Justia Intellectual Property Opinion Summaries

Dragon sued 10 defendants, alleging patent infringement. Based on petitions by DISH and SXM (collectively, “DISH”), the Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) of the patent. The district court stayed proceedings as to DISH but proceeded as to the other defendants. After the court issued a claim construction order, Dragon, DISH, and the other defendants stipulated to noninfringement as to the accused products. The court entered judgment in favor of all defendants. In the parallel IPR, the Board issued a final decision holding unpatentable all asserted claims.DISH sought attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285 and 28 U.S.C. 1927. Before the motions were resolved, Dragon appealed both the judgment of noninfringement and the Board’s decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision and dismissed the district court appeal as moot. On remand, the district court vacated the judgment of noninfringement as moot but denied DISH’s motions for attorneys’ fees, holding that “success in a different forum is not a basis for attorneys’ fees” in the district court. The Federal Circuit vacated. The judgment of noninfringement was vacated only because DISH successfully invalidated the claims in parallel IPR proceedings, rendering moot Dragon’s infringement action. DISH’s success in obtaining a judgment of noninfringement, although later vacated because of its success in IPR, supports holding that they are prevailing parties. View "Dragon Intellectual Property LLC v. DISH Network LLC" on Justia Law

Inter partes review (IPR) permits a patent challenger to ask the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to reconsider the validity of earlier granted patent claims. If a request comes more than a year after a patent infringement lawsuit against the requesting party, IPR “may not be instituted,” 35 U.S.C. 315(b). The agency’s determination of whether to institute IPR is “final and nonappealable” under section 314(d).Thryv sought IPR of Click-to-Call’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board rejected Click-to-Call’s argument that the suit was untimely, instituted review, and canceled 13 of the patent’s claims as obvious or lacking novelty. Treating the Board’s application of section 315(b) as judicially reviewable, the Federal Circuit concluded that the petition was untimely and vacated the Board’s decision.The Supreme Court vacated. Section 314(d) precludes judicial review of the agency’s application of section 315(b)’s time prescription. A challenge based on section 315(b) constitutes an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute” an IPR. Allowing section 315(b) appeals would unwind agency proceedings determining patentability and leave bad patents enforceable. Section 314(d)’s text does not limit the review bar to section 314(a)’s question of whether the petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Click-to-Call’s contention is, essentially, that the agency should have refused to institute IPR. View "Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP" on Justia Law

CardioNet’s 207 patent, titled “Cardiac Monitoring,” claims priority to an application filed in 2004 and describes cardiac monitoring systems and techniques for detecting and distinguishing atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter from other various forms of cardiac arrythmia. The district court dismissed CardioNet’s patent infringement complaint against InfoBionic, finding that the asserted claims of the patent are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101.The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court’s two-step “Alice” framework and finding that the asserted claims of the 207 patent are directed to a patent-eligible improvement to cardiac monitoring technology and are not directed to an abstract idea. Nothing in the record suggests that the claims merely computerize pre-existing techniques for diagnosing atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter. View "CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Spigen Design Patents each claim a case for a cellular phone. In an infringement case, the district court held as a matter of law that the Spigen Design Patents were obvious over the 218 and 209 patents and granted summary judgment of invalidity in favor of Ultraproof. Subsequently, Ultraproof moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. The district court denied the motion. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to invalidity; the district court improperly resolved a genuine dispute of material fact. The district court found that despite “slight differences,” the 218 patent undisputedly was “basically the same” as the Spigen Design Patents, and, thus, a proper primary reference. That determination was error because, based on the competing evidence before the district court, a reasonable fact-finder could find otherwise. View "Spigen Korea Co., Ltd. v. Ultraproof, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successful guitar maker and technician, designed a lightning storm graphic that originally appeared on the guitar of Darrell Abbott, late guitarist of the heavy-metal band Pantera. This copyright registration action relates to the lightning storm graphic. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant and several others, alleging copyright infringement, unfair competition, and false endorsement.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the district court properly concluded that plaintiff's copyright claim, primarily concerning copyright ownership, was time-barred; the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's false advertising and unfair competition claims because the statements he relies on were not false or misleading; and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's false endorsement claim, because plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion, mistake, or deception. View "Webster v. Guitars" on Justia Law

In 2012, Stratus, a facilities-based telecommunications provider, applied to register the STRATUS mark. UBTA, also a telecommunications provider, owns the STRATA mark and opposed registration of the STRATUS mark on grounds of a likelihood of confusion with UBTA’s STRATA mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found a likelihood of confusion and refused registration of the STRATUS mark, 15 U.S.C. 1052. The Board concluded that six of the 13 “DuPont factors” were relevant and that two factors “weigh heavily in favor” of finding a likelihood of confusion, one factor “weighs in favor” of finding a likelihood of confusion, two factors are neutral, and one factor weighs “slightly” against finding a likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence and is not otherwise legally erroneous. While the Board is required to consider each DuPont factor for which it has evidence, it may focus its analysis on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods. The Board determined that “even careful purchasers are likely to be confused by similar marks used in connection with services that are, in part, legally identical.” View "Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Communications Inc." on Justia Law

Ericsson sued TCL for infringement of its patent, titled “Security Access Manager in Middleware,” describing “a system and method for controlling access to a platform for a mobile terminal for a wireless telecommunications system.” Ericsson argued that TCL infringed claims 1 and 5 by making and selling smartphones that include the Android operating system, including “a security system that can grant apps access to a subset of services on the phone, with the end-user controlling the permissions granted to each app.” The jury found those claims infringed, awarded damages and found that TCL’s infringement was willful.The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patent claims ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. Claims 1 and 5 are directed to the abstract idea of controlling access to or limiting permission to, resources. Although written in technical jargon, a close analysis of the claims reveals that they require nothing more than this abstract idea. The claims are silent as to how access is controlled. They merely make generic functional recitations that requests are made and then granted. Neither claim recites any particular architecture; there is nothing sufficient to turn the claim into anything more than a generic computer for performing the abstract idea of controlling access to resources. View "Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd." on Justia Law

After licensing negotiations with Timney failed, Mossberg sued Timney for patent infringement. Instead of answering the complaint, Timney filed for inter partes reexamination. The district court granted a stay. The Patent Office rejected certain claims. Mossberg canceled the rejected claims and added new claims. Before the inter partes reexamination proceeded further, the Patent Office vacated its institution decision because Timney had not identified the real party in interest in its petition. In 2014-2015, Timney filed three ex parte reexamination requests. The examiner ultimately rejected all pending claims over prior art. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed. Throughout these reexaminations, the district court maintained the stay despite several motions by Mossberg to lift it.Mossberg filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The district court entered a docket text order stating that the case was dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Timney moved to declare the case exceptional so that it could pursue attorney’s fees, 35 U.S.C. 285. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Timney was not a “prevailing party” because a Rule 41 dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits and thus cannot be a judicial declaration altering the legal relationship between the parties. View "O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc. v. Timney Triggers, LLC" on Justia Law

Golden, pro se, filed this suit in 2019, under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a), seeking “reasonable and entire compensation for the unlicensed use and manufacture” of his “inventions described in and covered by” various patents. He had filed an unsuccessful patent infringement suit against the government in 2013; a fifth amended complaint had alleged “Fifth Amendment Takings.” In 2014, the government sought inter partes review (IPR) of the patents; Golden is challenging an unfavorable decision as “ultra vires.” The Claims Court dismissed Golden’s 2019 complaint as largely duplicative of the 2013 suit.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over these section 1491 claims because patent infringement claims against the government are to be pursued exclusively under 28 U.S.C. 1498. A patent owner may not pursue an infringement action as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. With respect to claims arising from the IPR proceedings, the court noted that Golden voluntarily filed a non-contingent motion to amend the claims on which the IPR was instituted. His substitute claims were found unpatentable. The claims at issue were canceled as result of Golden’s own voluntary actions; cancellation of the claims in the government-initiated IPR cannot, therefore, be chargeable to the government under any legal theory. View "Golden v. United States" on Justia Law

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted covered business method (CBM) review and found all of the claims of Bozeman’s patents, directed to methods for authorizing and clearing financial transactions to detect and prevent fraud, ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101.1. Bozeman challenged the Board’s authority to decide the petitions, arguing that the Federal Reserve Banks are not “persons” under the America Invents Act (AIA).The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Banks are “persons” who may petition for post-issuance review under the AIA. While the Supreme Court has held that federal agencies are not “persons” able to seek post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA, the Banks are distinct from the government for purposes of the AIA. They are operating members of the nation’s Federal Reserve System, which is a federal agency, but they are not government-owned and are operationally distinct from the federal government. The claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of “collecting and analyzing information for financial transaction fraud or error detection” and do not contain an inventive concept sufficient to “transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible applications of an abstract idea.” View "Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank" on Justia Law