Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the plaintiff, ams-OSRAM USA Inc. (formerly Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. or TAOS), sued Renesas Electronics America, Inc. (formerly Intersil Corporation) in the Eastern District of Texas. TAOS alleged patent infringement and state-law claims of trade secret misappropriation and breach of a confidentiality agreement related to ambient-light sensors. The patent claim is no longer at issue. TAOS claimed that Intersil used confidential information disclosed during merger discussions to develop competing products.The district court entered a judgment in 2015 based on a jury verdict, awarding TAOS damages for trade secret misappropriation but not for breach of contract, deeming the latter duplicative. In 2018, the Federal Circuit affirmed Intersil’s liability for trade secret misappropriation on a narrower basis, vacated the monetary award, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated the judgment denying contract damages as duplicative.On remand, the district court held additional proceedings, including a new jury trial. The court awarded TAOS $8,546,000 in disgorged profits for trade secret misappropriation, $17,092,000 in exemplary damages, and reasonable royalties for breach of contract totaling $6,637,693. The court also awarded prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings on the trade secret and contract claims, including the disgorgement and exemplary damages awards. However, the court reversed the finding that the trade secret became properly accessible in January 2006, determining the correct date to be February 28, 2005. The court affirmed the 26-month head-start period and the inclusion of profits from sales to Apple for the iPod Touch in the disgorgement award. The court vacated the prejudgment interest awards and remanded for further consideration of the appropriate accrual dates for interest on sales occurring after the complaint was filed. View "AMS-OSRAM USA INC. v. RENESAS ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. " on Justia Law

In 2018, DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. (DB&A), a management consulting firm, hired Justin Pethick as a regional vice president of sales. In 2020, Pethick accepted a job offer from The Randall Powers Company (the Powers Co.), a competitor. After Pethick joined the Powers Co., some prospective DB&A clients hired the Powers Co. DB&A alleged that Pethick stole its trade secrets and used them to poach clients.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas excluded DB&A’s damages expert under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing DB&A’s lack of evidence of damages. DB&A appealed, contesting the exclusion of its expert and the summary judgment on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that to prevail on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim under Texas law, a plaintiff must show that a trade secret existed, it was acquired through a breach of a confidential relationship or discovered by improper means, and the defendant used the trade secret without authorization. The court found that DB&A failed to identify specific trade secrets within its databases and did not provide evidence that Pethick or the Powers Co. used or disclosed any trade secrets. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of DB&A’s misappropriation claim on these alternative grounds. View "DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. v. Pethick" on Justia Law

Donald Forest submitted a patent application for an "Apparatus for Selecting from a Touch Screen" to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on December 27, 2016. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirmed in part the examiner’s rejection of certain claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and nonstatutory double patenting. Forest appealed this decision.The PTAB reviewed the case and upheld the examiner's rejection of certain claims in Forest's patent application. Forest did not dispute that his application was filed more than a year after the expiration date of any resulting patent, which would have been in 2015. The USPTO raised a jurisdictional issue, arguing that Forest had no personal stake in the appeal because he could not be granted enforceable rights by a patent with zero term. Forest argued that he would still acquire "provisional rights" under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) if the USPTO issued him an expired patent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with Forest's interpretation of the statute. The court held that provisional rights are granted only when a patent would issue with exclusionary rights, meaning before its expiration date. Since Forest's patent would issue after its expiration date, he would not receive any enforceable rights. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal. View "In Re FOREST " on Justia Law

Bigfoot Ventures Limited brought a shareholder derivative action on behalf of NextEngine, Inc. against Mark S. Knighton, ShapeTools, LLC, and NextEngine. Bigfoot alleged that the agreement between NextEngine and ShapeTools was not intended to benefit NextEngine or its shareholders. Bigfoot had a history of litigation against NextEngine, including disputes over loans and intellectual property (IP) rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Bigfoot’s suit, finding that Bigfoot could not fairly or adequately represent the interests of NextEngine’s shareholders as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. The court considered the ongoing litigation between Bigfoot and NextEngine, which suggested that the derivative action was being used as leverage in other lawsuits. The court also found that Bigfoot’s personal interest in gaining control of NextEngine’s IP outweighed its interest in asserting rights on behalf of NextEngine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit clarified that courts are not required to assess each of the eight factors from Larson v. Dumke when determining plaintiff adequacy in a shareholder derivative action. The court held that the district court did not err in considering the ongoing litigation as an outside entanglement and found that the record supported the district court’s conclusion that Bigfoot was an inadequate plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the trial to hear the motion to dismiss, as it raised significant issues that needed to be resolved before trial. View "BIGFOOT VENTURES LIMITED V. KNIGHTON" on Justia Law

Dyson Technology, Ltd., a UK-based company, filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against multiple e-commerce stores for selling counterfeit Dyson products. Dyson sought remedies under the Lanham Act, which allows trademark holders to recover profits, damages, and costs from infringing parties. The defendants did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment in Dyson's favor. However, the district court awarded only $1,000 in statutory damages and denied Dyson's request to recover the infringing sellers' profits, stating that Dyson had only provided evidence of revenue, not profits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled the initial case. The court's decision to limit Dyson's award was based on its interpretation that revenue and profits are not the same, and it declined to assume that all revenue equaled profits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Lanham Act. According to the Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to the defendant's profits, and the defendant bears the burden of proving any costs or deductions. The appellate court found that Dyson's evidence of revenue was sufficient to establish profits, as the defendants did not provide evidence to the contrary. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the district court to adjust the award if deemed just based on the case's circumstances. View "Dyson Technology Limited v David 7 Store" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the named inventors of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/005,678, which is directed to logistics systems and methods for the transportation of goods. The application was rejected by an Examiner under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by a published patent application (Lettich) and under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lettich in view of another reference (Rojek). The inventors appealed the rejection to the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board).The Board initially reversed the Examiner's rejections but later granted the Examiner's request for rehearing, determining that Lettich did qualify as prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e). The Board then sustained the Examiner's anticipation and obviousness rejections. The inventors appealed the Board's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board conducted an incomplete analysis in determining whether Lettich qualifies as prior art under § 102(e). Specifically, the court held that it is not sufficient to show that a single claim in the prior art application is supported by the provisional application; the specific portions of the application relied on in the rejection must also be supported by the provisional application. The court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further analysis to determine whether the Lettich Provisional Application provides written description support for the specific disclosures in Lettich that the Examiner identified and relied on in the prior art rejections. View "In Re RIGGS " on Justia Law

Wash World Inc. sought to reverse a final judgment that it infringed Belanger Inc.'s 8,602,041 patent. Wash World contended that the district court erred in not construing three claim terms and that Belanger could not prove infringement under the correct constructions. Wash World also disputed the jury's decision to award Belanger $9.8 million in lost profits damages and requested a remittitur of approximately $2.6 million. Belanger argued that Wash World forfeited these issues by not preserving them in the district court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled that no construction was needed for the disputed terms and denied Wash World's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. The jury found that Wash World’s Razor EDGE car wash system infringed Belanger’s patent and awarded $9.8 million in lost profits and $260,000 in reasonable royalties. The district court denied Wash World’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Wash World forfeited its arguments regarding the constructions of "outer cushioning sleeve" and "predefined wash area" by not presenting them adequately in the district court. However, the court agreed with the district court's construction of "dependingly mounted" and affirmed the judgment of infringement.On the issue of damages, the Federal Circuit concluded that the jury's award improperly included $2,577,848 for convoyed sales, which lacked sufficient evidence of a functional relationship with the patented product. The court vacated the damages portion of the judgment and remanded with instructions to remit the damages by $2,577,848, resulting in a total award of $7,482,152 in favor of Belanger. View "WASH WORLD INC. v. BELANGER INC. " on Justia Law

Maquet Cardiovascular LLC owns U.S. Patent No. 10,238,783, which relates to an intravascular blood pump system designed to improve the deployment of blood pumps within a patient's circulatory system. The patent aims to address the difficulties associated with guiding blood pumps to the appropriate position using supplemental guiding mechanisms. Instead, it employs integrated guide mechanisms located on the device itself. Maquet sued Abiomed Inc. and its affiliates for infringing claims of the '783 patent and U.S. Patent No. 9,789,238.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts construed certain claim terms of the '783 patent, including "guide mechanism comprising a lumen" and "guide wire" terms. The court included negative limitations in its constructions based on the prosecution history of related patents. The parties stipulated to non-infringement based on these constructions, leading the district court to enter a final judgment of non-infringement for both patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim constructions. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in applying prosecution disclaimer to the "guide mechanism comprising a lumen" term in claim 1 of the '783 patent, as the prosecution history of the related '238 patent was not relevant due to differences in claim language. The court also found that the district court erred in construing the "guide wire" terms in claims 1 and 24 of the '783 patent, as Maquet did not make a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope during the prosecution of the '728 patent.The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's judgment of non-infringement as to the '783 patent and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment of non-infringement as to the '238 patent was left undisturbed. View "MAQUET CARDIOVASCULAR LLC v. ABIOMED INC. " on Justia Law

Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc. ("Actavis") filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) with the FDA to market generic versions of branded drugs. The manufacturers of these branded drugs, who hold New Drug Applications (NDAs) and patents, sued Actavis for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Act considers the submission of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification as an act of patent infringement if it seeks FDA approval before the expiration of the patents. Actavis incurred significant litigation expenses defending these suits and deducted these expenses as ordinary business expenses on its tax returns.The IRS disagreed, treating these expenses as capital expenditures related to the acquisition of an intangible asset (FDA approval) and issued Notices of Deficiency. Actavis paid the assessed taxes and sued in the Court of Federal Claims for a refund, arguing that the litigation expenses were deductible. The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of Actavis, holding that the litigation expenses were deductible as ordinary business expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court considered whether the litigation expenses were ordinary business expenses or capital expenditures. Applying both the "origin of the claim" test and the IRS regulation under C.F.R. § 1.263, the court concluded that the expenses were deductible. The court found that the origin of the claim was the patent infringement suit, not the pursuit of FDA approval, and that the litigation did not facilitate the acquisition of the FDA-approved ANDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, allowing Actavis to deduct the litigation expenses as ordinary business expenses. View "ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

AMP Plus, Inc., doing business as ELCO Lighting, appealed a final written decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) which found that ELCO failed to show claim 22 of U.S. Patent No. 9,964,266 was unpatentable as obvious. The patent, owned by DMF, Inc., relates to a compact recessed lighting system that can be installed in a standard electrical junction box. The key issue on appeal was whether claim 22, which includes a limitation referred to as "Limitation M," was obvious.The PTAB initially found that claim 17 of the patent was anticipated by prior art, but did not explicitly address the patentability of claim 22. ELCO appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case for the PTAB to address the arguments concerning claim 22. On remand, the PTAB concluded that ELCO failed to show the unpatentability of claim 22, noting that ELCO's petition lacked sufficient analysis and evidence to establish that the marine recessed lighting system disclosed in the prior art could be installed in a building, as required by Limitation M.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the PTAB's decision. The court held that ELCO's petition did not adequately address the specific requirement of Limitation M and that the evidence cited did not support the installation of the marine lighting system in a building. The court also rejected ELCO's argument that claim 22 was anticipated by the same prior art that anticipated claim 17, as this argument was not raised in the original petition. The court concluded that the PTAB's determination was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the decision. View "AMP PLUS, INC. v. DMF, INC. " on Justia Law