Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries
Foss v. Eastern States Exposition
The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing on claim preclusion grounds Plaintiff's claims against Eastern States Exposition alleging violations of federal copyright infringement law and the U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act, holding that the district court erred.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the claim preclusive order gave claim preclusive effect to the dismissal in a prior action that she brought even where the dismissal rested on several grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive. In support of her claim, Plaintiff argued that federal res judicata law recognizes the "alternative-determinations" doctrine. The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing the claims at issue, holding (1) the assertedly preclusive dismissal rested on one ground that, on its own, would not allow the dismissal to be claim preclusive, even though the dismissal also rested on two counts that could have; and (2) federal res judiata law recognizes the alternative-determinations doctrine, which strips a dismissal of claim preclusive effect if the dismissal rests on multiple grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive, and the doctrine applied in this case. View "Foss v. Eastern States Exposition" on Justia Law
Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC
Sony petitioned for inter partes review of claims 1–6 of the Bot’s 540 patent, which concerns a gaming machine that authenticates certain data and that has both a motherboard and a different board. Independent claims 1 and 4 require that the “game program” be written to the motherboard only after the game program has been authenticated; the dependent claims (2, 3, 5, and 6) require two different CPUs—one on the motherboard, one on a different board— for executing the “authentication program” and “preliminary authentication program” respectively. The Board determined that the independent claims are unpatentable based on asserted combinations of prior art.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Bot failed to demonstrate that the Board, in making its unpatentability determinations, actually relied—or even might have relied—on a construction that permits writing portions of the game program to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. The Board found that both prior art references disclose writing only non-game-program data to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. Given Sony’s expert’s explanation and the references themselves, it nonetheless would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references to yield the claimed invention. Substantial evidence supports the findings underpinning the obviousness determination. View "Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC" on Justia Law
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Sanofi-Aventis’s 614 patent, entitled “Drug Delivery Device and Method of Manufacturing a Drug Delivery Device,” relates to a “drug delivery device” that can be “configured to allow setting of different dose sizes.” Mylan petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for inter partes review of claims 1–18, citing a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia, and de Gennes. Mylan relied on Burren—cited as prior art within the 614 patent—to teach the use of springs within a drug-delivery device and sought to combine Burren with Venezia to teach the use of spring washers within drug-delivery devices and de Gennes to add “snap-fit engagement grips” to secure the spring washer. Mylan argued that “De Gennes, while concerned with a clutch bearing [in automobiles], addresses a problem analogous to that addressed in Burren (axially [sic] fixation and support of two components relative to one another).”The Board found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed. Mylan failed to argue that de Gennes constitutes analogous art to the 614 patent and instead compared de Gennes to another prior art reference. Mylan did not meet its burden to establish obviousness premised on de Gennes. The Board’s factual findings regarding analogousness are not supported by substantial evidence. View "Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law
United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc.
UCANN sued Hemp for infringing its patent, entitled “Cannabis Extracts and Methods of Preparing and Using the Same.” UCANN filed for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the litigation. After the bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the patent case. UCANN’s infringement claims were dismissed with prejudice; Hemp’s invalidity and inequitable conduct counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice.Hemp sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, claiming that UCANN’s prosecution counsel had committed inequitable conduct by copying text from a piece of prior art into the specification of the patent and not disclosing it to the Patent and Trademark Office as prior art and UCANN’s litigation counsel purportedly took conflicting positions in its representation of UCANN and another client (the owner of the prior art). Hemp expressly notified the court that it did not seek any further proceedings, including a trial or evidentiary hearing, in connection with its motion. The district court denied the motion based on the existing record.The Federal Circuit affirmed upholding findings that Hemp failed to establish that it is the prevailing party under section 285, that this is an “exceptional” case warranting an attorney’s fee award, or that UCANN’s counsel acted in a vexatious or otherwise unreasonable manner. While Hemp’s position was extremely weak, it was neither “frivolous as filed” nor “frivolous as argued.” View "United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc." on Justia Law
HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp
Hormel met with Howard of HIP, which produced food safety and thermal processing equipment. The parties entered into an agreement to develop an oven for a particular process. Hormel conducted testing relating to color development, using both an infrared oven and a conventional spiral oven. Howard later alleged that it was during the meetings and testing that he disclosed the infrared preheating concept at issue. Hormel conducted additional testing using HIP’s test oven at Hormel's facility. The testing eventually revealed that turning off internal electrical heating elements in the oven solved the charred, off-flavor of bacon, and preheating the bacon with a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the flavor. That testing resulted in a two-step cooking process, the first step involving preheating the bacon and the second step involving cooking the meat in a superheated steam oven.Hormel filed a non-provisional patent application for the two-step cooking process in 2011, listing four joint inventors, who assigned their interests to Hormel. The application issued as the 498 patent. HIP sued, alleging that Howard was either the sole inventor or a joint inventor. The district court concluded that he was a joint inventor, 35 U.S.C. 256, based on his alleged contribution of the infrared preheating concept. The Federal Circuit reversed. Howard’s alleged contribution of preheating meat pieces using an infrared oven is “insignificant in quality” to the claimed invention. View "HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp" on Justia Law
TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft Corporation offers email security software to shield users from cyber threats. TocMail, Inc. is a relative newcomer to the cybersecurity scene and offers a product geared towards a specific type of threat called Internet Protocol (IP) evasion. TocMail sued Microsoft for false advertising—all within two months. In its complaint, TocMail alleged that Microsoft misled the public into believing that Microsoft’s product offered protection from IP evasion. And TocMail—who had been selling its product for two months, spent almost nothing on advertising and had not made a single sale—alleged billions of dollars in lost profits. TocMail brought two counts: false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act (count one); and contributory false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Microsoft.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of standing. The court explained that to establish an injury, in fact, a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The court wrote that TocMail failed to meet this standard because TocMail has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that it suffered any injury. TocMail didn’t offer testimony from any witness saying that he or she would have purchased TocMail’s product if not for Microsoft’s advertising. TocMail didn’t offer any expert testimony calculating TocMail’s lost sales from consumers who went with Microsoft. View "TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU
Defendant Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel a trademark registration belonging to Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU). SDCCU procured a stay to the TTAB proceedings by filing an action seeking declaratory relief to establish that it was not infringing either of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks and to establish that those marks were invalid. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement. After a bench trial, the district court also held that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees.
The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. The panel held that SDCCU had no personal stake in seeking to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark because the district court had already granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, which established that SDCCU was not infringing that mark. The panel held that the district court correctly exercised personal jurisdiction over CEFCU regarding SDCCU’s noninfringement claims, which sought declaratory relief that SDCCU was not infringing CEFCU’s registered mark or common-law mark. View "SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU" on Justia Law
FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission
Corning filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging FS violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed four patents that generally relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers. After investigating, the ALJ found that FS’ importation of high-density fiber optic equipment violated section 337; that FS induced infringement of two claims of the 320 patent, multiple claims of the 456 patent, and four claims of the 153 patent; and that FS’ accused modules directly infringed claims of the 206 patent. The ALJ adopted the Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ construction of “a front opening” as recited in the claims. The ALJ rejected invalidity challenges, including arguments that certain claims of the 320 and 456 patents were not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that FS violated section 337, and issuance a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS. The court upheld the enablement determination and the claim construction of “a front opening.” View "FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.
Amgen produces apremilast and markets it as a phosphodiesterase-4 (PDE4) inhibitor, which is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. The 638, 101, and 541 patents cover Otezla. Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking FDA approval to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen’s predecessor brought a Hatch-Waxman suit, asserting that Sandoz’s generic product would infringe the patents.The Federal Circuit affirmed holdings that claims 3 and 6 of Amgen’s 638 patent and claims 1 and 15 of Amgen’s 101 patent had not been shown to be invalid as obvious and that claims 2, 19, and 21 of its 541 patent”) were shown to be invalid as obvious in light of prior art. The court noted that varying a dose in response to the occurrence of side effects is a well-known, standard medical practice that may well lead to a finding of obviousness. View "Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc." on Justia Law
Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers
Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Plaintiff to photograph Lugalla, an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Plaintiff took seven photographs of the property, and Lugalla was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used Plaintiff’s photographs in a web-only article, which Hearst Newspapers published on websites associated with the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, and The Middletown Press. Plaintiff sued Hearst Newspapers for copyright infringement. On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to bring a copyright infringement claim against Hearst Magazine Media, Inc. and to allege that his photographs were also used on websites associated with various media sources. Plaintiff brought these claims within three years of discovering the infringements but more than three years after the infringements occurred. The district court followed Graper, granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Hearst’s motion.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Graper is the only precedent binding upon the court to apply the discovery rule with respect to the Section 507(b) limitations period for copyright infringement claims. Further, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Petrella and Rotkiske did not unequivocally overrule Graper. And under Graper, Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims were timely because he brought them within three years of discovering Hearst’s infringements. View "Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers" on Justia Law