Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Lucky Brand and Marcel market clothing. Marcel registered the trademark “Get Lucky.” Lucky Brand registered the trademark “Lucky Brand” and other marks with the word “Lucky.” In a 2003 settlement agreement, Lucky Brand agreed to stop using the phrase “Get Lucky.” Marcel released its claims regarding Lucky Brand’s use of its other trademarks.In 2005, Lucky Brand sued Marcel for violating its trademarks. Marcel filed counterclaims turning on Lucky Brand’s continued use of “Get Lucky,” but did not claim that Lucky Brand’s use of its other marks alone infringed that mark. The court enjoined Lucky Brand from copying or imitating Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark.In 2011, Marcel sued Lucky Brand, arguing only that Lucky Brand’s post-2010 use of Lucky Brand’s other marks infringed Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark. Marcel did not allege that Lucky Brand continued to use "Get Lucky." Lucky Brand argued, for the first time since early in the 2005 Action, that Marcel had released those claims in the settlement agreement. The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the action, concluding that “defense preclusion” prohibited Lucky Brand from raising that unlitigated defense.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Any preclusion of defenses must, at a minimum, satisfy the strictures of issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Here, issue preclusion does not apply, so the causes of action must share a “common nucleus of operative fact[s]” for claim preclusion to apply. The 2005 claims depended on Lucky Brand’s alleged use of “Get Lucky.” In the 2011 suit, Marcel alleged that the infringement was Lucky Brand’s use of its other marks containing the word “Lucky,” not any use of “Get Lucky” itself. The conduct in the 2011 suit occurred after the conclusion of the 2005 suit. View "Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc." on Justia Law

ETS filed a trademark infringement action against Scarpello over the "Engineered Tax Services" mark under the Lanham Act. The district court held that the mark lacked distinctiveness and granted summary judgment in favor of Scarpello.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that ETS's mark was not suggestive, but merely descriptive—and thus invalid. Furthermore, the district court failed to consider whether the mark might also have acquired any protectible secondary meaning or whether any actionable infringement occurred. The court held that a jury could reasonably find the mark inherently distinctive and remanded for further proceedings. View "Engineered Tax Services, Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying Dolores' motion for recovery of attorney's fees under the Copyright Act. The district court had granted summary judgment for Dolores on Doc's Dream's complaint seeking a declaration that the late religious leader Dr. Eugene Scott completely abandoned his works to the public domain. The district court then denied Dolores' motion for attorney fees under 17 U.S.C. 505.The panel held that, even when asserted as a claim for declaratory relief, any action that turns on the existence of a valid copyright and whether that copyright has been infringed invokes the Copyright Act. Therefore, attorney's fees may be available under section 505 of the Copyright Act. View "Doc's Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, the Federal Circuit (Arthrex) held that the appointment of the APJs by the Secretary of Commerce, 35 U.S.C. 6(a), violated the Appointments Clause. The Patent and Trademark Office and Cisco argued that the Federal Circuit erred in extending Arthrex beyond the context of inter partes reviews to an appeal from a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes reexamination. They claimed that administrative patent judges (APJs) should be deemed constitutionally appointed officers at least when it comes to their duties reviewing appeals of inter partes reexaminations.The Federal Circuit rejected the argument. The fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution. Courts should look not only to the authority exercised in the case but to all of the appointee’s duties when assessing an Appointments Clause challenge. An APJs’ duties include both conducting inter partes reviews and reviewing appeals of inter partes reexaminations. Although no discovery is held and no trial conducted in inter partes reexaminations, the proceedings are otherwise similar. The Director’s authority over the Board’s decisions is not meaningfully greater in the context of inter partes reexaminations than in inter partes reviews. View "Virnetx Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Starting in 1992, Schwendimann worked at ACT, which manufactured paper coating products. In 1998-2000, Schwendimann and Nasser (ACT's owner) filed the 983 and 845 patent applications; both were named as inventors. Schwendimann filed the 910 application as the sole inventor. All three applications were assigned to ACT. When ACT ceased operations in 2001, it owed significant debts. ACT gave Schwendimann a $282,073.25 promissory note for unpaid wages. ACT agreed to assign its patent applications to Schwendimann to satisfy its outstanding debt to her..Schwendimann agreed to satisfy ACT’s debts to its law firm, SLW. An SLW attorney was instructed to file the necessary documents. SLW filed an incorrect assignment for the 845 application.In 2011, Schwendimann sued Arkwright for infringement and became aware of the incorrect assignment; ACT's assignment to Schwendimann was then recorded with the Patent Office. The district court rejected a claim that Schwendimann lacked standing, finding that ACT assigned the 845 application to Schwendimann in 2002. A judgment of willful infringement was entered; the jury awarded Schwendimann damages of $2,624,228.00. The court awarded prejudgment interest of $1,915,328.00, applying a 10 percent interest rate, under Minnesota law.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Arkwright’s proposed 1.42 percent interest rate was insufficient to place Schwendimann in as good a position as she would have been in, had Arkwright entered into a reasonable royalty agreement; the prejudgment interest rate should be calculated based on the amount of damages awarded, not of Arkwright’s final settlement offer. Arkwright failed to provide a written offer. View "Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Visions of America filed suit against Scholastic, alleging copyright infringement on 89 photographs plaintiff had authored. The district court determined that Scholastic had infringed six of the photographs and dismissed the remaining claims.The DC Circuit held that the district court properly recited the elements of a copyright infringement claim and placed the burden of proof on plaintiff to demonstrate that Scholastic's use of his images was outside the scope of the license; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), did not abrogate this Circuit's adoption of the "discovery rule" for copyright infringement claim accrual in Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014); the Copyright Act limits damages to the three years prior to when a copyright infringement action is filed; and the registration of a compilation of photographs under 17 U.S.C. 409 by an applicant who holds the rights to the component works is valid and effectively registers the underlying individual photos, even if the compilation does not list the individual authors of the individual photos. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Sohm v. Scholastic Inc." on Justia Law

Eage filed suit, alleging infringement of four patents under the doctrine of equivalents, stemming from Slayback’s new drug application for a generic version of Eagle’s branded bendamustine product, BELRAPZO®. Bendamustine is used to treat chronic lymphocytic leukemia and indolent B-cell non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The district court entered a judgment of non-infringement on the pleadings.The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Eagle’s arguments that the district court erred when it concluded that the asserted patents disclose, but do not claim, ethanol—and therefore dedicated ethanol to the public and that the district court improperly applied the dedication disclosure doctrine at the pleadings stage, in the presence of factual disputes and without drawing all inferences in Eagle’s favor. The disclosure-dedication doctrine bars application of the doctrine of equivalents: “when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter, . . . this action dedicates the unclaimed subject matter to the public.” The application of the doctrine is a question of law. The asserted patents disclose ethanol as an alternative to propylene glycol in the “pharmaceutically acceptable fluid” claim limitation. The only reasonable inference that can be made from the disclosures is that a skilled artisan would understand the patents to disclose ethanol as an alternative to the claimed propylene glycol. View "Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC" on Justia Law

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review of Caterpillar’s patent and issued its final written decision on November 13, 2019. Caterpillar appealed, then moved to vacate and remand for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel in light of the Federal Circuit’s 2019 “Arthrex” holding that the administrative patent judges of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board were improperly appointed. The Federal Circuit denied the motion. Unlike prior cases, which have been remanded, Arthrex issued before the Board’s final written decision in Caterpillar’s case. The Arthrex holding was expressly limited “to those cases where final written decisions were issued.” The court rejected an argument that even if the panel members became constitutional immediately before issuing the final written decision, that “does not cure a year’s worth of constitutional violations influencing the Board’s thinking and conclusions.” View "Caterpillar Paving Products, Inc. v. Wirtgen America, Inc." on Justia Law

X One’s patent describes a “Buddy Watch application” that allows a mobile device user to add other mobile device users to her “Buddy List.” A user may set up “instant buddies.” For example, a stranded motorist may wish to be instant buddies with the driver of a tow truck, allowing each phone to show the location of the other phone on its moving map. Uber sought inter partes review asserting that claims of the patent were obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103, in view of prior art that generally describes transmitting location information between mobile devices. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board held the claims were not unpatentable.The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in determining that the combination of prior art does not render obvious the limitation “software . . . to transmit the map with plotted locations to the first individual.” Because terminal-side plotting and server-side plotting, as described in prior art, would have been two of a finite number of known, predictable solutions at the time of the invention of the patent, a person of ordinary skill would have faced a simple design choice between the two, and would have been motivated to combine the teachings of prior art to achieve the limitation. View "Uber Technologies, Inc. v. X One, Inc." on Justia Law

Oyster sued, alleging that Ciena infringed several patents. Ciena petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for inter partes review of the asserted patents. The district court stayed the litigation. The Board concluded that Ciena had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims were unpatentable.The Federal Circuit denied Ciena’s motion to vacate the decision. Ciena forfeited its argument that the members of the Board panel that issued the decision were not appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause. Ciena requested that the Board adjudicate its petition and affirmatively sought a ruling from the Board members, regardless of how they were appointed. Ciena was content to have the assigned Board judges adjudicate its invalidity challenges until the Board ruled against it. View "Ciena Corp. v. Oyster Optics, LLC" on Justia Law