Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Cellect’s challenged patents are directed to personal digital-assistant devices or phones. Each claims priority from a single application, the 255 patent. The 369 and 626 patents are continuations-in-part of the 255 patent. The 742 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 369 patent; the 621 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 626 patent. The 036 patent is a continuation of the 626 patent. Each of the challenged patents was granted Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) for Patent Office delay during prosecution (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 154(b)); each would have expired on the same day but for the grants of PTA. None were subject to a terminal disclaimer during prosecution; the patents have all expired.Cellect sued Samsung for infringement. Samsung requested ex parte reexaminations, asserting that the patents were unpatentable based on obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). The examiner determined that the challenged claims were obvious variants of Cellect’s prior-expiring reference patent claims, tracing back to the 036 patent, which did not receive PTA and retained an expiration date 20 years after the filing of the 255 application. The 621 patent claims were unpatentable over the 626 patent claims, which were unpatentable over the 369 patent claims. The 742 patent claims were unpatentable over the 369 claims. The 369 patent claims were unpatentable over the 036 claims, which did not receive PTA. The Board and Federal Circuit affirmed. ODP for a patent that has received PTA, regardless of whether a terminal disclaimer is required or has been filed, must be based on the expiration date of the patent after PTA has been added. View "In Re Cellect, LLC" on Justia Law

Whirlpool filed a complaint against Shenzhen Sanlida Electrical Technology Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Avoga Technology Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Shenzhen”) asserting federal and state law claims for trademark and trade dress infringement along with a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of the allegedly infringing mixers. The district court granted the injunction. In addition to its appeal, Shenzhen sought an emergency stay pending appeal. After granting an initial administrative stay, the Fifth Circuit denied that motion. Then, after the Federal Circuit heard the merits of the case, it affirmed the district court.The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the harms weighed in favor of Whirlpool. View "Whirlpool v. Shenzhen Sanlida" on Justia Law

Volvo’s 692 patent is directed to a tractor-type stern drive for a boat. A stern drive is an engine mounted in the boat's hull, connected to a drive unit mounted outside of the hull, typically on the stern; it is also called an “inboard/outboard drive.” A tractor-type drive generally relies on forward, bow-facing propellers that pull the boat through the water. In 2015, Volvo launched its commercial embodiment of the patent, the Forward Drive, which became extremely successful for water sports, including wake-surfing. The forward-facing propellers increased the distance between the propeller and swimmers, compared with prior, pulling-type stern-drive boats. In 2020, Brunswick launched its own drive that embodies the 692 patent, the Bravo Four, and petitioned for inter partes review, asserting that all claims would have been anticipated or obvious based on several references.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found all claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board’s finding of a motivation to combine was supported by substantial evidence but the Board failed to properly consider the evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. Volvo established a nexus between its objective evidence of secondary considerations and the claimed invention. Even if its assignment of weight to each factor was supported by substantial evidence (“some weight” for copying, industry praise, and commercial success; and “very little weight” for skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt unsolved need), the Board did not discuss the summation of the factors. View "Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp." on Justia Law

Pace (a company that sells and services garage doors) sued a competitor, Overhead Garage Door (“OGD”) (a company that also offers garage door services), alleging a host of federal and state law violations relating to OGD’s trade practices. Pace and Overhead Door Corporation (a garage door manufacturer that is not a party to this case but that has a name noticeably similar to Defendant OGD, its competition) have a licensing agreement in which Pace is the licensee, and Overhead Door Corporation is the licensor. As part of this agreement, Pace uses Overhead Door Corporation’s marks. The district court granted summary judgment to OGD on all of Pace’s claims, concluding in large part that Pace could not bring suit because Pace was a nonexclusive licensee that lacked sufficient ownership rights in Overhead Door Corporation’s marks and because OGD and Overhead Door Corporation’s settlement agreement extinguished Pace’s claims. Pace timely appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The court concluded that Pace may bring its federal and state law claims. The court concluded that the licensing agreement, Pace’s status as a nonexclusive licensee, and the settlement agreement do not bar Pace from bringing its claims under the Lanham Act, state law, or common law. The court explained that although the agreement may prevent OGD and Overhead Door Corporation from suing each other, the settlement agreement is “not . . . binding on . . . current and future licensees.” As such, the settlement agreement is not binding on licensees like Pace and does not prevent Pace from suing View "D.H. Pace Company, Inc. v. OGD Equipment Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Incept’s 723 and 913 patents relate to improved methods for treating cancer, particularly prostate cancer, using radiation. The patents describe methods of introducing a filler between a radiation target tissue and other tissue to increase the distance between the two and thereby decrease the amount of radiation received by the non-targeted tissue. Palette sought inter partes review challenging the claims of the patents as unpatentable over prior art, including “Wallace,” describes a method for the “rapid formation of a biocompatible gel . . . at a selected site within a patient’s body.”The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in holding that the claims were anticipated or obvious, 35 U.S.C. 102, 103. Wallace discloses each element of claim 1 of the 723 patent, arranged as in that claim. The Board’s findings of motivation to combine are supported by substantial evidence in the form of the references themselves and Palette’s expert’s detailed testimony, which the Board found “persuasive.” With respect to Incept’s argument that the Board improperly dismissed the market share data that Incept provided, the court deferred to the Board’s findings concerning the credibility of expert witnesses. View "Incept LLC v. Palette Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendants each licensed computer code from Live Face for $328. Live Face then sued them for copyright infringement, seeking about $483,000 in damages. Live Face has roughly 200 copyright suits pending. After more than five years, with summary judgment pending, Live Face successfully moved to dismiss its suit with prejudice. It argued that a 2021 Supreme Court case (Google) made the defendants’ fair-use defense insurmountable. The defendants sought fees; the district court denied the motion, finding that the defendants did not prevail because of their defenses but rather due to a fortuitous, unforeseen change in the law.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Copyright Act authorizes prevailing parties to recover costs and fees, 17 U.S.C. 505. Four nonexclusive factors are relevant: the frivolousness of the suit; the losing party’s motivation for bringing or defending against a suit; the objective unreasonableness of the claims advanced by the losing party; and the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. The defendants did prevail because of their defenses, including their fair-use defense. No matter which side prevailed in Google, the law would favor one of these parties. It is unclear whether Google changed anything relevant here, without a proper analysis of how Google affected Live Face’s claims. Even if Google did change something fundamental, the defendants raised defenses apart from fair use, which might have defeated Live Face’s claims. View "Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Society of Illinois, Inc." on Justia Law

The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)1 extended copyright protection to “architectural works,” defined in 17 U.S.C. Section 101 as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” The principal question raised by this appeal is whether First Security Bank & Trust Company (the “Bank”), which purchased an uncompleted building in a sale approved by the bankruptcy court in the property owner’s Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, infringed the architect’s copyright in the building by completing the building without the permission of the building’s architect, Cornice & Rose (“C&R”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court there was no actionable infringement because C&R’s infringement claims are precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale. The court explained that C&R makes no showing on appeal that the district court would have reached a different result (i.e., denied summary judgment) had it been allowed to file a sur-reply. In other words, the argument is entirely procedural. Further, it ignores that sur-replies are viewed with disfavor and that a party appealing the denial of leave to file a discretionary pleading has a heavy burden to prove that the adverse procedural ruling mattered. Here, even if C&R’s contention that DSC and WWA raised new or additional arguments in the supplemental affidavit is fairly debatable. Thus, the court concluded that the denial of permission to file the requested sur-reply in a thoroughly litigated case was a textbook example of harmless error. View "Cornice & Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys" on Justia Law

Rembrandt’s 019 patent is directed to test assay devices and methods for testing biological fluids. The test assay device receives a fluid sample “introduced directly to the sample loading zone” of one or more assay test strips. Alere petitioned for inter partes review.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that claims 3–6 and 10 would have been unpatentable for obviousness. Rembrandt argues that the Board erred by relying on Alere’s new theories asserted for the first time in its reply brief. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Alere did not offer new theories. Alere’s reply argument was responsive to Rembrandt’s arguments and the Board’s observations. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determinations. The Board was presented with “two alternative theories” about what the prior art discloses; the court reasoned that it was not its task “to determine which theory we find more compelling.” View "Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc." on Justia Law

This action represents Metabyte’s fourth attempt to hold Technicolor liable for Technicolor’s allegedly improper auction of a patent portfolio in 2009. After the French courts ruled they lacked jurisdiction in the criminal action, Metabyte brought an action in district court alleging a federal RICO claim and several state law causes of action. After the district court ruled that equitable tolling did not apply to its RICO claim as a matter of federal law, Metabyte dismissed the federal action and brought its state law claims in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The trial court granted Technicolor’s demurrer without leave to amend. Metabyte contends the trial court erred in finding equitable estoppel applies only where a plaintiff invokes remedies designed to lessen the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries or damages, with the result that Article 145 proceeding in France could not support equitable tolling because it did not provide such a remedy. Technicolor defends the trial court’s ruling but devotes more of its energies to its contentions that even if equitable tolling did apply, the order should be affirmed by applying the doctrines of issue preclusion and judicial estoppel.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer on the alternate ground that Metabyte failed to adequately plead facts showing that its decision to proceed in France was objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith. However, the court granted Metabyte leave to amend. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Metabyte v. Technicolor S.A." on Justia Law

Two companies that operate in the real estate development industry have spent years embroiled in a dispute over their shared name: “Dewberry.” Dewberry Engineers sued Dewberry Group to quell the latter’s use of several new insignias it developed as part of its rebrand. Dewberry Engineers owns federal trademark rights to the “Dewberry” mark and claims Dewberry Group’s rebranding efforts infringe that mark and breach an agreement struck between the sparring corporations over a decade ago. The district court sided with Dewberry Engineers in the proceedings below, assessing a nearly $43 million profit disgorgement award against Dewberry Group for its infringement, enjoining it from further breaches of its agreement with Dewberry Engineers, and ordering it to pay attorneys’ fees for forcing Dewberry Engineers to litigate an exceptional case of trademark infringement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties share an identical, arbitrary dominant word and disclaim different suffixes (and prefixes in some cases) in the marks at issue. The record shows they also employ those marks in related, overlapping, and complementary services. Those details go some distance toward creating a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of either party’s “Dewberry” mark. Moreover, the court explained that despite Dewberry Group’s failure to calculate exact figures or provide evidence of deductions from infringement revenues for losses and expenses, the court equitably reduced the requested award by twenty percent to $42,975,725.60.  The court finds no error of fact or law suggesting the district court’s conclusions were an abuse of its discretion. View "Dewberry Engineers Inc. v. Dewberry Group, Inc." on Justia Law