Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on three patents owned by the appellant, which describe a method for displaying information to facilitate the return of lost or stolen computers. The patented method involves powering on a computer and automatically displaying a screen with return information, either before or alongside the lock screen, and includes the ability to remotely initiate or change the displayed information without assistance from a user with the computer. The appellant alleged that certain devices sold by LG Electronics, featuring Google or Microsoft’s “Find My Device” software, infringed these patents.Following the appellant’s lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Google and Microsoft initiated six inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), contesting the validity of the patents based on prior art. The PTAB instituted review despite the appellant’s arguments referencing a parallel district court action and concerns about duplicative proceedings. LG, named as a real party in interest, filed a “Sotera stipulation,” agreeing not to pursue in district court any grounds raised in the IPRs, which the PTAB considered in its decision to institute review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s final written decisions, which found all challenged claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges tied to the PTAB’s institution decision, specifically regarding the impact of LG’s violation of the Sotera stipulation. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB’s construction of the “without assistance” claim limitation, finding no error and concluding that the prior art disclosed the disputed method. The court also determined that the PTAB’s analysis of secondary considerations of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part, awarding costs against the appellant. View "HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

Amarin Pharma, Inc. developed and marketed Vascepa, a drug containing icosapent ethyl. Initially, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication). Later, the FDA approved a new use: reducing cardiovascular risk in certain patients (the CV indication), for which Amarin held two method-of-use patents. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., a generic manufacturer, sought to market a generic icosapent ethyl. After Amarin’s SH-indication patents were invalidated by a district court, Hikma pursued FDA approval for a “skinny label” generic, carving out the patented CV indication. The FDA approved Hikma’s application with the label limited to the SH indication.Amarin sued Hikma in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s CV-indication patents. Amarin argued that various statements in Hikma’s skinny label, patient information leaflet, website, and press releases encouraged infringement. The District Court granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss, finding that the statements did not constitute active encouragement of infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding it plausible that a physician could read Hikma’s statements as instructions or encouragement to prescribe the drug for the patented use.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b). The Court clarified that liability requires affirmative “active steps” to encourage infringement, not merely statements that could be read as encouragement. The Court found Hikma’s statements either reflected legal compliance or ordinary industry practice, or were too vague or passive to plausibly constitute active inducement. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two companies over patents related to wireless communications for building automation systems. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s smart thermostat products infringed four patents, which addressed improvements in wireless network architecture, power and bandwidth usage, and data redundancy within building control systems. At trial, a jury found that the defendant had infringed at least one of the asserted patents (without specifying which), determined that the claims of one patent were not limited to well-understood or routine technology, found another patent’s claims invalid, and awarded the plaintiff lump sum damages.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the court denied these motions for the patents at issue, except for one where factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The court also denied the defendant’s post-trial motions, including challenges to the verdict form, jury instructions related to patent eligibility, and motions to exclude expert testimony. The plaintiff, in turn, appealed the district court’s limitation on prejudgment interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court’s verdict form, which combined all asserted patents into a single infringement question, violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. The appellate court vacated both the infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial on those issues. The court also vacated and remanded the § 101 eligibility determination for one patent, requiring further proceedings under the Alice framework. However, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that the asserted claims of two other patents were not directed to abstract ideas and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement on one patent. Remaining evidentiary and interest issues were dismissed as moot. View "OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC " on Justia Law

Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lil' Joe Records, Inc. v. Won" on Justia Law

AGI SureTrack LLC brought suit against Farmers Edge Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging infringement of several patents relating to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing, and sharing farming data. The core patented technology involved using a relay device with generic computer components to collect real-time data from various farming equipment, process this information, and share it via an online exchange. The patent claims described a system using a microprocessor, bus connector, GPS receiver, and memory storage, together with software that records and interprets data from farming implements.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Edge. The court found that the asserted patent claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded that the claims merely used generic computer components to collect and process data and did not constitute an inventive concept. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional and denied Farmers Edge’s request for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed both AGI’s challenge to the finding of patent ineligibility and Farmers Edge’s cross-appeal regarding exceptionality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted patents were not patent-eligible, holding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked any inventive concept beyond conventional technology. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s summary determination that the case was not exceptional, finding the lower court failed to provide adequate reasoning or allow both parties to present argument on the issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings on exceptionality and attorney’s fees. View "AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC. " on Justia Law

A clothing company filed a lawsuit against multiple e-commerce vendors, including a Chinese company, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition, and related claims under the Lanham Act. The defendants were identified in a document attached to the complaint. Because the defendants were primarily Chinese entities operating online, the plaintiff asserted it was difficult to determine their exact identities and addresses. The plaintiff sought and was granted permission by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to serve the defendants by email, which included sending a link to the complaint and other documents. The defendant, Hangzhou, engaged in settlement discussions but did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment. The court’s order also allowed the plaintiff to collect funds from third parties, including from Hangzhou’s Amazon account.After the plaintiff collected a portion of the judgment, Hangzhou appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment, primarily arguing that service by email in China was prohibited under the Hague Service Convention and thus the judgment was void for lack of proper service. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the Convention permits email service in China, and rejected other arguments related to Illinois post-judgment procedures.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by email in China, contrary to the district court’s conclusion. However, the appellate court determined that the district court must first decide whether the Convention applies to this case, specifically whether the defendant’s address was “not known,” which would render the Convention inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision denying the motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this threshold issue. View "Kangol LLC v Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

A medical device company that manufactures an adhesive, wearable insulin patch pump alleged that a competitor misappropriated trade secrets and infringed patents. The competitor had hired several former employees of the company, including a director who had extensive knowledge of the company’s product design and development. The alleged misappropriation occurred in 2018, when this former director provided design files and technical information to the competitor as it developed a second-generation insulin patch pump.The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which bifurcated the trade secret and patent claims. The company moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that decision in Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. (“Insulet I”), finding that the district court had not properly analyzed the statute of limitations and other elements. On remand, the district court denied both sides’ summary judgment motions on the statute of limitations for the trade secret misappropriation claim, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on four trade secrets, found the claims timely, awarded damages, and the district court entered judgment, imposed joint and several liability, and issued a permanent injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it had jurisdiction because the patent claims had been effectively dismissed with prejudice due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for at least one alleged infringing act. On the merits, the Federal Circuit held that, under the applicable statute of limitations standard, the evidence established the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged misappropriation more than three years before filing suit. The Court found the claims time-barred and reversed the judgment. View "INSULET CORP. v. EOFLOW, CO. LTD. " on Justia Law

George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law

Guild Mortgage Company LLC and CrossCountry Mortgage LLC are direct competitors in the residential mortgage industry. Over an 18-month period, several Guild employees in the Kirkland, Washington branch, including the branch manager and other high-level staff, were allegedly recruited by CrossCountry while still employed by Guild. According to the complaints, these employees solicited their colleagues to also move to CrossCountry, diverted customers and loan applications, and accessed Guild’s computer systems to take confidential and proprietary information. The employees had signed agreements with Guild prohibiting such conduct, and Guild subsequently lost nearly its entire Kirkland branch workforce to CrossCountry.After Guild initiated arbitration against the former employees and prevailed, it filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of San Diego County against CrossCountry. Guild’s claims included interference with economic advantage, interference with contract, violation of California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CCDAFA), unfair competition, and aiding and abetting tortious conduct. The Superior Court sustained CrossCountry’s demurrers, finding that the claims were preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) or otherwise failed to state a cause of action, and dismissed the case without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Guild had adequately alleged actionable duties of loyalty and, for the branch manager, fiduciary duty, that were breached by the employees and aided by CrossCountry. The court found that the claims for interference and violation of the CCDAFA were not displaced by CUTSA because they arose from conduct beyond trade secret misappropriation. The court also held that the unfair competition claim could proceed since the other claims were viable. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in favor of CrossCountry and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guild Mortgage Company v. CrossCounty Mortgage" on Justia Law

A holding company and its North Carolina insurance agency subsidiary, which function as intermediaries between clients and insurance carriers, experienced significant employee dissatisfaction after a shift in commission structure and a pay freeze in early 2020. This led to multiple employees, including both producers and account managers, leaving over several months to join a direct competitor, a new agency formed by a former employee. The departing employees had signed agreements with non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. During their departures, some employees forwarded company documents to personal accounts, and, after litigation began, engaged in extensive deletion of electronic evidence.Previously, in Guilford County Superior Court, the plaintiffs had sued a former producer, with most claims dismissed except for breach of employment agreement, and that suit was later settled. In the current litigation, after discovery, both sides sought partial summary judgment in the North Carolina Business Court (Superior Court for Complex Business Cases). The Business Court granted summary judgment in part for both parties, including a grant of adverse inference against defendants for spoliation of evidence, but did not specify how that inference would apply to each claim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the adverse inference ruling but remanded for the Business Court to clarify its specific application. The Court reversed the Business Court’s summary judgment that two client lists could not be trade secrets, holding there were genuine issues of fact. It clarified the standard for misappropriation of trade secrets under state law, requiring evidence of a specific opportunity to acquire trade secrets without authorization. The Court remanded claims related to trade secrets, enforcement of non-solicitation provisions (pending factual findings on the scope of the employer and affiliates), and certain computer fraud claims for further proceedings. Summary judgment for defendants on unjust enrichment was affirmed, and the Business Court was directed to issue a written opinion for claims it disposed of in a summary order. The disposition was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rel. Ins., Inc. v. Pilot Risk Mgmt. Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law