Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Continental, an auto-parts supplier, brought suit in the Northern District of California against several standard-essential patent holders and their licensing agent, claiming violations of federal antitrust law and attendant state law. The case was then transferred to federal district court where it was dismissed at the pleadings stage.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. The court concluded that the two theories Continental alleges, based on indemnity obligations and a refusal to license, are inadequate to prove the supplier has Article III standing, let alone that it has antitrust standing or has suffered harm flowing from an antitrust violation. In this case, defendants' harm to Continental on account of Continental's indemnity obligations to original equipment manufacturers remains speculative. Furthermore, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Continental's alleged unsuccessful attempts to obtain licenses on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms from defendants comprise an injury in fact conferring Article III standing. View "Continental Automotive Systems v. Avanci, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a sports psychologist, filed suit against the school district for copyright infringement after the softball team and flag corps at a public high school used their Twitter accounts to post a motivational passage from plaintiff's book, Winning Isn’t Normal.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the school district's motion to dismiss and award of attorney's fees. The court considered the four factors of the fair use doctrine and concluded that even though the nature of the work favors plaintiff, the school's use was in good faith and not for a commercial benefit; the small excerpt from the book was freely accessible to the public; and plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a substantially adverse impact on a legitimate market for his copyrighted work. The court concluded that "the purpose and character" factor, as well as "the effect of the use" factor, favor the school district. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the school district. View "Bell v. Eagle Mountain Saginaw Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an examiner’s refusal to register the trademark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on T-shirts. According to Elster’s registration request, the phrase he sought to trademark invokes a memorable exchange between then-candidate Trump and Senator Marco Rubio from a 2016 presidential primary debate, and aims to “convey[] that some features” of Trump’s “policies are diminutive.” The Board’s decision was based on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(c), and the Board’s finding that the mark included the surname of a living individual without his consent.The Federal Circuit reversed. Applying section 2(c) to bar registration of Elster’s mark unconstitutionally restricts free speech in violation of the First Amendment. Section 2(c), prohibits registration of a trademark that [c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.” As applied in this case, section 2(c) involves content-based discrimination that is not justified by either a compelling or substantial government interest. View "In Re Elster" on Justia Law

Alarm.com filed petitions seeking inter partes reviews (IPRs) under 35 U.S.C. 311–19 of claims of three Vivint patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued three final written decisions, which rejected Alarm.com’s challenges to certain claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed in 2018. In 2020, Alarm.com filed three requests for ex parte reexamination of those same claims under 35 U.S.C. 301–07. The Patent Office’s Director, without deciding whether the requests presented a “substantial new question of patentability,” vacated the ex parte reexamination proceedings based on section 315(e)(1), which, the Director concluded, estopped Alarm.com from pursuing the requests once the IPRs resulted in final written decisions.The district court dismissed Alarm.com’s complaint, reasoning that review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), (C), of the Director’s decision, was precluded by the ex parte reexamination scheme viewed as a whole. The Federal Circuit reversed The only portion of the ex parte reexamination statutory scheme that expressly precludes judicial review is section 303(c), but the preclusion established by that text does not apply to Alarm.com’s challenge. View "Alarm.com Inc, v. Hirshfeld" on Justia Law

Unicolors, the owner of fabric design copyrights, successfully sued H&M for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 411(a). H&M argued that Unicolors knowingly included inaccurate information on its registration application, rendering its registration invalid; Unicolors had filed a single application seeking registration for 31 separate works despite a regulation that provides that a single application may cover multiple works only if they were “included in the same unit of publication.” H&M argued that Unicolors had made some of the designs available for sale exclusively to certain customers while offering the rest to the general public.The Ninth Circuit determined that it did not matter whether Unicolors was aware that it had failed to satisfy the single unit of publication requirement because the safe harbor excused only good-faith mistakes of fact, not law; Unicolors knew the relevant facts.The Supreme Court vacated. Section 411(b) does not distinguish between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. Under the safe harbor, a certificate of registration is valid, even though it contains inaccurate information if the copyright holder lacked “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered its application inaccurate, it could not have included the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Legislative history indicates that Congress enacted section 411(b) to make it easier for nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations by “eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in the application process. The Court noted that willful blindness may support a finding of actual knowledge and circumstantial evidence may demonstrate that an applicant was aware of, or willfully blind to, legally inaccurate information. View "Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P." on Justia Law

Boor and Edson owned Brava, which had intellectual property and technical knowledge related to composite roofing. Wildhawk inquired about purchasing Brava. Boor proposed “an exclusive license for manufacturing current roofing products” with “a right of first refusal on all new product [d]evelopments.” The parties executed asset purchase and license agreements. Wildhawk paid $4 million and obtained an automatic license to “any Improvements” to the technology, whether patentable or not. Before executing the agreement, the parties removed a “New Product” section as required by Wildhawk’s lender but entered into an oral agreement for a right of first refusal. Wildhawk retained Boor and Edson as paid consultants, with non-compete agreements.Boor notified Wildhawk: “As per our handshake agreement” we offer you first right of refusal “on the below products.” The parties entered into a confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement regarding “possible R&D ‘new or enhanced product’ agreements.” They negotiated but failed to reach an agreement. Boor and Edson formed Paragon while Boor was still employed by Wildhawk. Paragon began producing the new products.Wildhawk sued. The district court granted Wildhawk a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Paragon from manufacturing or selling composite roofing. The Eighth Circuit vacated. Wildhawk had a fair chance of proving the defendants violated the agreement but the district court erred in rejecting an equitable estoppel defense. Wildhawk waited until Paragon had been producing the products for 10 months before making its claim, failing to show either reasonable diligence or harm that cannot be compensated by damages. View "Wildhawk Investments, LLC v. Brava I.P., LLC" on Justia Law

Intuitive filed three inter partes review (IPR) petitions to challenge the patentability of Ethicon’s patent, entitled “Drive Interface for Operably Coupling a Manipulatable Surgical Tool to a Robot.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in two IPRs, upheld the patentability of claims 24-26. Ethicon moved to terminate Intuitive as a party to the remaining IPR, arguing estoppel under 35 U.S.C. 315(e)(1) based on the decisions in the companion IPRs. The Board terminated Intuitive as a petitioner to the final IPR and upheld the patentability of claims 24–26 on the merits.Only a party to an IPR may appeal a Board’s final decision, 35 U.S.C. 141(c). Intuitive argued it could appeal because the Board misinterpreted 35 U.S.C. 315(e)(1) and that estoppel should not apply to simultaneously-filed petitions, noting that it was “once a party” to the IPR. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The Board did not err. Section 315(e)(1) estops a petitioner as to invalidity grounds for an asserted claim that it failed to raise but “reasonably could have raised” in an earlier-decided IPR, regardless of whether the petitions were simultaneously filed and regardless of the reasons for their separate filing. All three IPRs challenged the same claim; Intuitive actually knew of the cited prior art when it filed the other petitions and knew which claims it wanted to challenge based on that art. Intuitive reasonably could have raised its grounds from the third IPR in either earlier IPR. View "Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Ethicon LLC" on Justia Law

Junker, the named inventor of the 839 Design Patent, titled “Handle for Introducer Sheath,” sued MedComp for infringement of the sole claim of the D839 patent. The parties disputed whether a letter sent before the critical date was a commercial offer for sale of the claimed design, rendering the claim invalid under the on-sale bar, 35 U.S.C. 102(b), or merely a quotation signaling the parties were engaged in preliminary negotiations. The district court granted Junker summary judgment of no invalidity under the on-sale bar. After a bench trial, the court rejected each of MedComp’s remaining invalidity challenges, found that each of the accused products infringed the D839 patent claim and that the infringement was willful, and awarded Junker $1,247,910 in damages under 35 U.S.C. 289, which allows recovery of an infringer’s profits from the sale of the infringing products.The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity. The pre-critical date letter was a commercial offer for sale and there is no dispute that the claimed design was ready for patenting. The letter contains a number of necessary terms typical for a commercial contract and specifies different purchase options for its peelable sheath products. View "Junker v. Medical Components, Inc." on Justia Law

Adapt’s patents-in-suit claim methods of treating opioid overdose by intranasal administration of a naloxone formulation, and devices for intranasal administration. Naloxone—the active ingredient in Adapt’s NARCAN® Nasal Spray—is an opioid receptor antagonist that blocks opioids from reaching the opioid receptors, helping reverse the effects of opioid overdose. Before the priority date of the patents-in-suit, numerous naloxone products had been used to treat opioid overdose. The patents-in-suit are listed in the FDA’s “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations” “Orange Book.” Teva submitted to the FDA Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to manufacture and sell a generic version of NARCAN®., with a Paragraph IV certification asserting that the patents-in-suit are invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed, 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).Adapt sued Teva for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2). The Federal Circuit affirmed a holding that the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit would have been obvious in view of prior art. The district court’s findings, supported by ample evidence, provide a detailed explanation as to why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention. Prior art, as a whole, did not teach away from the claimed invention. The court rejected Adapt’s argument that its evidence of unexpected results, copying, skepticism, long-felt need, and failure of others indicated nonobviousness. View "Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc." on Justia Law

In litigation between Uniloc and Apple, Uniloc unsuccessfully sought to seal matters of public record, such as quotations of Federal Circuit opinions and a list of patent cases Uniloc had filed. The Federal Circuit affirmed but held that the district court must conduct a detailed analysis on whether confidential licensing information of third-party licensees of Uniloc’s patents should be sealed and remanded for “particularized determinations.”On remand, Uniloc moved to seal or redact third-party documents that revealed licensing terms, licensees’ names, amounts paid, including a Fortress (Uniloc’s financier) investment memorandum, containing Fortress’s investment criteria and other third-party licensing information. The district court ordered that the licensing information, including the licensees' identities, be unsealed in full. explaining that “patent licenses carry unique considerations” that bolster the public’s right of access, including the valuation of patent rights, and that disclosure of patent licensing terms would facilitate “up-front cost evaluations of potentially infringing conduct,” “driv[e] license values to a more accurate representation of the technological value,” and help “inform reasonable royalties.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The district court failed to follow the previous remand instructions to make particularized determinations. Any procedural failings of Uniloc and Fortress cannot justify unsealing the information of third parties in the investment memo. The court should have considered whether the interests of the third parties outweigh the public’s interest in seeing licensing details that are not necessary for resolving this case. View "Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law