Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

FMC and OSS own patents that cover structures for subsea oil and gas recovery. OSS sued, alleging that FMC’s Enhanced Vertical Deepwater Tree equipped with FMC’s Retrievable Choke and Flow Module infringed 95 claims across 10 OSS patents. The infringement question in the suit boiled down to whether fluid flows through FMC’s accused device as required by the OSS Patents. Finding that OSS failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether FMC’s accused devices met the “divert” limitations of the OSS Patents, the district court granted FMC summary judgment.FMC sought Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs under 35 U.S.C. 285, which applies to “exceptional cases.” FMC argued that the Markman Order foreclosed any legitimate diverter infringement claims going forward, making OSS’s litigation position on infringement objectively baseless and that the substantive weakness of OSS’s infringement claims is shown by OSS’s failure to produce any admissible evidence. FMC alleged litigation misconduct by OSS as unreasonably prolonging the case.Applying the Supreme Court's “Octane Fitness” test the district court denied FMC’s motion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting FMC’s arguments that OSS’s case was objectively baseless after the claim construction order and that rejection of OSS’s evidence demonstrated the substantive weakness of OSS’s case. OSS that it had no obligation to revise its litigation strategy just because the Patent Board had invalidated diverter claims in different patents. View "OneSubsea IP UK Ltd. v. FMC Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast. Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature. Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph. View "Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

LDL cholesterol can lead to cardiovascular disease, heart attacks, and strokes. PCSK9 is a naturally occurring protein that degrades LDL receptors responsible for extracting LDL cholesterol from the bloodstream. In 2011, Amgen and Sanofi each obtained a patent for the antibody employed in a PCSK9-inhibiting drug, describing the relevant antibody by its unique amino acid sequence. Amgen obtained two additional patents in 2014 that relate back to its 2011 patent and purport to claim “the entire genus” of antibodies that “bind to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9,” and “block PCSK9 from binding.” Amgen identified the amino acid sequences of 26 antibodies that perform those functions and described “roadmap” and “conservative substitution” methods for making other antibodies that perform the described functions.Amgen sued Sanofi for infringement. Sanofi argued that Amgen’s relevant claims were invalid under the “enablement” requirement, which requires a patent applicant to describe the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art” to make and use the invention,” 35 U.S.C. 112(a), characterizing the methods Amgen outlined for generating additional antibodies as a trial-and-error process.The district court, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court sided with Sanofi. If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. The claimed class of antibodies does not include just the 26 that Amgen described by their amino acid sequences, but many additional antibodies. The “roadmap” and “conservative substitution” approaches are little more than research assignments. View "Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi" on Justia Law

Varco, L.P. (“Varco”), an oil and gas drilling company, purchased the assets of another drilling company, including U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 (the “’142 Patent”). Varco’s parent company, Varco International, Inc., and a competitor, National Oilwell, Inc., completed a merger to form National Oilwell Varco, Inc. It was understood that Varco, as Varco International, Inc.’s operating company, would transfer its assets to the newly formed entity’s operating company: Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”).  NOV filed an action in district court alleging that Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee Auto-Dril, Inc. (“Auto-Dril”) infringed the ’142 Patent (the “Underlying Action”). Auto-Dril and NOV entered into a confidential settlement agreement that was intended to end their litigation over the ’142 Patent (the “Settlement Agreement”). The parties appealed various holdings that both preceded and followed a trial regarding their 2011 Settlement Agreement.   The Fifth Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction over Auto-Dril’s counterclaim for being fraudulently induced into entering the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the ruling granting summary judgment for NOV on Auto-Dril’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the dismissal of NOV’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and remanded NOV’s JMOL motion for reconsideration. The court explained that here, NOV’s conduct did not rise to the level of a fraud on the court. Specifically, there is no clear and convincing evidence that NOV was cognizant that it did not own the ’142 Patent while it was litigating the Underlying Action. View "National Oilwell Varco v. Auto-Dril" on Justia Law

DayCab designs, manufactures, and sells conversion kits that convert a sleeper tractor cab into a tractor that does not have a sleeper unit (a daycab). DayCab’s founder, Wagers, started his conversion kit business in 1997 and created the first Peterbilt extended-cab conversion kits on the market, the “Fat Albert” models. Wagers stated that he “carefully selected” the “angles, curves, tapers, lines, profile and appearance” of the DayCab conversion kit “with the aim of making a very distinctive and attractive kit,” but “any number of other angles, curves, tapers, lines, profile and appearance” would have also served as a Peterbilt conversion product.Osman began making conversion kits in 1998 and obtained a utility patent for a panel used to convert a sleeper truck cab into a day cab. Each kit is manufactured and sold with an identification card with Osman’s company’s logo embedded in the fiberglass. Those companies named their conversion-kit products: “Cousin Albert,” “Uncle Albert,” and “Fat Boy.”DayCab sued, asserting claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), for trade dress infringement. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the non-functionality element of DayCab’s trade dress claim as well as on the elements of secondary meaning and the likelihood of confusion. View "DayCab Co, Inc. v. Prairie Technology, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing on claim preclusion grounds Plaintiff's claims against Eastern States Exposition alleging violations of federal copyright infringement law and the U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act, holding that the district court erred.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the claim preclusive order gave claim preclusive effect to the dismissal in a prior action that she brought even where the dismissal rested on several grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive. In support of her claim, Plaintiff argued that federal res judicata law recognizes the "alternative-determinations" doctrine. The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing the claims at issue, holding (1) the assertedly preclusive dismissal rested on one ground that, on its own, would not allow the dismissal to be claim preclusive, even though the dismissal also rested on two counts that could have; and (2) federal res judiata law recognizes the alternative-determinations doctrine, which strips a dismissal of claim preclusive effect if the dismissal rests on multiple grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive, and the doctrine applied in this case. View "Foss v. Eastern States Exposition" on Justia Law

Sony petitioned for inter partes review of claims 1–6 of the Bot’s 540 patent, which concerns a gaming machine that authenticates certain data and that has both a motherboard and a different board. Independent claims 1 and 4 require that the “game program” be written to the motherboard only after the game program has been authenticated; the dependent claims (2, 3, 5, and 6) require two different CPUs—one on the motherboard, one on a different board— for executing the “authentication program” and “preliminary authentication program” respectively. The Board determined that the independent claims are unpatentable based on asserted combinations of prior art.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Bot failed to demonstrate that the Board, in making its unpatentability determinations, actually relied—or even might have relied—on a construction that permits writing portions of the game program to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. The Board found that both prior art references disclose writing only non-game-program data to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. Given Sony’s expert’s explanation and the references themselves, it nonetheless would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references to yield the claimed invention. Substantial evidence supports the findings underpinning the obviousness determination. View "Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC" on Justia Law

Sanofi-Aventis’s 614 patent, entitled “Drug Delivery Device and Method of Manufacturing a Drug Delivery Device,” relates to a “drug delivery device” that can be “configured to allow setting of different dose sizes.” Mylan petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for inter partes review of claims 1–18, citing a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia, and de Gennes. Mylan relied on Burren—cited as prior art within the 614 patent—to teach the use of springs within a drug-delivery device and sought to combine Burren with Venezia to teach the use of spring washers within drug-delivery devices and de Gennes to add “snap-fit engagement grips” to secure the spring washer. Mylan argued that “De Gennes, while concerned with a clutch bearing [in automobiles], addresses a problem analogous to that addressed in Burren (axially [sic] fixation and support of two components relative to one another).”The Board found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed. Mylan failed to argue that de Gennes constitutes analogous art to the 614 patent and instead compared de Gennes to another prior art reference. Mylan did not meet its burden to establish obviousness premised on de Gennes. The Board’s factual findings regarding analogousness are not supported by substantial evidence. View "Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

UCANN sued Hemp for infringing its patent, entitled “Cannabis Extracts and Methods of Preparing and Using the Same.” UCANN filed for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the litigation. After the bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the patent case. UCANN’s infringement claims were dismissed with prejudice; Hemp’s invalidity and inequitable conduct counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice.Hemp sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, claiming that UCANN’s prosecution counsel had committed inequitable conduct by copying text from a piece of prior art into the specification of the patent and not disclosing it to the Patent and Trademark Office as prior art and UCANN’s litigation counsel purportedly took conflicting positions in its representation of UCANN and another client (the owner of the prior art). Hemp expressly notified the court that it did not seek any further proceedings, including a trial or evidentiary hearing, in connection with its motion. The district court denied the motion based on the existing record.The Federal Circuit affirmed upholding findings that Hemp failed to establish that it is the prevailing party under section 285, that this is an “exceptional” case warranting an attorney’s fee award, or that UCANN’s counsel acted in a vexatious or otherwise unreasonable manner. While Hemp’s position was extremely weak, it was neither “frivolous as filed” nor “frivolous as argued.” View "United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc." on Justia Law

Hormel met with Howard of HIP, which produced food safety and thermal processing equipment. The parties entered into an agreement to develop an oven for a particular process. Hormel conducted testing relating to color development, using both an infrared oven and a conventional spiral oven. Howard later alleged that it was during the meetings and testing that he disclosed the infrared preheating concept at issue. Hormel conducted additional testing using HIP’s test oven at Hormel's facility. The testing eventually revealed that turning off internal electrical heating elements in the oven solved the charred, off-flavor of bacon, and preheating the bacon with a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the flavor. That testing resulted in a two-step cooking process, the first step involving preheating the bacon and the second step involving cooking the meat in a superheated steam oven.Hormel filed a non-provisional patent application for the two-step cooking process in 2011, listing four joint inventors, who assigned their interests to Hormel. The application issued as the 498 patent. HIP sued, alleging that Howard was either the sole inventor or a joint inventor. The district court concluded that he was a joint inventor, 35 U.S.C. 256, based on his alleged contribution of the infrared preheating concept. The Federal Circuit reversed. Howard’s alleged contribution of preheating meat pieces using an infrared oven is “insignificant in quality” to the claimed invention. View "HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp" on Justia Law