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

In 2005, Forest Park formulated a concept for a television show called "Housecall," in which a doctor, after being expelled from the medical community for treating patients who could not pay, moved to Malibu, California, and became a concierge doctor to the rich and famous. Forest Park created character biographies, themes, and storylines, which it mailed to Sepiol, who worked for USA Network. Initial discussions failed. A little less than four years later, USA Network produced and aired a television show called "Royal Pains," in which a doctor, after being expelled from the medical community for treating patients who could not pay, became a concierge doctor to the rich and famous in the Hamptons. Forest Park sued USA Network for breach of contract. The district court held that the claim was preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.101, and dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed. Forest Park adequately alleged the breach of a contract that included an implied promise to pay; the claim is based on rights that are not the equivalent of those protected by the Copyright Act and is not preempted. View "Forest Park Pictures v. USA Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006 the inventor submitted a utility patent application entitled “Crossbar Arithmetic Processor,” disclosing a computing device for processes such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division using nanoscale materials in a crossbar array. The examiner rejected all claims. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the claimed invention would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art. View "In re: Mouttet" on Justia Law

Wrigley and Cadbury compete in selling chewing gum that provides a cooling sensation. Historically, gum makers have achieved that sensation with menthol. Menthol has disadvantages, including a strong peppermint flavor and bitterness in high concentrations. WS-3 and WS-23 are alternative coolants: Cadbury owns the 893 patent, claiming a combination of menthol with WS-3. Wrigley owns the 233 patent, claiming menthol with WS-23. After Cadbury introduced its WS-3/menthol gum, Wrigley introduced a gum with menthol and WS-23. Cadbury then reformulated its products. Cadbury’s reformulated gum contained both WS-23 and menthol. Wrigley sued, accusing Cadbury of infringing the 233 patent. Cadbury counterclaimed, accusing Wrigley of infringing the 893 patent. The district court granted Wrigley summary judgment of noninfringement. Addressing Cadbury’s summary judgment motion, the district court concluded that claim 34 of the 233 patent was invalid for anticipation and obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The inventors were on notice of potential interchangeability of WS-23 and WS-3, but drafted claims of the 893 patent narrowly to recite certain N-substituted-p-menthane carboxamides, not a broader category of carboxamides that would include WS-23. The trial court properly held that Cadbury could not expand the coverage of its patent to include WS-23 through the doctrine of equivalents. View "Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a trademark infringement suit involving the sale of counterfeit versions of defendant's hoisin sauce. The district court subsequently imposed sanctions in fees and costs pursuant to FRCP 11 against plaintiffs and their attorneys in favor of defendant. The attorneys appealed, contending that the district court erred in its application of Rule 11. Defendant cross-appealed, contending that the district should have awarded substantially more in fees and costs and moved to sanction the attorneys for filing a purportedly frivolous appeal. The court held that the safe harbor requirement under Rule 11 was satisfied in these circumstances; the attorneys have failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the action was frivolous; nor have the attorneys shown that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to impose monetary sanctions. The court rejected defendant's arguments on cross appeal and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd." on Justia Law

In these parallel cases, separate petitions were filed requesting the district court to set a "reasonable" rate after ASCAP and BMI were unable to agree on licensing fees with DMX, a provider of background/foreground music. In both cases, the district court adopted DMX's proposals. The court held the Second Amended Final Judgment (AFJ2) permitted blanket licenses subject to carve-outs to account for direct licensing and the court rejected ASCAP's claim that a blanket license with an adjustable carve-out conflicted with the AJF2. The court concluded that the district court in both cases found that ASCAP and BMI did not sustain their burdens of proving that their proposals were reasonable; no legal error contributed to these findings and the findings supported by the record were not clearly erroneous; and in both instances, the district court had the authority to set a reasonable rate for DMX's licenses. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in setting DMX's licensing rates with ASCAP and BMI and that the rates set by the district court were reasonable. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc.; American Society of Computers, Authors and Publishers v. THP Capstar Acquisition Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose when the University told Daniel A. Moore, an artist who painted famous football scenes involving the University since 1979, that he would need permission to depict the University's uniforms because they were trademarks. Moore contended that he did not need permission because the uniforms were being used realistically to portray historic events. The parties could not reach a resolution and the University subsequently sued Moore for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. The court held that, as evidenced by the parties' course of conduct, Moore's depiction of the University's uniforms in his unlicensed paintings, prints, and calendars was not prohibited by the prior licensing agreements. Additionally, the paintings, prints, and calendars did not violate the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), because these artistically expressive objects were protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the district court with respect to the paintings and prints, and reversed with respect to the prints as replicated on calendars. With respect to the licensing agreements' coverage of the mugs and other "mundane products," the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because disputed issues of fact remained. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "University of Ala. Bd of Trustees v. New Life, Inc" on Justia Law