Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Microsoft Corporation offers email security software to shield users from cyber threats. TocMail, Inc. is a relative newcomer to the cybersecurity scene and offers a product geared towards a specific type of threat called Internet Protocol (IP) evasion. TocMail sued Microsoft for false advertising—all within two months. In its complaint, TocMail alleged that Microsoft misled the public into believing that Microsoft’s product offered protection from IP evasion. And TocMail—who had been selling its product for two months, spent almost nothing on advertising and had not made a single sale—alleged billions of dollars in lost profits. TocMail brought two counts: false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act (count one); and contributory false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Microsoft.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of standing. The court explained that to establish an injury, in fact, a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The court wrote that TocMail failed to meet this standard because TocMail has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that it suffered any injury. TocMail didn’t offer testimony from any witness saying that he or she would have purchased TocMail’s product if not for Microsoft’s advertising. TocMail didn’t offer any expert testimony calculating TocMail’s lost sales from consumers who went with Microsoft. View "TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel a trademark registration belonging to Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU). SDCCU procured a stay to the TTAB proceedings by filing an action seeking declaratory relief to establish that it was not infringing either of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks and to establish that those marks were invalid. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement. After a bench trial, the district court also held that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. The panel held that SDCCU had no personal stake in seeking to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark because the district court had already granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, which established that SDCCU was not infringing that mark. The panel held that the district court correctly exercised personal jurisdiction over CEFCU regarding SDCCU’s noninfringement claims, which sought declaratory relief that SDCCU was not infringing CEFCU’s registered mark or common-law mark. View "SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU" on Justia Law

Corning filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging FS violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed four patents that generally relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers. After investigating, the ALJ found that FS’ importation of high-density fiber optic equipment violated section 337; that FS induced infringement of two claims of the 320 patent, multiple claims of the 456 patent, and four claims of the 153 patent; and that FS’ accused modules directly infringed claims of the 206 patent. The ALJ adopted the Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ construction of “a front opening” as recited in the claims. The ALJ rejected invalidity challenges, including arguments that certain claims of the 320 and 456 patents were not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that FS violated section 337, and issuance a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS. The court upheld the enablement determination and the claim construction of “a front opening.” View "FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Amgen produces apremilast and markets it as a phosphodiesterase-4 (PDE4) inhibitor, which is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. The 638, 101, and 541 patents cover Otezla. Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking FDA approval to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen’s predecessor brought a Hatch-Waxman suit, asserting that Sandoz’s generic product would infringe the patents.The Federal Circuit affirmed holdings that claims 3 and 6 of Amgen’s 638 patent and claims 1 and 15 of Amgen’s 101 patent had not been shown to be invalid as obvious and that claims 2, 19, and 21 of its 541 patent”) were shown to be invalid as obvious in light of prior art. The court noted that varying a dose in response to the occurrence of side effects is a well-known, standard medical practice that may well lead to a finding of obviousness. View "Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc." on Justia Law

Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Plaintiff to photograph Lugalla, an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Plaintiff took seven photographs of the property, and Lugalla was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used Plaintiff’s photographs in a web-only article, which Hearst Newspapers published on websites associated with the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, and The Middletown Press. Plaintiff sued Hearst Newspapers for copyright infringement. On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to bring a copyright infringement claim against Hearst Magazine Media, Inc. and to allege that his photographs were also used on websites associated with various media sources. Plaintiff brought these claims within three years of discovering the infringements but more than three years after the infringements occurred. The district court followed Graper, granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Hearst’s motion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Graper is the only precedent binding upon the court to apply the discovery rule with respect to the Section 507(b) limitations period for copyright infringement claims. Further, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Petrella and Rotkiske did not unequivocally overrule Graper. And under Graper, Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims were timely because he brought them within three years of discovering Hearst’s infringements. View "Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers" on Justia Law

Charger filed an intent-to-use application to register SPARK LIVING on the Principal Register for leasing of real estate; real estate listing; real estate service, namely, rental property management. The examining attorney refused registration under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), on grounds of a likelihood “to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive with an earlier registered mark.” The earlier registered mark, SPARK, was registered for “[r]eal estate services, namely, rental brokerage, leasing, and management of commercial property, offices and office space.” Charger amended its description of services to only cover residential real estate services, then disclaimed the term “LIVING,” and again amended the description to “specifically” exclude commercial property and office space—the services of the registrant’s mark. The examining attorney maintained the refusal.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, as supported by substantial evidence the refusal to register Charger’s mark based on likelihood of confusion. The Board addressed five of the “Dupont factors”: similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, the nature of the goods or services, established, likely-to-continue trade channels, conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, and strength of the mark, focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks as well as the goods or services. View "In Re Charger Ventures LLC" on Justia Law

Rotigotine is used to treat Parkinson’s disease, which causes difficulty swallowing and slow transit times through intestines, which can frustrate oral treatments. Transdermal therapeutic systems deliver drugs through the patient’s skin and avoid those complications. In 2007, UCB invented and marketed Neupro®, the first FDA-approved patch treatment for Parkinson’s disease. Original Neupro® is covered by several UCB patents, including the Muller patents, which claim priority to an application filed in 1999. The Muller patents are listed in the FDA’s “Orange Book,” as covering reformulated Neupro®.In 2013, Actavis submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for FDA approval of a generic transdermal rotigotine patch. UCB sued for infringement. The district court granted UCB an injunction preventing approval of Actavis’s ANDA until March 2021, when the Muller patent expired. In 2018 UCB filed the patent application that matured into the 589 patent, claiming priority from a provisional application filed in 2009, entitled “Polyvinylpyrrolidone for the Stabilization of a Solid Dispersion of the Non-Crystalline Form of Rotigotine.” UCB again filed suit, asserting the 589 patent, to delay FDA approval of a generic for nine additional years.The district court found that the Muller patents anticipate all asserted claims and that the asserted claims would have been obvious in view of multiple prior art references, including the Muller patents. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity of the 589 patent. The district court’s fact findings on overlapping ranges, teaching away, unexpected results, and commercial success are not clearly erroneous, View "UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories UT, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court dismissed Sanderling’s infringement suit due to the asserted claims’ lack of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. The patents at issue share the title “Dynamic Promotional Layout Management and Distribution Rules,” and are directed to a method using distribution rules to load digital image branding functions to users when certain conditions are met. The patents share a common specification, which describes the digital image branding function as a transformation, using, for example, an icon or a filter, that displays in a client terminal for the user to apply to a digital image. A distribution rule “is a rule used in determining how to target a group of end users, for instance, a rule that determines that only a group of end users having certain characteristics and/or match a certain requirement.”The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims are directed to an abstract idea, not a specific improvement in computer functionality. The claims describe the use of computers as a tool to identify when a condition is met and then to distribute information based on satisfaction of that condition. The elements of the representative claim, individually and as an ordered combination, do not constitute an inventive concept. View "Sanderling Management Ltd. v. Snap Inc." on Justia Law

Sequoia’s patent is directed to “a method for managing a logical volume for minimizing a size of metadata and supporting dynamic online resizing,” and “a computer-readable recording medium storing a program or data structure for embodying the method.” The patent describes a preferred embodiment that has three storage virtualizations: extents, disk partitions, and logical volume. The accused product, Red Hat’s software tool, can create and resize logical volumes with units smaller than a whole disk partition, such as extents. Red Hat’s petitions for inter partes reviews were rejected.In infringement litigation, the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of invalidity based on the construction of “computer-readable recording medium” to include transitory media (signals or waves). Transitory media are ineligible statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. The district court erred in relying on extrinsic evidence that was clearly at odds with the intrinsic evidence.The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of noninfringement, upholding the constructions of a “disk partition” to mean a “section of a disk that is a minimum unit of a logical volume” and a “logical volume” to mean an “extensible union of more than one disk partition, the size of which is resized in disk partition units.” View "Sequoia Technology, LLC v. Dell Inc." on Justia Law

HCM sued Philip Morris for allegedly infringing at least one claim of HCM’s patent, which is directed to an electronic nicotine-delivery device. Philip Morris manufactures the IQOS electronic nicotine-delivery system, which “heats tobacco-filled sticks wrapped in paper [HeatSticks] to generate a nicotine-containing aerosol.” Philip Morris markets IQOS as a “heat-not-burn” system; the tobacco is heated at a low enough temperature that the tobacco does not burn, therefore, in Philip Morris’s view, preventing combustion.Philip Morris argued that an exhibit HCM attached to its original complaint conclusively demonstrated that IQOS does not initiate a combustion reaction as required by the asserted claims. The district court agreed that a Modified Risk Tobacco Product Application that Philip Morris submitted to the FDA when it sought a modified risk order to sell IQOS established that IQOS did not initiate a combustion reaction and thus did not infringe the asserted claims. The court granted Philip Morris attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285.The Federal Circuit reversed. HCM’s original and amended complaints recite sufficient allegations to raise a facially plausible case of patent infringement and specifically rejected the notion that IQOS does not initiate a combustion reaction. View "Healthier Choices Management Corp. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law