Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries
Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma S.A.
Medytox’s patent is directed to the use of an animal-protein-free botulinum toxin composition that exhibits a longer-lasting effect compared to an animal protein-containing botulinum toxin composition and purportedly can be used to treat both cosmetic and non-cosmetic conditions. Galderma requested post-grant review of claims 1–10, which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted. Medytox filed a non-contingent motion to amend seeking to cancel claims 1–10 and substitute claims 11–18 and requested that the Board issue a Preliminary Guidance. Galderma argued that the claims added new matter because the claims covered compounds with a 16-week responder rate between 50-100% but the specification only disclosed responder rates of up to 62%.Reversing its Preliminary Guidance, the Board found that the substitute claims impermissibly introduced new matter with the inclusion of the responder rate limitation and failed to meet the requirements for revised motions to amend; that the proposed substitute claims were unpatentable for a lack of written description; and that the full scope of the claims was not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board’s claim construction of the responder rate limitation as a range. The Board provided adequate explanation for its enablement finding. The Board’s revision of its claim construction of the responder rate limitation made between its Preliminary Guidance and final decision was not arbitrary and capricious, depriving Medytox of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. View "Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma S.A." on Justia Law
Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Lrd.
In 2018, Spireon sought to register the mark FL FLEX, for “[e]lectronic devices for tracking the locations of mobile assets" such as trailers, cargo containers, and transportation equipment, using global positioning systems and cellular communication networks. An Examining Attorney approved the application. Flex opposed the registration, citing priority and the likelihood of confusion with Flex’s marks, FLEX, FLEX (stylized), and FLEX PULSE, registered in 2016-2017, for services including supply chain management services, transportation logistics services, and inventory management, and computers, computer software for use in supply chain management, logistics and operations management, quality control, inventory management, scheduling, and related services.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Board sustained Flex’s opposition. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board erred in analyzing conceptual strength under the first DuPont factor, the similarity of the marks, rather than the sixth DuPont factor. The existence of third-party registrations on similar goods can bear on a mark’s conceptual strength. Third-party registrations containing an element that is common to both the opposer’s and the applicant’s marks can show that that element has “a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning.” Flex failed to show that the identical marks for identical goods were not used in the marketplace, but on remand, should be allowed to make such a showing. The Board also erred by comparing FL FLEX to FLEX PLUS rather than the relevant mark. View "Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Lrd." on Justia Law
Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.
In this copyright action involving ownership rights to the board game, "The Game of Life," the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying attorney's fees sought from the unsuccessful plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not err in denying fees and that this Court declines to award fees for the appeal.This case stemmed from a dispute between Rueben Klamer, a toy developer who came up with the initial concept of the game before it was introduced in 1960 by the Milton Bradley Company, and Bill Markham, a game designer that Klamer recruited to design and create the actual game prototype. Markham's successors-in-interest sued Klamer and other defendants seeking a declaration that they possessed "termination rights" under the 1976 Copyright Act. The district court granted judgment for Defendants but denied fees. Defendants appealed and moved for appellate attorney's fees. The First Circuit denied relief, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying fees; and (2) this Court declines to award fees for the appeal. View "Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc." on Justia Law
Nuvasive, Inc. v. Absolute Medical, LLC, et al.
NuVasive, Inc. manufactures medical products and equipment to treat spinal diseases. In central Florida, NuVasive sold its products through an exclusive distribution agreement with Absolute Medical, LLC. Under the agreement, Absolute Medical employed independent-contractor sales representatives who marketed and sold NuVasive’s products to doctors and medical practices in the region. NuVasive sued Absolute Medical, Soufleris, AMS, and two of Absolute Medical’s sales representatives who began working for AMS for breaching the exclusive. The district court enforced a dispute resolution clause in the agreement, ordering NuVasive and Absolute Medical to arbitrate NuVasive’s breach-of-contract claim seeking money damages. Absolute Medical, Soufleris, AMS, and the sales representatives appealed the district court’s order granting NuVasive’s motion to vacate the arbitration panel’s final award.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not err by equitably tolling the three-month filing deadline and considering NuVasive’s motion as timely. The court explained that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and they supported the district court’s conclusion that NuVasive satisfied both prongs of the equitable tolling analysis. Defendants’ conduct presented extraordinary circumstances, and NuVasive was diligent once it learned that there was reason to pursue vacatur. Further, the court held that the district court did not err by vacating the final award. The district court correctly concluded that the fraud was materially related to that issue. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to direct a rehearing by the arbitration panel. View "Nuvasive, Inc. v. Absolute Medical, LLC, et al." on Justia Law
CEATS v. TicketNetwork
CEATS, Inc. is a non-practicing intellectual property company that owns patents for technologies used in online ticketing. TicketNetwork, Inc. and Ticket Software LLC (together “Ticket”) maintain an online marketplace for tickets to live events. More than a decade ago, CEATS filed a patent-infringement lawsuit against Ticket and other providers (the “2010 Lawsuit”). CEATS and Ticket settled that suit. The settlement agreement gave Ticket a license to use CEATS’s patents in exchange for a lump-sum payment from Ticket and for ongoing royalty payments from Ticket and its affiliates (the “License Agreement”). CEATS continued its litigation against the remaining non-settling defendants, but the jury in that case found that CEATS’s patents were invalid. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed that part of the Sanctions Order that imposes joint and several monetary liability against CEATS. The court vacated those parts of the Sanctions Order that impose joint and several monetary liability against the Individuals, that impose the Licensing Bar, and that deny CEATS’s tolling request. The court vacated the Calculation Order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that here CEATS told the district court that a discovery violation “must be committed willfully or in bad faith for the court to award the severest remedies available under Rule 37(b).” CEATS also argued that it did not violate the Protective Order willfully or in bad faith because the “communications . . . were clearly inadvertent.” That argument was enough to put the district court on notice that CEATS opposed any definition of “bad faith” that includes inadvertent conduct. View "CEATS v. TicketNetwork" on Justia Law
In Re Couvaras
The pending claims of the 422 application recite methods of increasing prostacyclin release in the systemic blood vessels of a human with essential hypertension to improve vasodilation. Increased prostacyclin release is achieved by co-administering two well-known antihypertensive agents: a GABA-a agonist and an Angiotensin II Receptor Blocker (ARB). Essentially, the claims relate to combatting hypertension with known anti-hypertensive agents and claiming their previously unappreciated mechanism of action. During prosecution, Couvaras conceded that GABA-a agonists and ARBs “have been known as essential hypertension treatments" for decades. The Examiner agreed, citing 10 references establishing that GABA-a agonists and ARBs lower blood pressure; the claimed results of increased prostacyclin release, activation of uninhibited GABA-a receptors, and smooth muscle relaxation were not patentable because they naturally flowed from the claimed administration of the known antihypertensive agents.The Patent Board affirmed the rejection, holding that the claimed result of an increased prostacyclin release was inherent in the obvious administration of the two known antihypertension agents and that Couvaras’s objective indicia arguments did not overcome
the prima facie case of obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board erred in affirming that a skilled artisan would have had motivation to combine the art; that the claimed mechanism of action was unexpected, and that the Board erred in discounting its patentable weight; and that the Board erred in weighing objective indicia of nonobviousness. View "In Re Couvaras" on Justia Law
Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC
The Parus patents are directed to an interactive voice system that allows a user to request information from a voice web browser. Their shared specification discloses two preferred embodiments: a voice- based web browser system and a voice-activated device controller. On inter parties review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found several claims unpatentable as obvious.The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board’s decision to disregard evidence submitted by Parus and to consider a certain reference prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Board’ determinations concerning written description did not exceed its statutory authority; its finding that the challenged clams were not entitled to an earlier priority date was supported by substantial evidence. View "Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law
Blue Gentian, LLC v. Tristar Products, Inc.
Blue Gentian owns the asserted patents. Berardi, Blue Gentian’s principal was the sole named inventor on each patent. The utility patents generally relate to an expandable hose. The design patents claim the ornamental design for an expandable hose. Blue Gentian sued Tristar for infringement. Tristar counterclaimed to correct the inventorship of all six patents. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that a nonparty, Ragner, should have been a named co-inventor on all asserted patents and entered judgment on the inventorship counterclaim, ordering correction of the patents under 35 U.S.C. 256.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The district court properly determined that the three key elements were a significant contribution to the conception of at least one claim of each asserted patent. To the extent the district court should have provided a more detailed claim-by-claim comparison of Ragner’s contributions, any error was harmless. The three elements, taken together, were a significant contribution to at least one claim of each asserted patent. Blue Gentian’s insistence that claim construction was a prerequisite to an inventorship hearing, without more, did not present a dispute about claim scope since it did not otherwise present a material dispute about claim meaning. View "Blue Gentian, LLC v. Tristar Products, Inc." on Justia Law
Jack Daniel’s™ Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC
VIP makes a chewable dog toy that looks like a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle; the words “Jack Daniel’s” become “Bad Spaniels.” “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” turns into “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s demanded that VIP stop selling the toy.VIP sought a declaratory judgment that Bad Spaniels neither infringed nor diluted Jack Daniel’s trademarks. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed. The Lanham Act defines a trademark by its primary function: identifying a product’s source and distinguishing that source from others. A typical infringement case examines whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(A). A typical dilution case considers whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a trademark. VIP cited the “Rogers test,” which requires dismissal of an infringement claim when “expressive works” are involved unless the complainant can show either that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of VIP.The Supreme Court vacated. When an alleged infringer uses a trademark as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, the Rogers test does not apply. Consumer confusion about source is most likely to arise when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark. Bad Spaniels was not automatically entitled to Rogers’ protection because it “communicate[d] a humorous message.” VIP used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers. Although VIP’s effort to parody Jack Daniel’s does not justify the application of the Rogers test, it may make a difference in the standard trademark analysis on remand. View "Jack Daniel's™ Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC" on Justia Law
VHT, INC. V. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., ET AL
Thousands of copyrighted photos on Zillow’s site come from VHT, a professional real estate photography studio. Zillow used VHT’s photos on its real estate “Listing Platform,” which is the primary display of properties, and on a home design section of the website called “Digs.” Following summary judgment rulings, a jury trial, and various post-trial motions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in large part in prior appeal Zillow I. Essentially, the panel agreed with the district court that Zillow was not liable for direct, secondary, or contributory infringement.
Back on remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in full. The panel held that the district court properly excused VHT’s failure to meet Section 411(a)’s non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement because copyright registration was wholly collateral to whether Zillow infringed on VHT's copyright, dismissing VHT’s claim after the statute of limitations had already expired would cause irreparable harm, and excusal would not undermine the purpose of administrative exhaustion. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, on remand, that the 2,700 VHT photos remaining at issue were not a compilation, which would entitle VHT to only a single award of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), but rather, each individual photo constituted an infringement. The photos were part of VHT’s master photo database, and the VHT group registered its images as a “compilation.” But VHT also registered the underlying individual images and licensed these images on a per-image or per-property basis. The panel held that the photos had independent economic value separate from the database and did not qualify as “one work.” View "VHT, INC. V. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law